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Preface 
The contribution of small companies to America's economic 
development is easily forgotten in this age of business con-
glomerates. As late as 1954, firms employing fewer than one 
hundred workers constituted over go percent of all businesses 
in the United States. Such companies supplied only one-fifth 
of the nation's total manufacturing output, but even the most 
enthusiastic proponent of large-scale enterprise recognizes that 
without them the economy would have ceased to function. Also, 
historians have neglected the significant role of small manufac-
turing in the settlement and growth of the American West. 
Perhaps because of their preoccupation with the study of west-
ern agriculture and mining, and the short duration of their 
existence in any one region, scholars have neglected such pio-
neer manufacturing enterprises as barrel factories, breweries, 
brick yards, paper plants, rope walks, wagon works, and woolen 
mills. 
Following the arrival of merchants along with a few custom-
order artisans, businessmen entered newly developing areas to 
construct small manufacturing and processing plants aimed at 
providing frequently needed goods and services to residents 
within a few miles of each factory. Since the output flowing 
from this type of production was normally low in value relative 
to its bulk, residentiary manufacturers, as they are called, lo-
cated businesses close to markets. High freight charges on com-
modities shipped into the region, coupled with a close proximity 
to raw products and markets, offered pioneer manufacturers 
important locational advantages over potential competitors out-
ix 
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side the area. Such firms could realize a profit by providing 
goods suited to the particular needs of rural and small-town 
consumers and priced within their capacity to pay. Specializa-
tion began with residentiary manufacturing as well as factory 
production for delivery to final demand. Therefore, these com-
panies constituted an intermediate step in the transition from 
a self-sufficient agrarian region to modem industrialization. 
All areas of the United States experienced the residentiary 
phase of manufacturing during their formative period when 
population was scattered and internal transportation was primi-
tive. Thus, for purposes of studying this type of enterprise, the 
selection of a specific region and the exact delineation of its 
geographic or political boundaries is relatively unimportant. 
However, as I have defined it, the states of Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin con-
stitute the Middle West. Although woolen mills comprised only 
one of a number of residentiary industries which arose to serve 
midwesterners, there were, in 1870, 881 of them in the region. 
My study ranges from their organization and location in the 
early 186os to their struggle for survival once the Midwest 
gained relatively inexpensive intra- and interregional transpor-
tation after 1goo. An analysis of changes in the midwestern 
economy during this period has been necessary because pioneer 
woolen mills were primarily market-oriented and, therefore, 
very susceptible to any forces which affected that market. 
I am grateful to Professors Lewis Atherton and Harold Wood-
man of the University of Missouri for their guidance. I owe a 
special debt to Mrs. Manfred Weber, Shawnee Mission, Kansas, 
for permitting me to examine her private collection of material 
on the Watkins Mill. To F. Harwood Orbison, president, Apple-
ton Mills, Appleton, Wisconsin, and Robert W. Klemer, pres-
ident, Faribault Woolen Mill, Faribault, Minnesota, go my 
special thanks for their willingness to open company records 
to me, for clarifying many ideas, and answering questions on 
the manufacture of woolen textiles. Portions of chapters three 
and four previously appeared in Agricultural History as an arti-
X 
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de on the marketing of wool in the nineteenth century, and 
are used here with the kind permission of the editors. 
As the Harvard-Newcomen Fellow in Business and Economic 
History during 1967-Ig68, I benefited greatly from the op-
portunity to present and discuss my research at meetings of 
the Business History Group. Professors Ralph Hidy and 
Arthur H. Cole read portions of the manuscript and gave freely 
of their time, while James Baughman, Arthur M. Johnson, 
and Fritz Redlich constantly raised questions and suggested 
numerous methods for clarification and improvement. Finally, 
to my wife, Delores Sanders Crockett, typist, mother of four, 
and constructive critic of poorly written history, a mere thank 
you hardly seems adequate. Her continued encouragement and 
support throughout the preparation of this study made it not 
only much easier, but in large part possible. 
An Earhart Fellowship in Economic and Business History 
from the Relm Foundation, Ann Arbor, Michigan, funds made 
available to me as the Harvard-Newcomen Fellow, and research 
grants from the University of Missouri at Rolla helped to fi-
nance this study. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Eastern Background 
Between the first American colonization and the Civil War 
the manufacture of woolen textiles along the Atlantic Coast 
shifted largely from home to mill, from handtools to machines, 
from a function of self-contained living to commercial enter-
prise. To bring about that transformation millions of men and 
women, working singly and collectively, generated a capacity to 
buy finished goods while, at the same time, a few others applied 
an accumulated knowledge about wool, men, and machines to 
change the methods of woolen production. In other words, the 
American people, through cultural borrowing and their own 
ingenuity, effected fundamental alterations in both supply and 
demand markets that characterized the woolen textile industry 
in 186s. 
Colonial America looked to the merchants' ships of the Atlan-
tic Community to supply manufactured goods and to transport 
raw materials to the world market. Despite the availability of 
European manfactures, many Americans were either isolated 
or could not afford to purchase them and quickly turned to 
household manufacturing. Most colonial homes produced a 
myriad of products, but woolen textiles comprised one of the 
most universal commodities of domestic production. Flocks of 
sheep kept by many northern farmers provided the necessary 
wool for spinning and weaving when inclement weather prohib-
ited outdoor work.1 
Whether in colonial times or later, production of woolen cloth 
involved eight basic functions. Raw wool was sorted, washed, 
dyed, carded, spun into yarn, and woven into cloth which was 
then fulled and finished. Aside from weaving, carding and 
3 
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fulling constituted the most laborious and monotonous tasks 
faced by household woolen manufacturers. The carder, quite 
often one of the family children, repeatedly combed small lots 
of wool between two brushes studded with wire teeth until the 
fleece formed a soft, extended rope, or roving, ready for the 
spinning wheel. Since woven cloth fresh from the loom was stiff 
and uneven in texture, a fulling process became necessary. 
Fulling required soaking the material in warm soapy water 
while beating it with heavy wooden mallets in order to soften 
the fabric and make it more pliable.2 
Several American colonies proposed inducements to encour-
age both woolgrowing and manufacturing. Between 166o and 
1682, Connecticut and Massachusetts attempted to regulate 
cloth quality, while Virginia and Maryland extended tobacco 
bounties for domestically produced woolens. Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, and Virginia levied taxes to establish spinning 
schools, hoping thereby to aid the poor, create skilled workers, 
and alleviate shortages. Through bounties and tax reductions, 
several colonial governments sought to promote sheep raising. 
Although such laws may have encouraged a few farmers to 
expand flocks, the poor quality of native fleece plagued the 
woolen industry for decades.3 
Such legislation coupled with increasing quantities of domes-
tic textiles produced a conflict of interests between the colonies 
and Great Britain'. The Woolens Act of 1699 prohibited the 
colonists from loading woolens or raw wool on ships or carts for 
export, and Parliament proposed a law that, had it passed, 
would have prevented the sale of domestically produced wool-
ens. Beginning in 1718, Parliament enacted a series of statutes 
1. Carl Bridenbaugh, The Colonial Craftsman (New York, 1950), 
34-35· 
2. Colonial fulling parties served a similar purpose. At such 
gatherings people sat barefooted in a circle around large pieces of 
soggy cloth which were thoroughly trounced and kicked. 
3· Marcus Wilson Jemegan, The American Colonies, I492-I750 (New York, 1959), 173; VictorS. Clark, History of Manufactures in 
the United States, z6o7-z86o (Washington, D.C., Igi6), 34-35, 44; 
Frederick G. Jensen, Capital Growth in Early America (New York, 
zg6s), So. 
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to protect British supremacy in the woolen textile markets of 
the world.4 
It is doubtful, however, if the Woolens Act and subsequent 
legislation had a significant impact on American output. In 
most areas the poor quality of homespun fabrics offered little 
competition to British imports. Furthermore, several Americans 
considered English broadcloth the ultimate in finery, and for 
some, garments of imported material provided a badge of social 
distinction for which price was not a major consideration. 
While imported broadcloth retailed for two to three dollars per 
yard, Iinsey-woolsey, a coarse fabric of flax and wool, sold for as 
little as fifteen cents. Expensive transportation between col-
onies, availability of domestic materials in the home and of 
imported goods, and the generally low level of income kept the 
volume of intercolonial trade in woolens at a minimum.5 Colo-
nial producers proved incapable of competing with the British 
in quality of output because they lacked the investment capital, 
quality wools, and skilled textile workers possessed by England. 
Moreover, British world trade provided a sufficiently large mar-
ket to permit specialization and division of labor within the 
English industry. As late as 1760, after observing New Eng-
land's manufacturing plants, the Reverend Andrew Burnaby 
noted that residents in Massachusetts "also endeavor to make 
woollens, [sic] but have not yet been able to bring them to any 
degree of perfection; indeed it is an article in which I think they 
will not easily succeed."6 
The manufacture of wool represented a unique pattern of 
industrial development. Some industries grew from household 
manufacturing to custom-order production and then to the inte-
grated factory. Of course, economic progress seldom proved to 
4· Rolla M. Tryon, Household Manufactures in the United States, 
I64o-z86o (Chicago, 1917), 25. 
5· Clark, History of Manufactures, roB, I4D-4I; Mary Alice 
Hanna, "The Trade of the Delaware District before the Revolution," 
Smith College Studies in History 2 ( 1917): 259. 
6. Andrew Burnaby, Travels through the Middle Settlements in 
North America in the Years I759 and z76o with Observations upon 
the State of the Colonies (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), 97· 
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be so simple. Tradition, geographic isolation, and economic 
necessity discouraged rapid transitions. Variations frequently 
appeared in several sectors, and at any given time an industry 
might exhibit all three types of production, along with a combi-
nation or modification of them, operating concurrently'. Recog-
nition of such variables, however, fails to destroy the validity of 
attempting to categorize industrial growth in the past. Stages, 
like economic models, provide convenient reference points 
which aid in the reconstruction of actual developments.7 
Family members composed the major production unit in 
household manufacturing. They often provided the raw mate-
rial, labor, tools, and consumed all the finished product. In 
time, some families produced a surplus beyond their own imme-
diate needs which they marketed in exchange for other com-
modities. When artisans, who possessed special skills and 
owned their own tools, established small shops, families fre-
quently supplied them with raw material to be worked into a 
finished product on a custom basis. In payment, most artisans 
accepted cash, a service, another marketable commodity, or a 
portion of the finished material. 
Given adequate local demand and a supply of capital, some 
handicraftsmen purchased their own raw materials and pro-
duced manufactured goods to fill direct orders from customers. 
The withdrawal of raw material and tools from households to 
artisan workshops constituted the key element which distin-
guished custom-order production from household manufactur-
ing. With increased prosperity, a few artisans fabricated fin-
ished goods in advance of custom orders and such readymade 
items were either displayed at the shop, peddled from door to 
door, or hawked in the local market. 
7· For a complete discussion of stages of industrial development, 
consult Tryon, Household Manufactures, 243-30!, and NormanS. B. 
Gras, Industrial Evolution (Cambridge, Mass., r930), I-49· More 
recently, Herman Freudenberger and Fritz Redlich have argued for 
a new model of industrial stages based on a criteria of capital and 
control, and one which distinguishes between capital-intensive and 
capital-extensive industries. See "The Industrial Development of 
Europe: Reality, Symbols, Images," Kyklos no. 3, I7 (r964): 272-
403. 
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The transformation from custom-order to factory production 
was sometimes a long process. In the factory, the worker re-
ceived payment for his labor in wages or goods and services, 
and no longer owned the tools and raw materials with which he 
worked. Although the grouping under one roof of many artisans 
using handtools induced some savings, the introduction of 
power machinery increased output while lowering production 
costs. The resulting economies of scale provided the major 
inducement behind factory formation. However, because of the 
skill involved in each step of fabrication, wool manufacturing 
offered stubborn resistance to production changes: 
In households, women and children converted raw wool into 
finished material, which was then sewn into family garments. 
An outside tailor might occasionally be employed to make cloth-
ing, or, if the family was prosperous, the services of an itinerant 
weaver might be utilized. In most cases, however, few artisans 
beyond the immediate family circle handled the actual fabrica-
tion of cloth. 
The expanding production of woolen fabrics in American 
homes, plus the demand for carded wool by the increased 
number of household spinners, made fulling and carding feasi-
ble commercial operations. Inventors had successfully applied 
waterpower to both fulling mills and carding machines by 1795, 
and within fifteen years carders and fullers outside the home 
probably carded more wool and dressed more cloth than did 
household manufacturers. Unlike typical artisans, commercial 
fullers and carders failed to produce a finished commodity; 
their services simply involved two steps in production which 
substantially reduced the labor and time of family members. 
Thus, the development of power machinery for carding and 
fulling, temporarily strengthened the economic position of 
household wool manufacturing.8 
Private attempts before I8oo at concentrating all stages of 
woolen cloth production under one roof proved abortive. Since 
spinning and weaving required one worker per spinning frame 
8. Curtis P. Nettels, The Emergence of a National Economy, I775-
zBzs (New York, 1962), 276. 
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or loom, little was gained by housing all laborers in one plant. A 
reduction of transfer costs in moving materials from one ar-
tisan to another usually resulted, but normal factory economies 
of scale were unattainable. Moreover, the poor character of 
native wool, coupled with the varying skills of handloom and 
spinning wheel operatives, prevented the perfection of a prod-
uct of consistent high quality. To utilize best the talents of local 
artisans, a few entrepreneurs employed the cottage or putting-
out system, in which some steps of production were delegated to 
laborers who resided in their own homes or small workshops 
and processed the raw materials of the manufacturer.9 There-
fore, most early American woolen "factories" represented noth-
ing more than a fulling mill and carding machine flanked by 
the houses and shops of local spinners and weavers. 
Spinning and weaving constituted the major bottlenecks in 
early American factory production of woolens for many years. 
In developing nations the demand for cheap textiles is highly 
price elastic, and some manufacturers recognized that the intro-
duction of power machinery to reduce input costs and expand 
output could increase both consumption and profits. Therefore, 
a number of Americans showed interest in the spinning ma-
chines and power looms developed in the British cotton and 
woolen industries. England, of course, had enacted laws pro-
hibiting the export of textile appliances, knowledge, or skilled 
labor, but such statutes failed to deter some manufacturers 
from borrowing what they could not buy or build. 
The methods employed by Thomas Attewood Digges typified 
the efforts of several Americans who attempted to coax English 
and Irish textile workers to the United States. No doubt perceiv-
ing the nearly unlimited market for textiles, Digges first concen-
trated on transporting both skilled laborers and up-to-date ma-
chinery. Smuggling bulky machines, however, proved to be a 
formidable task, so Digges then sought to entice artisans who 
g. Peter Stewart, "A Brief History of the Peace Dale Manufacturing 
Company, 1802-1918," Textile History Review 4 (January 1963): 
12-14; U.S. Bureau of Statistics, Wool and Manufactures of Wool 
(Washington, D.C., 1888), xlvii. 
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could build such equipment or tried to obtain drawings of these 
machines. William Pearce, who emigrated at Digges's invita-
tion, suffered the fate of several other English migrants in that 
he failed to secure patents for his textile "inventions."10 
Men like Digges brought some trained workers and a few 
machines to America, but on the eve of the Revolution wool 
manufacturing remained in a modified artisan stage of develop-
ment. Handicraftsmen operated tiny carding, fulling, and weav-
ing shops, worked the material of others, and customarily ac-
cepted payment in farm products or in the commodity which 
they processed. Manufacturers attempting to organize factories 
faced capital shortages, which lowered their ability to offer 
competitive wages and necessitated the operation of old, and 
often inadequate machinery. The millowners' lack of knowledge 
concerning very elementary processes and the poor quality of 
native fleece made competition with foreign imports difficult. 
Thus, in the domestic market, American woolen mills could not 
compete with British textiles, and household manufacturers 
supplied the bulk of the demand for coarse-quality cloth. 
During the Revolutionary War the rapid expansion of house-
hold production of woolens was fostered by patriotism and 
necessity. A few government dignitaries took public pride in 
their homespun suits, but politics and a shortage of foreign 
fabrics made such action palatable when imports ceased. Most 
people clothed themselves adequately, and a few families even 
managed to produce a surplus for market. After the Treaty of 
Paris, however, Americans again looked to English manufac-
turers to supply fine-quality woolens, and per capita consump-
tion of British textiles continued to increase from 1783 to the 
turn of the century.U 
xo. Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., "Thomas Digges and William Pearce: 
An Example of the Transit of Technology," William and Mary Quar-
terly 2I (October 1964): 551-60. 
II. In 1790 British woolen imports into the United States 
amounted to approximately £x ,soo,ooo, which represented 30 per-
cent of Britain's total woolen export, and nine years later such im-
ports had reached 40 percent. Herbert Heaton, "Benjamin Gott and 
the Anglo-American Cloth Trade," Journal of Economic and Business 
History 2 (November 1929): I47· 
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A substantial portion of the funds which financed factory 
construction prior to and during the War of I8I2 came from 
mercantile profits, but the shift from commerce to manufactur-
ing was relatively slow. Merchants were reluctant to withdraw 
capital from trade to invest in factories, and many carried on 
mercantile activities long after they made manufacturing in-
vestments. Perhaps because they were familiar with the prod-
uct, textile merchants who imported and sold woolens seemed 
most inclined to invest in woolen factories. However, many 
refused to loan funds for carding and fulling mills, since they 
wanted a product to enhance their trading operations. The 
profits of some manufacturers encouraged others to enter the 
race-the closed outlet for raw materials plus the increased 
ratio of the price of finished goods to input costs, lured capital 
into manufacturing with an expectation of large returns.12 
Some capital for woolen mills emanated from the profits of 
other manufacturing enterprises: William Young and Joshua 
and Vincent Gilpin of Delaware built textile mills from paper-
making profits; Robert Phillips, owner of a factory on the Bran-
dywine, had operated a gristmill before I8I2; and the woolen 
plant of E. I. DuPont and Peter Barduy grew from capital 
accumulated in gunpowder manufacturing. Partnerships of-
fered mutual advantages in alleviating shortages of money and 
skills. For example, throughout the War of I8I2, John Phillips 
produced woolen thread at his Delaware mill. John Butler, a 
fuller, and Charles Briggs, a finisher, later joined Phillips in a 
partnership which pooled machinery, funds, and expertise.13 
Despite previous injections of capital, the American woolen 
industry exhibited signs of instability in I8I5. In the domestic 
12. Samuel Eliot Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, 
1783-I86o (Boston, I92I), 215; Margaret E. Martin, "Merchants 
and Trade of the Connecticut River Valley, I75o-182o," Smith Col-
lege Studies in History 24 (1938): 184; Nettels, Emergence of a 
National Economy, 338. 
13. George H. Gibson, "The Growth of the Woolen Industry in 
Nineteenth Century Delaware," Textile History Review 5 (October 
1964): 125, 129. 
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market, wartime scarcity had created an artificial demand and 
few factories could withstand English competition once trade 
was resumed. Mills held large cloth inventories, consumers 
complained of inferior material, and some factories owned ex-
cessive quantities of raw wool purchased at inflated prices.14 In 
addition, household manufacturers still enjoyed their entrenched 
position in the market. Homespun experienced a slow death, 
and not until eastern farmers faced western grain and livestock 
competition after the I82os, did household manufacturing 
show indications of decline. Only then did farmers in the East 
realize that they must specialize in serving local urban markets 
with perishable foodstuffs that could not be shipped from the 
West. Given such an unstable situation, many woolen mills 
simply closed their doors when the first great postwar wave of 
British textiles hit the American market in late ISis. 
Like the American Revolution, the War of I8I2 failed to 
provide economic liberation from English and European manu-
facturers. However, the period between I790 and I8I6 wit-
nessed slow but significant changes in the American economy. 
Embargo, nonintercourse, and war altered foreign trade pat-
terns while the subsidiary sectors of banking, brokerage, and 
insurance blossomed to serve the reexport and carrying trades. 
In tum, shipping and reexport fostered urban growth and stim-
ulated local manufacturing to supply the new internal market. 
And the psychological impact of a new and stronger central 
government encouraged increased investments by entrepre-
neurs.:t5 
Not surprisingly in an undeveloped economy, woolen manu-
facturers won support for their plea for direct aid from legisla-
tors and the colonial practice of subsidizing manufacturing 
continued throughout the antebellum years. States provided 
loans, offered tax exemptions, and granted lottery privileges. As 
only one of numerous examples, Massachusetts gave one firm 
14. Clark, History of Manufactures, 379· 
15. Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 
179o--I86o (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., xg6I), 49-51. 
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the right to label its product with the state seal, thus backing 
the commodity with the prestige of the commonwealth.16 There-
fore, government aid to woolen factories was common practice 
when millowners urged Congress to impose a protective tariff 
on imported textiles in I8I5. In response, Congress enacted 
major tariffs on woolens in I8I6 and I824, and a few states 
offered distressed woolen factories special tax privileges. 
When state relief and federal tariff alike failed to halt the 
flood of British woolens, beleaguered manufacturers asked for 
and received additional protection. The tariff of 1828 contained 
a provision for a minimum duty on imports which American 
manufacturers argued would eliminate undervaluation of im-
ported woolens by dishonest customs officials.U Regardless of 
the claims and charges of tariff supporters and detractors, the 
effect of the I 828 tariff is debatable, since by that time most 
American woolen mills were well established, if not overly 
prosperous, and no longer needed the protection afforded infant 
industries in a developing nation. Henry C. Carey and others 
continued to demand protection for American manufacturing, 
but the chatter of tariff argumentation subsided rapidly after 
I833, perhaps as a result of the good times ushered in with the 
increase of American agricultural exports and the lowering of 
English tariff rates in the I 84os. 
American woolen manufacturers began a gradual conversion 
from hand to power machinery in the I 82os, and by the I 84os 
the transition had accelerated. However, American inventive-
ness seemed lacking in the field of woolen machine technology 
and most of the inventions between I840 and the Civil War 
consisted of minor modifications and improvements of existing 
16. Oscar and Mary F. Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study of the 
Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 
I774-I86I (New York, 1947), II1-12; Joseph S. Davis, Essays in 
the Earlier History of American Corporations, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1917) 2: 266-68. 
17. Chester W. Wright, Wool-Growing and the Tariff (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1910), 41, 68; Frank W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the 
United States (New York, 1923), 37-45. 
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machines.18 Large capital requirements and a shallow internal 
market foiled several early attempts at establishment of sep-
arate firms for the manufacture of textile appliances, but after 
I845 machinists accomplished a complete withdrawal of ma-
chine shops from factories. Thereafter, American woolen mills 
no longer had to depend upon their own ingenuity or foreign 
producers to supply them with original equipment or replace-
ment parts.19 
The employment of women and children in American woolen 
mills increased with the introduction of power machinery. 
Heavy strain on the vertical, or warp threads, had previously 
prevented woolen factories from adopting power looms, and as 
a consequence of the strength necessary to operate the hand-
loom, men normally constituted well over one-half of the labor 
force in early mills. With the application of power to nearly all 
steps in production, however, millowners hired entire families 
since women and children could then be used effectively. Un-
skilled labor became easier to find, but despite the importation 
of foreign operatives and the introduction of programs to train 
workers, prior to the Civil War most American woolen mills 
faced periodic shortages of skilled laborers.20 
Auctions had been a familiar sight in the pre-Revolutionary 
era, and such sales remained an important feature of American 
marketing in the decade after ISis. Since American shop-
IS. The Goulding Condenser in 1826, which automatically passed 
the roving from one carding machine to another, and a self-cleaning 
card in 1853, constituted the only major American contributions to 
woolen machine technology before the Civil War. 
Ig. W. Paul Strassmann, Risk and Technological Innovation: 
American Manufacturing Methods during the Nineteenth Century 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1959), 7D-77· For detailed studies of two early textile 
machine builders, see Thomas R. Navin, The Whitin Machine Works 
since 1831 (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), and GeorgeS. Gibb, The Saco-
Lowell Shops (Cambridge, Mass., 1950). 
20. Norman Ware, The Industrial Worker, I84o-186o (Gloucester, 
Mass., 1959), 61-64; William A. Sullivan, "The Industrial Revolution 
and the Factory Operative in Pennsylvania," Pennsylvania Magazine 
of History and Biography 78 (October 1954): 485-87; Gibson, "Dela-
ware Woolen Industry," 145-48. 
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keepers and merchants could not normally meet auction prices, 
they agitated to restrict the method. However, state prohibition 
and mild tax restrictions proved incapable of preventing the 
fake labeling and other deceptive practices of some auctioneers. 
Despite their public denunciations, many merchants joined 
their competitors by selling through auctions. This in turn only 
compounded the problem by delaying the rapid development of 
an efficient internal marketing structure. Although auctions 
were no more unique to woolens than other commodities, this 
method of wholesaling and retailing found wide adoption by 
woolen importers.21 Between 1822 and 1830, for example, 70 
percent of the dry goods marketed in New York are said to have 
been sold at auction. 22 
The close of the 183os saw the relative demise of the auction 
system, as foreign textile manufacturers tended to concentrate 
on filling large, direct orders from American merchants rather 
than selling through a host of small importers and agents. 
American commission houses assumed increasing importance 
in the wholesale distribution of textiles, and such firms ac-
cepted goods from eastern manufacturers, deducting charges 
for transportation, storage, insurance, and a selling commis-
sion. In addition, commission merchants collected and received 
funds, advanced short term loans, and advised mills on the 
correct types and quantities of fabrics to produce. After 1840, 
several commission houses concentrated on special lines, such 
as dress goods or suiting, and became the exclusive sales agents 
for a few large factories. Since these companies were closely 
tied to the mills they served, most suffered when depressions hit 
the woolen industry.28 
21. Fred Mitchell Jones, Middlemen in the Domestic Trade of the 
United States (Urbana, Ill., 1937), 35-43; Lewis E. Atherton, "Auc-
tions as a Threat to American Business in the Eighteen Twenties 
and Thirties," Bulletin of the Business Historical Society II (Novem-
ber 1937): I04-107. 
22. Norman S. B. Gras and Henrietta M. Larson, Casebook in 
American Business History (New York, 1939), 678. 
23. Arthur Harrison Cole, The American Wool Manufacture 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1926) I: 208-xs. 
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In the late antebellum period eastern consumers displayed a 
tendency toward increased fashion in dress and demanded a 
lightweight woolen cloth that could be easily fabricated into 
attractive clothing. And, by 1865 worsted material, a relative 
newcomer to the American woolen industry, offered strong com-
petition to woolen manufacturers. Worsteds, which used long, 
coarse wool and required more elaborate machinery than wool-
ens, were scarce in America prior to 1840. The lack of a native 
wool suitable for worsted manufacturing was alleviated with 
establishment of Canadian reciprocity in 1854, and in that 
same year America's first combing machines commenced oper-
ation. By comparison to woolen mills, worsted factories were 
giants. In 186o, for example, the bulk of American worsted 
cloth came from three firms which had an average capital 
investment of over one million dollars.24 
The Civil War's long-range effect on American industrial 
growth is debatable, but for a while, woolen manufacturers 
basked in prosperity~ At first, northern mills could not meet 
Union army demand, but woolen producers assured the govern-
ment that needs would be filled quickly. Although new factories 
opened, cotton mills converted to wool, and plant operating 
time increased, the Union was forced to buy cloth worth approx-
imately $8oo,ooo from England, much to the consternation and 
embarrassment of American millowners.25 To silence the result-
ing storm of criticism, the army quartermaster finally agreed to 
cease all foreign purchases and to accept domestic material of 
varied colors. As a result, a few gray-clad soldiers from the 
North were shot and killed by their own comrades.26 
24. Manchester Print Works, Manchester, New Hampshire; Pacific 
Mills, Lawrence, Massachusetts; and the Hamilton Woolen Works, 
Southbridge, Massachusetts. 
25. Emerson D. Fite, Social and Industrial Conditions in the North 
during the Civil War (New York, 1910), 83; VictorS. Clark, "Man-
ufacturing Development during the Civil War," in The Economic Im-
pact of the American Civil War, ed. Ralph Andreano (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1962), 46. 
26. Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the 
Union Army, I86I-IB6s, 2 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1928) I: 84, go-
93; Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (New York, 1952), 22. 
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To meet the heavy demand for their product, American sheep 
producers expanded flocks during the war, thus creating at its 
close a raw wool surplus matched only by the increased inven-
tory of finished cloth. Wool and woolens markets were thor-
oughly glutted by r865, and in that year the wholesale price 
index of textiles reached its peak and then began a steady 
descent which lasted through 1870. Within two years after 
Appomattox many farmers slaughtered sheep for their mutton 
and hides as wool prices also tumbled. Although woolgrowers as 
a group publicly opposed the tariff in theory, declining profits 
after 1865 prompted them to praise the merits of a high protec-
tive barrier against foreign wool.27 
Manufacturers, on the other hand, also sought additional 
tariff protection, and the possibility of open political conflict 
between sheep farmers and woolen producers increased sub-
stantially in 1865 with the formation of both the National 
Association of Wool Manufacturers and the National Wool 
Growers Association. The two groups, however, soon recog-
nized that cooperation provided the best solution to their prob-
lems and the end result was united support for the Wool and 
Woolens Act of 1867. The new law retained the compensation 
system included in the Morrill Tariff of r861, which combined 
protection for woolgrowers and wool manufacturers. Imported 
woolens paid an ad valorem duty, plus an additional charge per 
pound, designed to compensate the manufacturer for a duty on 
imported raw wool.28 
General agreement between sheep farmers and millowners 
lasted much longer than the harmony within the National 
Association of Wool Manufacturers. Representatives from the 
carpet and worsted sections appear to have wielded the most 
power inside the new association, and woolen producers com-
plained that they paid a higher import duty on raw material 
27. Robert P. Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party: An Economic 
Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore, Md., 1959), 147; 
Howard K. Beale, "The Tariff and Reconstruction," American Histor-
ical Review 35 (January 1930): 283-85. 
28. Taussig, Tariff History, 195-218. 
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than did worsted manufacturers.29 Since American consumers 
were exhibiting an increasing propensity to buy worsted rather 
than woolen fabrics, several wool manufacturers withdrew 
from the organization and later formed a separate trade asso-
ciation to handle their own lobbying.30 
In the three decades before the Civil War, the American 
woolen industry manifested a general trend of growth and 
consolidation. While the number of woolen factories declined 
by over five hundred in the 18sos, total capital investment in 
woolen mills increased by over 18 percent, an indication of the 
enhanced utilization of machinery. By 1865, all sections of the 
country contained woolen mills, but New England claimed the 
largest plants and the greatest number of firms. Increased 
capitalization ousted many small producers. Large factories 
sometimes ran at losses to reduce average costs, prices declined, 
and smaller and less efficient firms found competition difficult. 
High ratios of capital to labor, however, indicated that by the 
close of the Civil War the American wool manufacture had 
advanced well beyond the struggling steps of its infancy and 
had finally reached maturity. The availability of modern ma-
chines, skilled labor, and pools of investment capital had en-
couraged many businessmen to manufacture woolen textiles in 
an effort to supply the increasing domestic market of the United 
States. Yet, while these changes were in progress, the market 
for woolen fabrics was constantly expanding as people moved to 
newly developing regions. Some eastern manufacturers sought 
to produce cloth and yarn for shipment to the new market, 
while a few entrepreneurs perceived the possibilities of con-
structing woolen factories in the West. 
29. Erastus Bigelow from the carpet industry, and J, Wiley Ed-
wards of Pacific Mills, a worsted producer, were considered the major 
spokesmen for these two interests. In 1869, for example, Bigelow was 
president of the association and served on the Executive Committee, 
while Edwards sat on both the Finance and Executive committees. 
30. Stanley Cohen, "Northeastem Business and Radical Recon-
struction," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46 (June 1959): 74-
75; Harry James Brown, "The Fleece and the Loom: Wool Growers 
and Wool Manufacturers during the Civil War," Business History 




Enter the Middle West 
Historians continue to debate numerous aspects of American 
economic development, but few deny the rapidity of settlement 
in the West. While many eastern towns suffered heavy popula-
tion losses after 1830, several once-isolated western villages 
blossomed into major cities in less than twenty years. Chicago's 
population, for example, doubled twice in the ten years after 
1847 and by the late fifties the city was already destined to 
become the center of midwestern transportation. The agents of 
cities, counties, states, and railroads bombarded the Atlantic 
Coast and Europe with promotional literature aimed at poten-
tial immigrants, and each assured the prospective settler that 
his immediate locality would soon be the commercial and finan-
cial hub of the West.1 Although poor organization and overen-
thusiasm limited many state and local immigration programs, 
on the eve of the Civil War, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Mis-
souri ranked third, fourth, sixth, and eighth in population re-
spectively, and the eight states of the Middle West contained 
nearly nine million inhabitants.2 
Prior to I 830, most midwestern farmers remained isolated 
from the national economy, and except for those settlers living 
near water routes, a commercial market for agricultural pro-
duce was either nonexistent or confined primarily to the imme-
diate neighborhood. Only furs, livestock, and a few other com-
modities could withstand overland shipment to the seaboard. 
Adlard Welby clearly perceived the problem of inadequate and 
expensive transportation in the West after his visit to George 
Flower's English Prairie in Illinois. Writing around 1820, Welby 
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recognized that the local population failed to constitute a mar-
ket of sufficient depth to consume the output of the area, and 
that these farmers must resign themselves to '1aying the foun-
dation of future fortune for their posterity."3 
While Welby wrote, however, significant changes were al-
ready underway. Perfection of the cotton gin and the growing 
demand of the English textile industry for raw material 
prompted the rapid adoption of the plantation system in the 
rich soils of the Deep South. With increased specialization on 
cotton culture in the South, middlewestern small farmers soon 
found a ready market for their agricultural commodities.4 Re-
ceipts of interior produce at New Orleans amounted to over 
$22,ooo,ooo in 1830, and the total value doubled in each of the 
next three decades.5 Armed with the income from the sale of 
their products, midwestern farmers increased demands for 
northeastern and European manufactures. 
Eastern merchants and commission houses were cognizant of 
the growing market for manufactured goods in the West. New 
York's astounding success with the Erie Canal after 1825 initi-
I. For a discussion of the immigration programs of several mid-
western states, see Norman L. Crockett, "A Study of Confusion: Mis-
souri's Immigration Program, z865-19I6," Missouri Historical Re-
view 57 (April 1963): 248-60; Theodore C. Blegen, "The Compe-
tition of the Northwestern States for Immigrants," Wisconsin Maga-
zine of History 3 (September 1919): 3-29; Maurice D. Baxter, "En-
couragement of Immigration to the Middle West during the Era of 
the Civil War," Indiana Magazine of History 46 (March 1950): 25-
38. 
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Ninth 
Census, The Statistics of the Population of the United States, z870 
(Washington, D.C., 1872), I: 3· 
3· Adlard Welby, A Visit to North America and the English Settle-
ments in Illinois (London, 1821) in Early Western Travels, ed. Reu-
ben Gold Thwaites, 32 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1906), 12: 257-58. 
4. Guy Stevens Callender, Selections from the Economic History 
of the United States, I76s-x86o (Boston, 1909), 272-73; Louis Ber-
nard Schmidt, "Internal Commerce and the Development of a Na-
tional Economy before z86o," Journal of Political Economy 47 
(December 1939): 8o3-8o6. 
5· Emory R. Johnson and others, History of Domestic and Foreign 
Commerce of the United States, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1915), 1: 
243· 
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ated a wave of canal building. New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania, equipped with foreign capital from the sale of 
state bonds, chartered banks and corporations, giving direct aid 
to canal construction. Hardly had the canal mania reached its 
zenith than railroads began laying track, first to fill the gaps in 
water transport, and later to tap more of the hinterland. This 
activity increased city land values and encouraged even greater 
investments.6 By the mid-184os, the volume of western grain 
going over the lake route exceeded that being floated down river 
to New Orleans.7 
Despite liberal state support, midwestern transportation facil-
ities failed to keep pace with the region's growing population. 
Although western farm staples and eastern manufactured goods 
were exchanged, the United States lacked a completely national 
marketing system until well after the Civil War. Frozen streams 
and low water, differentials in railroad track gauge, inadequate 
feeder lines, high freight rates, and the steady advance of 
population limited the easy exchange of products.8 On cargoes 
bound for villages not immediately adjacent to a canal, railroad, 
or river, transport costs exhibited few signs of reduction; town-
to-town or farm-to-market road improvement did not constitute 
an important characteristic of the "transportation revolution." 
Even those communities on navigable rivers often found con-
sistent freight service a slow development. For example, the 
residents of Franklin, on the Missouri River, witnessed the 
dockage of a steamboat in 1826, but they waited nearly four 
years for regular freight and passenger service.9 
During the early years of settlement, boats loaded with man-
6. Carter Goodrich and others, Canals and American Economic 
Development (New York, 1961), 249-55; Guy Stevens Callender, 
"The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in 
Relation to the Growth of Corporations," Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 17 (November 1902): 159-61. 
7· Harvey S. Perloff and others, Regions, Resources, and Economic 
Growth (Baltimore, Md., Ig6o), II5. 
8. George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu, The American Railroad 
Network, I86I-I89o (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 35-41. 
g. Jonas Viles, "Old Franklin: A Frontier Town of the Twenties," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review g (March 1923): 275. 
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ufactured items traveled the western rivers, distributing their 
wares to traders along the shore, and as early as 1810 mer-
chants began to transport staple groceries and dry goods to 
small stores along the Mississippi, Missouri, and Ohio. As set-
tlers increased in numbers and moved inland away from the 
rivers, merchants trekked into the interior, selected a suitable 
location, and began operations. The arrival of merchants in an 
isolated area invoked enthusiasm among residents, since most 
realized the economic importance of a local store. When John 
Beauchamp Jones established his store at Pike Bluff, Missouri, 
in the 1840s, "the people for miles around came in every day to 
inquire when the goods would arrive. . . . The beginning of a 
new town . . . by means of the establishment of a store there, 
made considerable noise in that community."10 
A small town usually formed around the nucleus of a store, 
and artisans joined the new community to offer their services to 
area residents. A scarcity of trained labor often prompted inter-
ested citizens to contact people in the East who possessed 
special skills to encourage them to migrate westward. John 
Bergen, for example, who in 1828 moved from New Jersey to 
Springfield, Illinois, wrote friends in Philadelphia inviting car-
penters, blacksmiths, jewelers, saddlers, shoemakers, and tai-
lors to join him in Sangamon County.U Rural communities with 
artisan workshops usually sprang up at distances of six to 
twelve miles apart, so midwestern farmers had a market within 
one day's journey of their homes. Therefore, farmers tended 
increasingly to specialize in staple crops and to purchase items 
from rural stores which were previously manufactured by the 
family.12 
Regardless of size, most frontier towns provided a great vari-
10. Luke Shortfield, The Western Merchant (Philadelphia, 1849), 
42. 
II. J, Van Fenstermaker, "A Description of Sangamon County, 
Illinois, in 1830," Agricultural History 39 (July 1965): 139. 
12. Lewis E. Atherton, Main Street on the Middle Border (Bloom-
ington, Ind., 1954), 3; Eugene Smolensky and Donald Ratajcak, "The 
Conception of Cities," Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, vol. 
2, 2d ser. (Winter 1965): 101. 
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ety of goods and services to the residents of their own immedi-
ate trade area. For example, Franklin, Missouri, not only con-
tained the usual assortment of pioneer artisans and stores in 
I8Ig, but also provided a livelihood for doctors, dentists, and 
lawyers. The twenty-five families who made up one town in 
Delaware County, Indiana, in 18so, received service from three 
general stores, a grocer, an inn, a shoemaker, a blacksmith, two 
tanners, two cabinetmakers, a miller, three carpenters, two 
coopers, two wagonmakers, two doctors, and a cobbler.13 
As the density of the midwestern market increased and as per 
capita incomes grew, settlers in the region consumed larger 
quantities of manufactured. goods and also demanded products 
of higher quality. On his tour of the western states in 1818, 
Estwick Evans expressed amazement at the high prices received 
for the large volume of eastern manufactured items shipped to 
Detroit.14 And, as early as I815, Christian Wilt's invoices of 
eastern merchandise for his St. Louis store illustrated the desire 
of local residents for finer quality clothing corresponding more 
closely to the styles and fashions of cities in the East. Mercan-
tile establishments throughout the Middle West, therefore, pub-
licized the eastern origin of their firms' inventory since such 
notations impressed customers.15 
Prior to the advent of through rail service, heavy eastern 
goods were shipped by boat down the Ohio, or by coastal vessel 
to New Orleans and then upstream to interior destinations, 
while lighter commodities normally went overland, utilizing 
water routes where practicable. Transportation costs were high. 
I3. Harvey L. Carter, "Rural Indiana in Transition, I8So-I86o," 
Agricultural History 20 (April I946): III; Viles, "Old Franklin," 
274-78. 
I4. Estwick Evans, A Predestrious Tour of Four Thousand Miles, 
through the Western States and Territories during the Winter of 
IBIS (Concord, Mass., 1819) in Early Western Travels, ed. Reuben 
Gold Thwaites, 32 vols. (Cleveland, Ohio, 1906), 8: 219-20. 
IS. Sister Marietta Jennings, A Pioneer Merchant of St. Louis 
z8zo-z82o: The Business Career of Christian Wilt (New York, 1939), 
I87; Lewis E. Atherton, The Pioneer Merchant in Mid-America, Uni-
versity of Missouri Studies, no. 2, (Columbia, Mo., 1939) 14: n6, 
I25. 
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James and Robert Aull, who operated stores in several Missouri 
towns in the 183os, calculated freight charges at approximately 
one-fourth of the value of delivered merchandise.16 After 1830, 
to supplement the annual visit of western merchants and to 
increase sales, eastern manufacturers dispatched drummers to 
the West. Such agents collected accounts, checked credit refer-
ences, and filled direct orders from retailers.17 
High overland transfer costs and irregular service encour-
aged a multitude of handicraftsmen and manufacturers to 
enter the Middle West to offer their goods and services to local 
residents. Artisans established small shops to finish the semi-
manufactured items of household producers, or to fill direct 
orders from their own raw material inventories on a custom 
basis. The cabinetmaker, shoemaker, and tailor, therefore, be-
came as much a part of the westward movement as the farmer, 
merchant, and trapper. In addition, the existence of a market 
lacking inexpensive inter- and intraregional transportation fa-
cilities, encouraged businessmen to construct factories which 
could utilize an abundant local resource and sell manufactured 
goods to the residents of surrounding farms and small towns. 
Since their raw material and market existed in the immediate 
locality of the firm, these residentiary industries were both 
market-oriented and resource-oriented. 
The high cost of transportation, which in part retarded the 
complete development of a national market, actually protected 
residentiary manufacturers from larger eastern competitors. 
Therefore, middlewestern producers operated behind the protec-
tive barrier of high freight rates on eastern goods shipped into 
the region. As long as local manufacturers concentrated on low-
and medium-quality products, for which there was a nearly 
universal demand, most could show a profit. Because such 
goods were low in value relative to their bulk, producers in the 
16. Lewis E. Atherton, "James and Robert Aull-A Frontier Mis-
souri Mercantile Firm," Missouri Historical Review 30 (October 
1935): g. 
17. Theodore F. Marburg, "Manufacturer's Drummer, 1852, with 
Comments on Western and Southern Markets," Bulletin of the Busi-
ness Historical Society 22 (April 1948): xo8-1og, II3-14. 
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East found that on many items profit margins were too small 
and sale prices too low to add high transport charges and still 
compete with manufacturers in the Middle West. On some 
items, eastern producers could undersell pioneer manufacturers 
in the midwestern market. However, since transportation costs 
as a percentage of sales were highest on low-value goods, east-
ern factory owners could maximize profits by producing high-
value items for sale in the Middle West. Any economies of scale 
enjoyed by manufacturers in the East because of mass produc-
tion or greater efficiency were presumably less than the trans-
port costs to the Middle West. 
In a short time, a midwestern community of any size pos-
sessed its own brewery, woolen mill, wagon factory, and paper-
plant. For example, Knox County, Indiana, in 182o, contained 
factories which produced barrels, candles, fur hats, furniture, 
plows, saddles, thread, wagons, and woolen yarn.18 Although 
the town of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, had a population of only 2,500 
in 1853, it harbored plants which supplied area residents with 
barrels, beer, candles, shingles and sashes, threshing machines, 
wagons, and water pumps.19 Except for minor variations, manu-
facturing development exhibited a similar pattern of growth in 
each developing region. A close examination of the factories of 
New England in the late colonial period, Ohio in the 182os, and 
Iowa on the eve of the Civil War, show striking similarities as to 
type, mode of operation, and extent. Thus, the residentiary 
stage of manufacturing accompanied each westward surge of 
population. 
As isolated areas of the Middle West filled with settlers, the 
eastern woolen industry repeated its development of previous 
decades with only a few minor modifications. Midwestern pi-
oneer women, like their ancestors of the colonial period, found 
it necessary to take up the spinning wheel and handloom in 
order to provide their families with adequate clothing. Long 
18. U.S. Department of Commerce, Fourth Census, 1820, Man-
ufactures, State of Indiana, 205, microfilm in the Indiana State Li-
brary, Archives Division, Indianapolis. 
19. John W. Hunt, Wisconsin Gazetteer (Madison, Wis., 1853), 
167. 
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after local storekeepers offered imported dry goods some house-
holds continued to manufacture textiles. In writing to a friend 
in 1859, one Indiana housewife claimed that in six months she 
had spun thirty-five pounds of wool into yarn, had woven forty 
yards of cloth, and had fashioned sixty yards of material into 
family garments. 20 The extent of domestic wool manufacturing 
prior to the Civil War was apparent to several people in the 
Middle West. Theodore Denney, for example, an Indiana 
farmer, in an 1841 letter to his brother in New England, urged 
his relatives to ship him a large quantity of handcards to 
Indianapolis, since the state comprised a market for "more 
cards than they could produce."21 
Hardly was the farmer established in an area before fullers 
and carders set up machinery on small streams to offer their 
services to local citizens. Typical of what Rolla Tryon labeled 
the "mill stage," these early carding and fulling appliances 
represented a small capital investment and ran only when local 
demand warranted operation. For example, in 1820, one rural 
Indiana carding and fulling mill, valued at six hundred dollars, 
employed but one worker who ran the machinery periodically.22 
Farmers hauled their wool to carders and fullers for process-
ing, and in turn offered various methods of payment for the 
service. The account book of William Murray, who operated a 
small mill in Wayne County, Indiana, from 1847 to 1854, is 
typical of such establishments which relied on the local econ-
omy for their income. In addition to cash, promissory notes, and 
raw wool, Murray accepted the following in payment for card-
ing wool and finishing cloth: bricks, credit at a local store, soap, 
wheat and corn, pumpkins, apples and cider, grass seed, lum-
ber, the services of a dentist and blacksmith, and hours of labor 
spent at butchering, hauling hay, and work in the milJ.23 
20. Carter, "Rural Indiana in Transition," II3-I4. 
21. Theodore Denney to Christopher Denney, Indianapolis, Febru-
ary 6, 1841, Theodore Denny Papers, in the Indiana Historical So-
ciety, Indianapolis. 
22. Fourth Census, Indiana, 1820, 204. 
23. Account Book, William Murray Woolen Mill, Wayne County, 
Indiana, 1847-I853, 99-136, William Murray Woolen Mill Account 
Books, in the Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis. 
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Because of the need to utilize available water supplies, mills 
of all types tended to concentrate on small streams. Eli Creek, 
near Indianapolis contained three sawmills, a flour-and-grist 
mill, two carding engines, and a fulling mill around 182o.24 
Moreover, since one water wheel or small steam engine could 
provide motive power for several different types of machinery, 
one building might perhaps house equipment to grind wheat, 
full woolen cloth, and saw wood. For example, William Elliot's 
mill at St. Catherine, Missouri, in r86o, contained two carding 
machines, a flour mill, and distilling apparatus.25 
With each advance of population, commercial carders moved 
westward. Before 1825 carding machines had crossed the Mis-
sissippi River,26 and twenty years later Illinois, Indiana, Mich-
igan, Ohio, and Wisconsin could each claim several Goulding 
Condensers, the most up-to-date machines available.27 By r86o, 
carding engines could be found in every state of the Middle 
West, and the federal census of that year enumerated 247 in 
the region, with Missouri's 86 machines leading all middlewest-
ern states.28 Long after the establishment of full-scale woolen 
factories, many housewives continued to weave their own cloth, 
and up to the turn of the century midwestern woolen plants 
emphasized their custom-carding services in order to meet the 
demands of household manufacturers. 
The putting-out or cottage system, which had represented a 
transitional step from custom-order to factory production in the 
24. File on "Early Mill, or Mill Sites, Built Prior to 1870," in the 
Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis. 
25. The History of Linn County, Missouri (Kansas City, 1882), 
676. 
26. Missouri Intelligencer, April 22, 1823; Jackson (Mo.) Inde-
pendent Patriot, May 26, 1821. 
27. Proprietor of the Condensing Cards, Statistics of the Woolen 
Manufactories in the United States (New York, 1846), passim. 
28. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Office, Manufactures 
of the United States in I 86o: Compiled from the Original Returns of 
the Eighth Census (Washington, D.C., 1865), II3, 145, 163,276,284, 
318, 488, 658. The typical carding machine in the Middle West in 
186o represented a capital investment of less than $1,8oo and, on 
the average, the owners normally employed less than two workers 
per year. 
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evolution of the eastern woolen industry, found virtually no 
counterpart in midwestern development. High population den-
sity and lack of power machinery had provided the incentive to 
employ eastern cottagers. In the Middle West, however, labor 
proved expensive because of its scarcity, and by the time the 
region was being settled the basic machines which had replaced 
hand operations had already been invented. Hence, the Midwest 
experienced no cottage phase of production. Fully equipped 
factories, which handled all steps in cloth manufacture, from 
sorting to finishing, sprang up in many localities where once 
only carding engines and fulling mills had previously operated. 
Many factors influence the locational pattern of economic 
activity. Manufacturers locate firms in order to benefit from 
capital resources, raw products, labor supplies, or nearness to 
markets. Theoretically, the farsighted entrepreneur chooses the 
one location which permits the best combination of these ele-
ments, but, realistically, imperfect knowledge prohibits the 
selection of the perfect factory site. Chance frequently plays an 
important role, and quite by accident a producer may select the 
correct location and thus gain the upper hand over competitive 
firms, or, as the economy changes, all advantages may 
disappear. 29 
Industries in which the finished product is low in value and 
yet universally demanded, and in which raw materials are 
locally abundant, tend to disperse over a wide geographic area, 
with each plant attempting to serve a small market. Wool 
manufacturing constituted just such an industry, and business-
men established factories any place in the Middle West where 
local markets appeared adequate to support such enterprises. 
The Midwest's increases in sheep and in human population 
after 1850 provided a relatively good market, laborers, and 
sufficient quantities of raw wool, while the steam engine freed 
manufacturers from dependence upon streams to provide power 
for machinery. 
29. Charles M. Tiebout, "Location Theory, Empirical Evidence, 
and Economic Evolution," Regional Science Association, Papers and 
Proceedings 3 (1957): 74-86. 
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Many early woolen mills sprang up in rather isolated areas, 
several miles from canals, railroads, and rivers. As examples, 
the Watkins Mill, first opened in 1861 in northwest Missouri, 
stood approximately six miles from the nearest town, and An-
drew Yount built his Montgomery County, Indiana, factory four 
miles from Crawfordsville. In general, midwestern woolen pro-
ducers constructed mills in rural areas, in or near small towns, 
where population density within a fifty-mile radius of the plant 
provided a sufficient market to consume factory output. How-
ever, with few exceptions, manufacturers avoided locating in 
larger cities and also tended to establish mills in areas not 
served by other woolen factories. 30 
Personal background information on early midwestern wool 
manufacturers is fragmentary, although material is available 
on the early lives of thirty-five of them. Fortunately the mills 
they founded were well distributed throughout the eight states 
of the region. All indications suggest that these men constitute 
a representative sample of middlewestern millowners, and that 
from an examination of their activities one can generalize 
regarding the entire industry.31 
A majority of the men studied were born in Ohio, New York, 
or the New England states in the 183os, married there, and 
moved to the Middle West in the twenty years between 1850 
and 1870. With the exception of the six men born in foreign 
countries, migration to the region represented for most the first 
30. For example, of Missouri's seventeen woolen mills in I86o, 
all were located in counties with a population of at least five thou-
sand, and two-thirds were in counties of ten thousand or more peo-
ple. Only two, however, were located in large cities (St. Joseph and 
St. Louis), and except for three mills in the northwest corner of the 
state, all were built at distances of approximately forty to fifty miles 
apart. 
31. Textile Manufacturers' Directory (New York, I883 ), listed 345 
midwestern millowners whose names were then checked in various 
newspapers, county histories, and state and national biographical 
directories. In some cases, material on one individual was acquired 
from numerous sources. 
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major move away from the immediate locality of their place of 
birth. 
Several pioneer woolen producers, at some time in their 
careers, had gained firsthand experience in some aspects of 
textile manufacturing. George Buell, 'Who with the financial aid 
of his father, constructed a small woolen factory at St. Joseph, 
Missouri, in 1852, had managed a woolen mill in Illinois. 
Thomas Hainsworth was employed as foreman of an Indiana 
woolen firm before he established his own factory at Neosho, 
Missouri, in 186g, while Elisha Cockefair, who developed the 
Eagle Mills near Indianapolis, had acquired knowledge of pro-
duction processes during his childhood apprenticeship to a 
weaver. W. W. Webster, founder of the Rushford, Minnesota, 
Woolen Mill in the late 186os, had previously worked in his 
father's woolen factory at La Crescent, Minnesota. Typical of 
many cases, Waltus Watkins and Carl Klemer, who built 
woolen plants near Lawson, Missouri, and at Faribault, Minne-
sota, operated custom-carding machines prior to their attempts 
at the full-scale manufacture of fabrics. 
For those millowners who possessed no previous knowledge 
of cloth fabrication, employment of skilled personnel proved 
essential. Midwestern mills sought qualified superintendents 
within the region to compensate for the lack of experience on 
the part of owners. For example, when F. J. Harwood and 
associates, who apparently had no prior connection with tex-
tiles, purchased Hutchinson and Company, a woolen factory in 
Appleton, Wisconsin, the new owners quickly retained the ser-
vices of H. L. Waldo, Hutchinson's seasoned plant manager.32 
Manufacturers in the Middle West also attempted to hire super-
intendents from eastern factories to oversee production. 
Like many pioneer promoters, several midwestern wool man-
ufacturers pursued other economic activities in addition to re-
tailing and wholesaling their cloth and yam. Pliny S. Lyman, 
for example, not only produced woolens at his Corunna, Mich-
32. Historical Review of the State of Wisconsin: Its Industrial and 
Commercial Resources (New York, 1887), 78. 
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igan, mill, but manufactured bricks and carried on extensive 
farming operations.33 Both Waltus Watkins and William Elliot 
owned sawmills and held stock in coal mines, while W. W. 
Hutchinson, Edward DeGarmo, Jefferson Benner, and Oren 
Stone all engaged in the dry goods business'.34 William James 
built a woolen factory at St. James, Missouri, in 1867, in addi-
tion to his investments in a flour mill and the Maramec Iron 
Works.35 
Although several millowners had gained previous training in 
textile production, these men constituted a minority of those 
who constructed and operated woolen factories. Thus it seems 
obvious that in the Middle West, the venture into wool manu-
facturing merely represented an attempt to reap profits from 
one of a large number of business enterprises, and that the 
investment in woolen mills did not indicate a special commit-
ment or attachment to that one particular industry. This is 
further illustrated by the fact that many invested capital in 
trade and in other types of manufacturing. Therefore, typical of 
a developing region, midwestern wool manufacturers appear to 
have been opportunity-oriented rather than industry-oriented.36 
Since at least thirteen of the sample had previously been 
merchants or were the sons of merchants, mercantile capital 
provided a portion of the funds to finance midwestern wool 
manufacturing. Perhaps more significant, however, at some 
time in the past, nearly one-half of the sample group had risked 
capital in some other type of manufacturing, including barrel 
33· Personal Diary of Pliny S. Lyman, Corunna Woolen Man· 
ufacturer, Pliny S. Lyman Papers, in the Michigan Historical Collec-
tions, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
34· Watkins (Watkins Mill, Lawson, Missouri); Elliot (Elliot 
Woolen Mill, St. Catherine, Missouri); DeGarmo (Warrensburg 
Woolen Mill, Warrensburg, Missouri); Hutchinson (Appleton Woolen 
Mills, Appleton, Wisconsin); Benner (Rockford Woolen Mill, Rock-
ford, Minnesota); Stone (Stone-Atwood Company, Flint, Michigan). 
35. James D. Norris, Frontier Iron: The Maramec Iron Works 
z826-z876 (Madison, Wis., 1964), 155· 
36. For a brief discussion of opportunity orientation, see "Invest-
ing in Modem Management: The 'free-form' Corporation," Equity 
Research Associates, Bulletin, September 20, 1966, p. g. 
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and paper factories, flour mills, meatpacking plants, and wagon 
works. Moreover, several had owned sawmills and a few had 
speculated in land. Only two had previously farmed and only 
one person could be considered a skilled artisan. Thus, profits 
acquired directly from earlier business enterprises in large part 
financed construction and production in the early woolen mills 
of the Middle West. 
In his study of fifty-seven businessmen in Illinois between 
1820 and 18go, Donald Kemmerer discovered that borrowing or 
inheritance proved unimportant in providing funds for begin-
ning manufacturing plants in that state. Since most pioneer 
enterprises required relatively small amounts of money, many 
Illinois businessmen had acquired sufficient capital in previous 
pursuits, such as merchandising, to commence operation.87 
However, because factory production of woolens required a 
large building, complicated and expensive machinery, skilled 
labor, and a raw material inventory, it necessitated a larger 
monetary outlay than the ordinary pioneer manufacturing ven-
ture. The Middle West's 881 woolen mills in 1870 represented 
an average capital investment of approximately $17,700; in 
that same year, the average investment in these factories ex-
ceeded the average capital investment in the midwestern manu-
facture of boots and shoes, bricks, carriages and wagons, 
pumps, saddles and harnesses, tanned leather, and the packing 
of meat.38 
Pioneer woolen men needed larger capital resources than 
some manufacturers, but they lacked a pool of investment 
funds within the Middle West from which to draw. The immo-
bility of capital among regions of the United States hindered 
economic growth throughout most of the nineteenth century, 
and although western interest rates generally remained higher 
than those on the eastern market, savers in the East were often 
37· Donald L. Kemmerer, "Financing Illinois Industry, 183o-
18go," Bulletin of the Business Historical Society 27 (June 1953): 
no. Only one of the fifty-seven businessmen studied by Kemmerer 
was a wool manufacturer. 
38. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Manufactures: 1905, Textiles, Bulletin 74, 134-36. 
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reluctant to risk large sums in western manufacturing enter-
prises. Mobility within an industry usually took place only when 
investors migrated west taking their capital with them.39 There-
fore, a few middlewestern manufacturers experienced difficulty 
raising money for initial woolen mill construction. 
Although the town of Reedsburg, Wisconsin, dispatched 
agents to New York in the 18sos to solicit funds for a mill, local 
citizens had to await the arrival of eastern investors who moved 
there. 40 And, following his failure to secure loans in Missouri in 
186o, Waltus Watkins found it necessary to enlist financial 
support from family members and friends in Kentucky in order 
to continue construction and begin operation of his new woolen 
factory. 41 As late as 1892, the owners of the Faribault Woolen 
Mill in Minnesota could not collect enough capital from Fari-
bault citizens to rebuild the factory following a fire in Septem-
ber of that year.42 Those mills which escaped the pinch of 
scarcity during their formative period often turned to incorpora-
tion when funds were needed to expand operations. As only a 
few examples, woolen factories in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Ful-
ton, Missouri; Clinton, Michigan; and Appleton, Beaver Dam, 
Cedarburg, and Racine, Wisconsin, all incorporated between 
1866 and 1883.43 
39· Lance E. Davis, "Capital Immobilities and Finance Capitalism: 
A Study of Economic Evolution in the United States, I82o-I89o," 
Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, vol. I, 2d ser. (Fall 1963): 
88-g6. Exceptions did exist. For example, meatpacking, a western 
industry which marketed substantial portions of its output in the 
East, received capital from eastern investors. See Rudolf A. Clemen, 
The American Livestock and Meat Industry (New York, 1923), 137. 
40. Merton E. Krug, History of Reedsburg and the Upper Baraboo 
Valley (Madison, Wis., 1929), 36; William H. Canfield, Outline 
Sketches of Sauk County (Baraboo, Wis., 1872), 22-23. 
41. Mary Handy to Waltus Watkins, Mercer County, Kentucky, 
September 24 and December 2, x869, and promissory note, Waltus 
Watkins to Jane Watkins, April II, I862, in the private collection of 
Mrs. Manfred Weber, Shawnee Mission, Kansas. 
42. Frank H. Klemer, "The History of the Faribault Woolen Mills" 
(paper read before the Rice County, Minnesota, Historical Society, 
October 22, 1940, copy in the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul). 
43· Of course, incorporation could have indicated an attempt by 
a millowner to unload a bad investment. However, extant company 
records indicate that in most cases capital acquired through incorpo-
ration financed expansion programs. 
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In many cases midwestern woolen mills were family oper-
ations and an examination of company records indicates a high 
degree of nepotism. Major administrative positions in woolen 
mills at Lawson and St. Joseph, Missouri; Faribault, La Cres-
cent, Minneapolis, and Rushford, Minnesota; and Lacon, Illi-
nois, were dominated by relatives of owners and managers. The 
1884 corporate minutes of the Appleton Mills in Wisconsin 
illustrate a typical case where three members of the same 
family were president, general manager, and secretary-treas-
urer.44 
Given such a situation, relatives frequently assumed control 
of a firm upon the death or retirement of the original owner, or, 
after several years with the mill, withdrew from the company 
and established a similar factory in another locality. For exam-
ple, when Isaac Chapman, owner of the Watertown, Wisconsin, 
woolen mill died in 1885, his wife Jane continued to operate the 
business for some time/5 and the three sons of Waltus Watkins 
manufactured cloth and yarn for several years after their fa-
ther's retirement in the mid-188os. Edward McFetridge and his 
brother James built the Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, Woolen Mill in 
1866. Nine years later James sold his interest in the plant in 
order to buy into the Island Woolen Mills at Baraboo, Wiscon-
sin.46 
The numerous steps in the fabrication of woolen cloth multi-
plied the different types of machinery required for its produc-
tion. Since they had located in a relatively unpopulated region, 
those manufacturers who built woolen mills in the Middle West 
prior to 1870 found it necessary to order equipment from many 
different firms scattered throughout the United States. The 
Watkins Mill, which operated from 1861 to 1886, bought its 
boiler from a St. Louis foundry, spindles and cards from Phil-
adelphia, and weaving appliances from loomworks in New Jer-
44. Appleton Mills, Corporate Minutes, Director's Meeting, Jan-
uary IO, 1884, in the possession of the company, Appleton, Wis-
consin. 
45· Historical Review of the State of Wisconsin, 136. 
46. Memorial and Genealogical Record of Dodge and Jefferson 
Counties, Wisconsin (Chicago, 1894), 17. 
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sey.47 Although textile machine manufacturers had agents in 
Indianapolis and other midwestern cities by 186o, most mill-
owners had to await the arrival of materials from eastern 
concerns. As late as 1874, when the owners of the Appleton 
Mills ordered machinery from a woolen manufacturer's supply 
house in Milwaukee, they discovered that the Milwaukee firm 
did not build or stock such equipment but merely accepted 
advance orders for an eastern company.48 
Since they operated where knowledge of complicated textile 
equipment was limited, midwestern wool manufacturers fre-
quently relied on machine builders for the installation of new 
appliances. For example, J, T. Dewdall and Company of St. 
Louis, manufacturer of the boiler for the Watkins Mill, sent 
their own engineer to northwest Missouri in the fall of I86o to 
install the engine, boiler, and its connective apparatus.49 And, in 
December 1893, the Buell Manufacturing Company, a woolen 
mill in St: Joseph, Missouri, requested that the C. G. Sargent 
Company send a man from the factory at Graniteville, Massa-
chusetts, to unpack and set up their new wool dryer. 5° 
Although machinery suppliers were miles to the east, mid-
western manufacturers enjoyed a close proximity to raw wool 
supplies. As early as the 184os eastern farmers started to aban-
don sheep raising, and the Merino flocks of New England and 
the Middle Atlantic moved into Ohio and then spread over the 
other states of the Middle West. The relocation of sheep to the 
center of the continent necessitated some major alterations in 
the structure of the domestic wool market. 
47· J. T. Dewdall and Company, St. Louis, November 26, x86o, 
August 8, I86o, February 21, 1861, Alfred Jenks and Son, Philadel-
phia, January I, x86I, and Van Ripper and Son, Patterson, April 8, 
I86g, March 18, 1869, to Watkins Mill, in the Watkins Mill Collec-
tion, Jackson County, Missouri, Historical Society Archives, Inde-
pendence. 
48. Northwestern Woolen Manufacturers's Supply House to Apple-
ton Mills, Milwaukee, August 22, 1874, in the Appleton Mills Collec-
tion, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. 
49· E. N. Dewdall to Watkins Mill, St. Louis, October 31, I86o, in 
the Watkins Collection. 
so. C. G. Sargent Company to The Buell Manufacturing Company, 
Graniteville, December rs, r893, in the C. G. Sargent Collection, 
Merrimack Valley Textile Museum, North Andover, Massachusetts. 
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The Marketing of Wool 
in the Middle West 
Sheep moved westward with each advance of settlers, and as 
small farms filled the Middle West after I85o, woolgrowing 
became an important aspect of the region's economy. With 
expansion of the eastern woolen textile industry, midwestern 
farmers found in wool a commodity which could withstand 
transport charges over long distances. Within a few years, both 
eastern and western businessmen established permanent wool-
houses in the region, many local produce traders specialized in 
wool, agents of eastern woolen mills made annual visits to the 
Middle West to procure raw material, and a host of rural 
storekeepers accepted wool from farmers in payment of ac-
counts. By I 870, the thirteen million sheep on midwestern 
farms provided fleece in sufficient quantities to generate the 
formation of a widespread, yet relatively inefficient, system of 
wool marketing.1 
Thanks to the importation of large numbers of foreign breed-
ing rams during the mania for Merinos2 after I80I, and an I82o 
speculation in Saxony sheep, a Merino type, the quality of 
American wool slowly improved.3 In response to the high fleece 
prices of the I 82os, many eastern farmers adopted woolgrow-
ing, and, as a result, the American sheep population doubled 
between I8I4 and I831. In the latter year, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, and Vermont contained large portions of the estimated 
twenty million sheep in the United States.4 
While eastern farmers sought to meet the demand of the 
textile industry for raw material, businessmen in the major port 
cities organized commission houses which specialized in buying 
and selling wool. Throughout most of the antebellum period, 
35 
The Woolen Industry 
Boston triumphed over New York and Philadelphia as the na-
tion's major wool market, and the city retained its dominant 
position long after the exodus of sheep from the Northeast. As 
late as 1870, Boston's wooldealers still handled 40 percent of 
the domestic clip.5 
As northeastern cities spawned more and more woolhouses, 
cloth manufacturers combined fleece purchases from local 
farmers with orders to these firms in an effort to acquire correct 
grades and quantities of wool. In the mid-183os, Faulkner and 
Colony, a woolen factory at Keene, New Hampshire, bought 
most of its wool directly from farmers and country storekeepers. 
However, by 1856 the mill also utilized the services of wooldeal-
ers throughout New England.6 And, in the 186os, the Agawam 
I. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Eleventh 
Census, Agriculture: z8go, 92-93. 
2. There are four major classifications of sheep: the Merino, a 
Spanish development, which produces a fine, greasy fleece; English 
breeds, exhibiting long, coarse wool, and possessing a larger carcass 
than the Merino; the crossbreeds, composed of various Merino-Eng-
lish crosses; and the native sheep of all countries, whose coarse wool 
is not normally satisfactory for cloth production. American Sheep 
Producers Council, Breeds of Sheep, Educational Pamphlet 3 (Den-
ver, Colo., n.d.), passim. 
3· Discussions of the Merino Mania and subsequent sheep crazes 
can be found in Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., "E. I. Dupont and the Merino 
Mania in Delaware, I8o5-1815," Agricultural History 26 (April 
1962): 91-Ioo, and "E. I. Dupont, Don Pedro, and the Introduction 
of Merino Sheep into the United States, 1801: A Document," Agri-
cultural History 33 (April 1959): 86-88; Arthur Harrison Cole, 
"Agricultural Crazes," American Economic Review 16 (December 
1926): 622-39· 
4· U.S., Congress, Senate, The Wool Trade of the United States, 
61st Cong., 1st sess., Senate Misc. Doc. 70, p. 41; L. G. Connor, "A 
Brief History of the Sheep Industry in the United States," American 
Historical Association, Report I ( 1918): 109--10. 
5. U.S. Bureau of Statistics, Wool and Manufactures of Wool 
(Washington, D.C., 1888), lxvi-lxvii; George H. Gibson, "The Growth 
of the Woolen Industry in Nineteenth Century Delaware," Textile 
History Review 5 (October 1964): 131; The Wool Trade of the 
United States, 3o-31, 42-52. 
6. Incoming Correspondence, 1836, and D. B. Sexton to Faulkner 
and Colony, Cleveland, May 10, 1856, in the Faulkner and Colony 
Collection, Manuscripts Division, Baker Library, Harvard University. 
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Woolen Company, in Massachusetts, procured fleece through 
purchases from area woolgrowers, in addition to buying from 
several Boston commission merchants. 7 
Direct buying saved millowners the fee charged by wool-
houses, but large factories soon discovered that local flocks were 
usually incapable of meeting raw material needs. Therefore, 
mills placed heavy dependence upon wooldealers to supply 
them. In the early years of his business, Nathaniel Stevens 
bought wool from farmers in the immediate vicinity of his 
factory in Andover, Massachusetts. By r83o, a representative of 
the firm toured Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire visiting 
shearing pens and contracting for fleece from woolgrowers and 
dealers. However, except for an occasional trip to the Far West, 
the Stevens Company appears to have abandoned direct pur-
chases by I 86o, preferring instead to depend upon wool mer-
chants to supply the mill with the bulk of raw material.8 
Sheep continued to move west with each advancing line of 
settlement. Merinos entered the Zanesville, Ohio, area as early 
as r8or, and by r82o some settlements in Illinois and Indiana 
had received large numbers of sheep. In spite of these initial 
gains, in most western states woolgrowing made little commer-
cial progress prior to 1830. Sheep were heavily concentrated in 
some areas, but household manufacturing usually absorbed sub-
stantial portions of fleece output. As only one example, all but 
approximately 8 percent of Washington County, Pennsylva-
nia's, 1825 clip of 40o,ooo pounds was consumed locally.9 
7· For examples, see letters from Massachusetts farmers and 
storekeepers in Beckett, November 20, 1866, West Springfield, Oc-
tober 15, 1866, and Enfield, August 3, 1866, to Agawam Woolen 
Company, in the Merrimack Valley Textile Museum, North Andover, 
Massachusetts. 
8. Nathaniel Stevens and Son, Wool Bills, July 13, 185g-January 
6, 1870, in the Merrimack Valley Textile Museum, North Andover, 
Massachusetts; Horace Stevens, Nathaniel Stevens, 1786-r865 
(North Andover, Mass., 1946), 29-30, 62-63; Nathaniel Stevens, 
Early Days of the Woolen Industry in North Andover, Massachusetts: 
A Sketch (North Andover, Mass., 1925), 20-21. 
g. Percy W. Bidwell and John I. Falconer, History of Agriculture 
in the Northern United States, r62o-r86o (New York, 1941 ), 183. 
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Completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 expanded the volume 
of wool moving eastward, and twenty years later it was esti-
mated that over two million pounds cleared Buffalo bound for 
tidewater.10 Through canal construction and river improvement, 
illinois and Indiana joined Ohio and Pennsylvania in develop-
ing direct eastern market connections in the early fifties. And 
by 1853 railroads linked St. Louis, Chicago, and the Great Lakes 
Region to the Atlantic Coast. The seemingly endless quantities 
of western fleece pouring into seaboard markets forced many 
northeastern farmers to abandon sheep raising. From 1850 to 
186o woolgrowers in areas comprising New York and New 
England thinned flocks by 63 percent.11 
High value per pound and durability supported heavy freight 
charges for wool over long distances, and the favorable trans-
port costs for wool as compared to other agricultural commod-
ities prompted many midwestern farmers to buy sheep. Around 
1840, one pound of high grade wool would carry twenty pounds 
to market, while the fifty-seven cent differential between New 
York and Chicago wheat prices amply illustrated the high 
freight rates for grain.12 As late as 1862, J. B. Grinnell, an Iowa 
farmer, succinctly stated the situation: "I give So percent of the 
value of my wheat which impoverishes my farm, to find a 
market; and 4 percent to find the best wool market."13 
Two other factors helped to promote middlewestern wool-
growing. Since sheep were relatively easy to turn to, grain 
farmers could periodically reallocate capital from cereals to 
wool, and the low agricultural prices of the early I 84os encour-
aged such investments. Second, the milder winters in the south-
10. U.S., Congress, Senate, Israel D. Andrews, Trade and Com-
merce of the British North American Colonies, and upon the Great 
Lakes and Rivers, 1854, 32d Cong., 1st sess., Senate Exec. Doc. II2, 
p. 92. 
II. Harold F. Wilson, "The Rise and Decline of the Sheep Industry 
in Northern New England," Agricultural History 9 (January 1935): 
2o-21. 
12. Connor, "Brief History of the Sheep Industry," II4-15. 
13. As quoted in the Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture, 
1862, U.S., Congress, House, 37th Cong., 3d sess., House Exec. Doc. 
78, p. 304. 
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ern portions of the Middle West eliminated expensive feeding 
and shelter so necessary throughout New England from Novem-
ber through March. In 1862, Iowa sheepmen calculated their 
annual upkeep expenses at $0.75 to $I.oo, while New York 
woolgrowers expended $2.00 per animal. And, following the 
Civil War, it was estimated that a Missouri farmer could keep a 
flock of sheep for one-half the cost of his New England counter-
part.14 
Some eastern sheepmen moved west. For example, Truman 
and Isaac Harvey established a sheep farm near La Salle, 
Illinois, in 1843 after migrating from Vermont. Enroute they 
purchased 2,300 animals in Columbus, Ohio, and to defray 
expenses, sold all but 1 ,2oo on arrival in Illinois. Subsequent 
acquisitions of breeding rams from Vermont and Ohio aided 
flock improvement. The Harveys followed a typical approach by 
leasing some of their sheep to local farmers, with the lessee 
receiving either one-half the wool or lamb increase.15 Henry 
Ancrum, a Pike County, Missouri, farmer suggested a slightly 
different plan when he advertised for sheep in 1849. Ancrum 
proposed to retain all the fleece and lambs, and to pay the 
owner 10 percent of the flock's annually assessed value.16 
The center of American sheep production rapidly shifted 
westward after 1840. The phenomenal growth of sheep raising 
in Ohio and Michigan during the twenty years before 186o 
represented only extreme examples of a common trend through-
out the Middle West. By 1870, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Ohio ranked among the top six wool-producing states.17 The 
14. Ibid., 303; Finla G. Crawford, "The Wool Industry of the 
United States, 1865-187o" (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 
1916), 73; Ezra A. Carman, H. A. Heath, and John Minto, Special 
Report on the History and Present Condition of the Sheep Industry 
of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1892), 825. 
15. U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Commissioner of Patents, 
Agriculture, 1845, 29th Cong., 1st sess., House Doc. 140, pp. 341-42. 
16. The Western Journal of Agriculture, Manufactures, Mechanic 
Arts, Internal Improvement, Commerce, and General Literature 2 
(February 1849): 131. 
17. Armour's Livestock Bureau, Manthly Letter to Animal Hus-
bandmen 13 (March 1935): 3· 
39 
The Woolen Industry 
general trade position of larger midwestern cities assured them 
of an active wool market once the region's sheep population 
became sufficiently dense to provide a commercial surplus. In 
the initial years of the trade, interior city wool merchants 
merely collected small lots for direct forwarding to Boston, 
Philadelphia, and New York. However, as fine-wooled Merinos 
continued to enter the Middle West, such cities as Chicago, 
Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and St. Louis repre-
sented important wool markets in their own right. 
It soon became apparent to woolgrowers and manufacturers 
alike that the midwestern trade in wool constituted a highly 
imperfect market. That is, both buyers and sellers experienced 
unusual difficulty in finding efficient systems of purchase or 
sale. Many factors accounted for the imperfect nature of the 
market, yet nearly all causes of market inefficiency stemmed 
from the interaction of three major problem areas : (I ) the 
inherent nature of wool, ( 2) the physical distribution of supply 
relative to the locus of demand, and ( 3) inadequate communi-
cations between buyer and seller in the marketplace. 
The unique characteristics of wool in part shaped the struc-
ture of the market created to handle it. The major properties 
which determined wool value were its fineness, length and 
strength, color, sheen and softness, and the volume of foreign 
material imbedded in the fibers. Moreover, wool might differ as 
much as 30 to So percent in shrinkage, or the loss in weight 
when it was scoured in a warm alkali solution to remove impur-
ities. These qualities varied among breeds, regions, flocks, sea-
sons of the year, within a single fleece, and yearly within the 
same locality. There were over two thousand grades of raw wool 
and as many as thirteen of these might be sorted from the wool 
of one animal. Thus, each fleece constituted a unique product 
which inhibited the standardization of grades and the forma-
tion of a futures market.18 
18. Benjamin Richards, Textiles (New York, 1939), 8; the New 
York Wool Top Exchange was not established until 1931. Wool "top," 
or the combed and drawn fibers used in worsted production, could 
be standardized and, therefore, allowed the development of futures 
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As sheep continued to leave the Northeast, inadequate mar-
ket information plagued both the grower and manufacturer of 
wool. In the Middle West, a multitude of persons, scattered over 
a broad geographic area, raised sheep as part of a general 
farming program. Numerous factors, ranging from the weather 
to the market price of other agricultural commodities, affected 
the quantity and quality of the wool clip. Therefore, each spring 
woolen manufacturers and farmers attempted to predict what 
grades and quantities of fleece would be available during the 
summer and fall, and at what prices they would be bought and 
sold. 
Although cloth producers enjoyed a relatively constant de-
mand throughout the year, most wool went to market immedi-
ately after shearing. Also, maintaining a large wool inventory 
required storage facilities and tied up capital. The high shrink-
age rate of most Merino wools offered an additional danger 
since a miscalculation in weight could mean the difference 
between profit and loss. Each type of fabric required a different 
combination of wool grades, yet most eastern textile mills found 
it necessary to bid on wool prior to the establishment of prices 
and fashions in the cloth market. Unlike cotton factories, the 
absence of a futures market in raw wool prohibited woolen 
mills from hedging to reduce the risks of price increases on raw 
material. 
To many woolgrowers the problem seemed equally complex. 
They faced several alternative methods of sale in a market 
where prices usually fluctuated in response to changes in supply 
and demand. Yet except in their immediate neighborhoods, 
ignorance of the quantity offered for sale and quality of 
other wool on the market limited the number of rational 
choices. The lack of a few standard grade classifications pre-
vented most farmers from comparing the prices offered for local 
trading. However, wool top constituted a semimanufactured product. 
For a discussion of the organization and operation of the New York 
Wool Top Exchange, consult Alston Hill Garside, Wool and the Wool 
Trade (New York, 1939), 103-47, and Paul T. Cherington, "Some 
Aspects of the Wool Trade of the United States," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 25 (February 1911): 337-56. 
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wool with quotations in other markets. To help maximize his 
profits from woolgrowing the farmer had to decide whether to 
sell at the shearing pen, to a wool dealer or local trader, ship 
fleece directly to the eastern market or consign it to a commis-
sion merchant there, store it hoping for a price advance, or to 
dispose of his clip through any number of other market outlets. 
Perceiving the high degree of imperfection, many middlemen 
entered the wool market hoping to capitalize on the uncertain-
ties of the trade and to reap profits from the purchase and sale 
of fleece. The marketing of wool in the Middle West, therefore, 
rapidly became a speculative operation composed of many 
small buyers and sellers. Aside from their functions as buyers 
and shippers, wool dealers could have provided an important 
link between farmers and manufacturers in the passage of 
information. However, most chose to keep woolgrowers unin-
formed and thereby hoped to purchase fleece at relatively low 
prices. 
Concentration of the wool clip at a few convenient locations 
offered one possible solution to the farmer's ignorance of the 
total market. And the Middle West gave birth to the first wool 
pool, organized in Greencastle, Indiana, in 1855· Pooling con-
centrated the wool of many growers for sale to the highest 
bidder, and this method of marketing assumed increasing im-
portance following the Civil War. Since they normally existed 
only while the clip was being sold, pools should not be confused 
with farm cooperatives. Rather than tightly controlled coopera-
tion, pools operated as loosely structured local farm organiza-
tions providing only temporary central markets and giving deal-
ers and eastern mill agents easy access to area wool. In most of 
the early pools, sorting and grading were not attempted, since 
farmers seemingly preferred to sell individual clips separately.19 
Pools seldom satisfied both buyer and seller. Manufacturers 
19. 0. B. Jesness and W. H. Kerr, Cooperative Purchasing and 
Marketing Organizations among Farmers in the United States, United 
States Department of Agriculture, Bulletin 547, p. I; Deane W. 
Malott and Boyce F. Martin, The Agricultural Industries (New York, 
1939), 412-13; A. F. DuPlessis, The Marketing of Wool (London, 
1931 ), 20Q-20I. 
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argued that in an advancing market farmers ignored the pool, 
and either sold direct to local speculators or consigned wool to 
commission merchants. Falling prices prompted farmers to 
enter a pool, and many deemed it the duty of manufacturers to 
take all the wool offered. In the larger pools, buyers sometimes 
graded clips, but were closely watched by farmers, and should 
woolen men sort fleeces too carefully, the pool might refuse to 
sell to them in the future. Woolgrowers, on the other hand, 
bitterly complained of buyer secrecy and collusion.2° Farmers 
suspected that through a prearranged agreement, bidders inten-
tionally offered low prices for the first few lots auctioned, hop-
ing thereby to create the impression that a surplus of fleece 
existed throughout the region.21 
During the infant years of factory production, eastern woolen 
millowners sometimes found it necessary to maintain their own 
flocks in order to provide enough high-quality fleece. However, 
as both the quantity and quality of American wool increased 
after I 820, most factories abandoned woolgrowing and pro-
cured raw material through face-to-face contacts with farmers. 
Almost from the first movement of sheep into the Middle West, 
eastern woolen manufacturers sent their buying agents in pur-
suit of fleece~ For example, the agents of Lowell factory owners 
were purchasing wool in the Edgerton, Ohio, area as early as 
1847, and a large portion of the Clinton County, Indiana, 1854 
wool clip went to buyers who represented eastern mills.22 
Many woolgrowers distrusted agent buyers, but lacking suffi-
cient knowledge of the market, the growers sometimes de-
pended upon them to purchase fleece. If the farmer consigned 
his wool to an eastern commission merchant, he shouldered 
20. Copy of "An Interview, Lucile Kane with William G. Northup 
in the Minneapolis Offices of the North Star Woolen Mills," Novem-
ber 16, 1949, in the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
21. Harry James Brown, "The National Association of Wool Man-
ufacturers, 1864-1897" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1948), pro-
vides an excellent description of grower-manufacturer conflicts. 
22. U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Commissioner of Patents 
for the Year IB53, 33d Cong., 1st sess., House Exec. Doc. 39, p. 40; 
Niles' National Register 72 (July 24, 1847), 331. 
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part of the capital burden and ran the risk of falling prices.23 
Choosing the best eastern wool dealer provided an annual frus-
tration, as illustrated by Sam Boardman, a farmer near Lincoln, 
Illinois. In 1868, Boardman sarcastically counseled a sheep 
raiser on the proper method to employ in selecting an eastern 
wool commission merchant; the farmer should "get the best 
information he can with regard to different wool houses, shut 
his eyes, and send it."24 
Other than eastern mill buyers, pooling, and consigned ship-
ment, midwestern woolgrowers also sold directly to local trad-
ers, who purchased wool as one of a number of items in general 
speculative trading. The local resident trader usually bought 
and sold any item which promised a quick profit and rapid 
capital turnover. As fleece supplies increased in the Middle 
West, some local traders specialized in wool. For example, 
Lothrop Johnson, a local trader, purchased wool on his own 
account in Gainesville, Michigan, from 1859 to 1864. He spent 
several thousand dollars each spring for wool ranging from 
quantities as small as one fleece to several thousand pounds. 
Johnson apparently bought all grades of wool since in early 
1859 he paid prices which varied from $0.20 to $o.62 per 
pound. The scarcity of wool during the Civil War, however, 
forced him to offer as much as $1.00 per pound in 1864.25 
Mter 1850, several eastern woolhouses flooded the Middle 
West with agents before and during the clipping season to 
collect lots directly from farmers or local traders. For example, 
23. On wool consignments, commission merchants usually ex-
tended cash advances to farmers at the rate of two-thirds to three-
fourths of the estimated market value of the fleece. However, wool-
growers often paid 6 percent interest for such advances in addition 
to a selling commission. Robert L. Studley, "The Marketing and Fi-
nancing of Wool" (an address delivered before the Robert Morris 
Associates, Boston, November 17, 1923, copy in the Baker Library, 
Harvard University). 
24. As quoted in the Missouri State Board of Agriculture, Report, 
1868, 136. 
25. Lothrop Johnson, Wool Purchase Book, Gainesville, Michigan, 
I85g-I864, in the Michigan Historical Collections, University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
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Sutliff and Case, wool merchants of Cleveland, Ohio, sent Na-
than Brownell, Jr., to Michigan in the early spring of 1851 
under instructions to establish a purchasing agency in Detroit.26 
The parent firm channeled capital through Brownell, to local 
buyers, during April and May.27 Brownell's buyers in turn sup-
plied their side agents with funds to purchase for Sutliff and 
Case. Local agents examined wool, made the purchase, and 
arranged for sacking and transit, usually receiving a commis-
sion of one cent per pound. In the Detroit area alone, Brownell 
released over $42,ooo for wool purchases during the 1851 sea-
son.28 Although this method dispersed capital and agents 
throughout the wool area and aided in procuring the clip, it also 
reduced communications among buyers in a highly unpredict-
able market where knowledge of day-to-day price changes 
proved imperative. 
Brownell relayed instructions that buyers should begin bid-
ding at last-season prices to test the market. As the buying 
progressed, Sutliff and Case warned Brownell of the shaky 
nature of the eastern wool market, and suggested that he lower 
bids to conform to the situation.29 Concern quickly produced 
criticism. Early July found Sutliff and Case angrily instructing 
Brownell to withdraw funds from local buyers until they fol-
lowed instructions, because, from their vantage point in Cleve-
land, it appeared to them that "Michigan was the worst place to 
purchase wool there is in the western states."30 Throughout 
August, Sutliff and Case carefully observed prices in the eastern 
cloth trade and, as they continued to fall, impressed upon 
Brownell the urgency of withholding his Michigan agents from 
26. Sutliff and Case to Nathan Brownell, Jr., Cleveland, April 18, 
1851, Nathan Brownell, Jr., Papers, in the Michigan Historical Col-
lections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
27. Sutliff and Case to Brownell, Cleveland, May 3, 5, II, 1851, 
Brownell Papers. 
28. Daniel Houskins to Brownell, Jackson, Michigan, May 7, 1851, 
Brownell Papers. 
29. Sutliff and Case to Brownell, Cleveland, June 6, 7, 1851, 
Brownell Papers. 
30. Ibid., July 10, 1851, Brownell Papers. 
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purchases.31 Brownell's buyers complained.32 Buck Thompson of 
Ann Arbor advised Brownell that competition from other deal-
ers in that town had inflated prices three to five cents above the 
level he was directed to offer. Since he was an area resident and 
local trader, farmers expected him to bid on their wool; if he 
failed to do so, his reputation would suffer. If Brownell con-
tinued to maintain a noncompetitive bidding level, Thompson 
threatened to purchase wool on his own account.33 
Purchasing agents like Brownell normally remained in a 
region only during the buying season. However, after 186o 
some commission men established permanent woolhouses in 
many areas of the Middle West where the sheep population 
merited their existence. Such was the case when Thomas 
McGraw organized his Detroit woolhouse in April 1864, and six 
years later created a Boston branch office. McGraw migrated 
from Canada to Michigan with his father in 1835, and his early 
business training included bookkeeping, clerking for the Pitts-
burgh Iron Company, and operating a general store in Novi, 
Michigan. 
Like several other dealers, McGraw first entered the wool 
trade by accepting fleece from farmers in payment of accounts 
at his store. In a short time his wool operations completely 
overshadowed all other business, and in I 864 he abandoned the 
mercantile aspect and moved to Detroit. In 1887 McGraw's wool 
purchases amounted to approximately five million pounds. He 
later became the major stockholder of the Globe Tobacco Com-
pany, president of the Michigan Savings Bank, and director of 
the American National Bank, all of Detroit.34 
Typical of most agencies, Thomas McGraw and Company 
employed one or two permanent buyers who ranged over a wide 
31. Ibid., August 23, 1851, Brownell Papers. 
32. Daniel Houskins, Jackson, Michigan, May 28, 1851, H. Rex-
ford, Ypsilanti, Michigan, May 20, 1851, and C. M. Brewer, Marshall, 
Michigan, June 3, 185I, to Brownell, Brownell Papers. 
33· Buck Thompson to Brownell, Ann Arbor, May 28, 185I, Brown-
ell Papers. 
34. Silas Farmer, The History of Detroit and Michigan (Detroit, 
Mich., 1889), 1159-60. 
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geographic area in search of fleece. Such individuals often 
handled the allocation of funds among local buyers who pur-
chased for McGraw on a commission of one cent per pound. To 
name only a few, during the 1865 shearing season McGraw had 
buyers who bid on local wool in the Michigan towns of Albion, 
Ann Arbor, Battle Creek, Dexter, Farmington, Flint, Ionia, Jack-
son, Lansing, Marshall, and Pontiac.35 
Mter noting local trade activity and checking the prices 
offered by other dealers, McGraw's buyers called on area farm-
ers, examined the wool, and placed bids. Since wool could 
sometimes be purchased cheaply if farmers were kept in igno-
rance of current prices, McGraw's local buyers seldom em-
barked on a program of market education. For example, E. B. 
Tyler, a McGraw buyer in Dexter, Michigan, wrote in June 1865 
that "I keep cool-not anxious, letting the farmers have their 
own way, they are kind of up a stump, they know not what to 
do."36 Tyler also cautioned McGraw to "make no one any offer 
that comes from here," since one Dexter farmer, who obviously 
did not trust Tyler, was journeying to Detroit to check the 
market and might seek a bid from McGraw personally.37 In 
addition to his own agents, McGraw acquired wool through 
other channels. To fill an order in November 1864 he purchased 
fleece worth over $8,ooo from Traugott Schmidt, a fellow De-
troit wool dealer. E. S. Noble of Albion was only one of a host 
of country storekeepers who bought for McGraw, and the Ypsi-
lanti woolen mill, like similar firms throughout Michigan, col-
lected commissions by accepting fleece for McGraw's Detroit 
woolhouse.38 
35. G. B. Johnson, Granville, Ohio, June 7, 24, and August 20, 
1865, and N. P. Smith, Kensington, Michigan, June 18, 1865, to 
Thomas McGraw, in the Thomas McGraw Papers, Burton Historical 
Collection, Detroit Public Library, Detroit. 
36. E. B. Tyler to McGraw, Dexter, Michigan, June 17, 1865, Mc-
Graw Papers. 
37. Ibid., May 25, 1865, McGraw Papers. 
38. Sales receipt, Traugott Schmidt, Detroit, November 23, 1864, 
and letters from E. S. Noble, Albion, Michigan, May 30, 1865, Ypsil-
anti Woolen Manufacturing Company, Ypsilanti, Michigan, June 2, 
1865, to McGraw, McGraw Papers. 
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Before the establishment of his Massachusetts branch office, 
McGraw maintained a joint account with Nevins and Company, 
commission merchants in Boston. McGraw frequently pur-
chased Michigan wools which were then forwarded to Nevins to 
fill an order, or were added to the Nevins-McGraw inventory. 
During the last two years of the Civil War, Nevins kept McGraw 
constantly informed on the changing price of gold since both 
firms apparently felt it offered the best barometer for predicting 
future business. In November 1864, Nevins advised McGraw 
that the market was "very dull. Wool is depressed and few sales 
taking place owing to the . . . uncertainty of gold."39 Although 
rumors of peace circulated through some Boston business cir-
cles by late January 1865, McGraw was warned to avoid opti-
mism since "gold fluctuates at s% to Io% daily and things are 
very unsettled in trade."40 At home in Michigan, McGraw found 
others concerned; a scarcity of bank currency plagued many 
areas, country banks often refused to cash drafts drawn on 
Detroit, and farmers demanded either greenbacks or national 
currency in payment for their wool.41 
Following the Civil War McGraw expanded operations and by 
the late 186os he represented the typical full-function market 
intermediary. His firm accepted wool consigned from growers, 
charging I to 2 percent sales commission, filled direct orders 
from other woolhouses, sold to eastern and western woolen 
mills, and sorted and stored fleece awaiting factory needs.42 
McGraw also advanced cash on wool consignments, discounted 
commercial paper, made direct loans, accepted personal notes, 
and sold to textile mills on credit ranging from a few days to 
several months. The Massachusetts branch office expedited 
39· Nevins and Company to McGraw, Boston, November 21, 1864, 
McGraw Papers. 
40. Ibid., January 30, 1865, McGraw Papers. 
41. H. Stevens, Albion, Michigan, June 21, 1864, E. B. Tyler, 
Albion, Michigan, May 23, 1865, and Merrifield and Willer, Lansing, 
Michigan, June 16, 1865, to McGraw, McGraw Papers. 
42. L. W. Blakesly, Aurora, Illinois, October 16, 1866, Bumh and 
Gray Company, Janesville, Michigan, May 2, 1870, and Chamberlin 
Brothers and Company, Boston, August 16, 1866, to McGraw, Mc-
Graw Papers. 
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wool sales, since samples of Detroit fleece could be relayed to 
the Boston warehouse for inspection by potential purchasers. To 
reduce expenses, McGraw arranged with a Michigan railroad 
for a "confidential" shipping rate, by agreeing to transport all 
his eastbound wool on their trains. The new freight charge of 
one cent per pound from Detroit to Boston represented a so 
percent saving.43 
Not all wool merchants in the Middle West dealt directly with 
farmers. Mauger and Avery,44 wool dealers of Boston with 
branch offices in Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, and Prov-
idence, acquired the major portion of their fleece from smaller 
commission houses throughout the country. Although the firm 
occasionally dispatched a buyer to the middlewestern shearing 
pens to search for a large lot, or to seek a special type of wool, 
Mauger and Avery preferred to buy from interior city dealers in 
Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and St. Louis.45 
Eastern woolen mills placed direct orders for fleece with 
Mauger and Avery, or asked to be contacted when a particular 
type of wool appeared on the market.46 The home office in 
Boston coordinated ordering, buying, and sales, then relayed 
this information to all its branches. With most direct orders, 
43. J. D. Hayes, Detroit, April 23, 1870, Gregory and Merrill 
Company, Pontiac, Michigan, June 12, 186g, Nevins and Company, 
Boston, October 7, 1870, Bank of Montreal, Hamilton, Ontario, No-
vember 16, 1870, Joseph J, Hedges, Constantine, Michigan, Septem-
ber 25, 1871, Chamberlin Brothers and Company, Boston, September 
14, 1866, and J. P. Crawley, Morenci, Michigan, May 20, 1870, to 
McGraw, McGraw Papers. 
44. The Mauger and Avery business records (M-A Collection) 
which cover the period I873-I9I4, are on deposit in the Manuscripts 
Division, Baker Library, Harvard University. The collection contains 
some 249 volumes and ten cases of unbound materials. 
45· For example, in the summer of 1885, Mauger and Avery sent 
a buyer as far west as Russell, Kansas, in search of wool. T. K. Hast-
ings to Mauger and Avery, Russell, Kansas, July 7, 1885, M-A Col-
lection. 
46. As only one illustration, all Mauger and A very branches in 
1885 appeared to possess a standing order to purchase fleece for the 
George H. Gilbert Manufacturing Company of Ware, Massachusetts. 
H. W. Booth to Mauger and Avery, Chicago, March II, x885, M-A 
Collection. 
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buying was left to the wool merchant's discretion. If, however, 
the purchase involved a large sum of money, the eastern mill 
might send a representative to the wool to examine the entire 
lot.47 
In the mid-188os, H. W. Booth headed the Mauger and Avery 
office in Chicago. Booth handled the acquisition and shipment 
of the firm's midwestern wool purchases and filled fleece orders 
from the other Mauger and Avery branches. In addition to these 
duties, all offices of the firm depended upon Booth to provide 
them with relevant information on the movement of wool in the 
Middle West. Therefore, he periodically reported on the quan-
tity, quality, and estimated price of wool held by dealers 
throughout the region. Booth carefully observed the actions of 
his competitors, attempted to determine their eastern custom-
ers, and then sent this information to Boston.48 To assemble 
such material, he frequently traveled to Detroit, Milwaukee, and 
St. Louis and maintained a close correspondence with wool 
dealers in other cities. On occasion, Booth collected a I percent 
brokerage fee by arranging sales between small midwestern 
dealers and eastern manufacturers.49 
The midwestern shearing season began in the spring, and 
might vary with climate from as early as April in Missouri, to 
mid-June in Minnesota. In addition to the larger shearing crews 
which advanced northward from Mexico in March, a few itiner-
ant shearers, who worked alone, traveled at random through the 
region in search of sheep. Some farmers who kept small flocks 
in isolated areas sheared their own sheep, often extracting both 
mutton and wool from the poor animals. To solve the difficult 
problem of moving heavy wool wagons over muddy roads, some 
growers drove their sheep to the banks of the Illinois, Missouri, 
47· Examples of the firm's sales methods can be seen in the cor-
respondence to the Chicago office during the I88os. 
48. In writing to Boston in 1885 concerning the relocation of the 
Chicago office, Booth argued for one particular site since other wool 
merchants were close, and "they can be watched." H. W. Booth to 
Mauger and Avery, Chicago, March II, 1885, M-A Collection. 
49· Ibid., January 8, 1882, and January 13, 1885, M-A Collection. 
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Mississippi, and Ohio rivers and did their shearing adjacent to 
the transportation outlet. 50 
Most midwestern farmers washed their sheep before shear-
ing, but a few woolgrowers simplified the process by driving 
them through shallow water a few days before the fleece was 
removed. In I 868, one Missouri farmer claimed that he washed 
sheep by "swimming them three times across a running stream, 
with an hour's interval between swims,"51 which seemed to be a 
common formula. Even the process of washing each sheep by 
hand had little value, but because of tradition buyers continued 
to discount unwashed wool.52 
A feeling of mutual distrust between buyer and seller per-
meated the Inidwestern wool market. In the Ininds of some 
woolgrowers, the methods employed by buyers justified a cer-
tain degree of dishonesty. In response to real and imagined 
exploitation, some farmers tied wool bundles with enormous 
quantities of heavy twine to add weight. One eastern manufac-
turer is said to have received 121 feet of jute rope along with 
his purchase of an Ohio fleece, and some woolsacks being 
readied for shipment received liberal injections of extraneous 
matter. Textile Inillowners screamed fraud and deception, but 
in most cases exact identification of guilty parties proved impos-
sible. In turn, when manufacturers or cominission merchants 
discounted what they considered to be excessively dirty wool, or 
fleece containing a high percentage of impurities, farmers be-
came vehement.53 
so. Edward Norris Wentworth, America's Sheep Trails, History, 
Personalities (Ames, Iowa, 1948), 77· 
51. As quoted in the Missouri State Board of Agriculture, Report, 
1868, 133. 
52. For example, wool purchased by the North Star Woolen Mills 
of Minneapolis in February 1877 showed a five to six cent differ-
ential between washed and unwashed fleece. Wool Book, 1877-1881, 
in the North Star Woolen Mill Company Records, Minnesota Histor-
ical Society, St. Paul. 
53· Wentworth, America's Sheep Trails, 575; Dominion of Canada, 
Department of Agriculture, The Sheep Industry in Canada, Great 
Britain, and United States (Ottawa, 1911), 52-53; National Associ-
ation of Wool Manufacturers, Bulletin 28 (June 1908): 140-57. 
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Domestic production of wool lagged well behind domestic 
consumption throughout the last half of the nineteenth cen-
tury.54 Theoretically, this implies a seller's market with wool-
growers reaping the bene:fits.55 However, market imperfections, 
caused by the nature of the product, the geographic dispersion 
of woolgrowing, and poor channels of market communication 
reversed this advantage. Middlemen entering the trade recog-
nized that the maximization of current and future profits de-
pended upon close cooperation with manufacturers. Wool pur-
chased at low prices in the Middle West meant higher profit 
margins when sold in the eastern market, and assured wool 
dealers that textile mills in the East would utilize their services 
in the future. Thus, in most years, buyers dominated the mid-
western wool market. 
Despite recognition of their plight, sheep raisers seemed un-
willing or unable to alter the structure of the market. No single 
farmer produced wool in sufficient quantities to effect· changes 
in price levels. And, since sheep represented only a small por-
tion of the capital investment of most farmers, few could afford 
the time or money necessary to create an efficient regional or 
national organization to improve the marketing of wool. Such a 
body might have handled the concentration and sale of fleece, 
collected and disseminated relevant market information, and 
promoted better sheep husbandry. However, the immense num-
ber of wool grades and the dispersed nature of the industry 
stood as effective barriers in the path of change. County and 
state woolgrower associations sprang up throughout the Middle 
West, but such groups seemingly felt content to hold annual 
conventions characterized by rhetoric rather than action, and to 
54. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Manufactures: zgos, Textiles, Bulletin 74, 107. 
55· This argument rests upon two assumptions: (I) most middle-
western farmers sold their wool to buyers in the domestic market; 
( 2) woolen textile manufacturers purchased the major portion of their 
raw material inside the United States and sold the majority of their 
final output in the domestic market. Space prohibits documentation 
of these assumptions; however, they rest upon data contained in 
ibid., Cherington, "Some Aspects of the Wool Trade," and U.S. Tariff 
Board, Wool and Manufactures of Wool (Washington, D.C., 1912). 
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sponsor sheepshearing exhibitions at county fairs. The National 
Wool Growers Association, formed in 1865, might have pro-
vided the nucleus of a central marketing agency, but during the 
early years of its existence the Association expended most of its 
energy and funds lobbying in Congress for increases in the 
tariff on imported wool. 56 
56. Harry James Brown, "The Fleece and the Loom: Wool Grow-
ers and Wool Manufacturers during the Civil War," Business History 
Review 29 (March 1955): 1-27, discusses the formation of the 
National Wool Growers Association. 
CHAPTER IV 
Quests for Wool and Workers 
In the normal course of their search for raw material, the 
small woolen mills of the Middle West became important agents 
and buyers in the region's wool market. The brokers and com-
mission houses, organized to collect and ship raw wool to the 
textile factories of the East, served midwestern mills by allow-
ing them to reduce fleece inventories, thus freeing capital for 
other purposes. In 1870 the woolen mill at Morenci, Michigan, 
consistently placed an order at least once a month with the 
woolhouse of Thomas McGraw at Detroit.1 By dealing with 
several wool merchants, mills could compare prices, and the 
existence of many such firms assured manufacturers of locat-
ing the correct quantities and types of wool. Throughout the 
187os, the Watkins Mill purchased fleece from at least eight 
different Missouri dealers in Cameron, Kansas City, St. Joseph, 
and St. Louis, and from concerns in Chicago and Philadelphia. 
Commission merchants dispatched small samples of wool to 
mills, and, following a close inspection and a shrinkage test, the 
two firms frequently haggled until both parties could agree on 
price. 
Woolhouses also assisted mills by extending credit on pur-
chases. Commission merchants usually gave a liberal grace 
period on sales, with allowance of additional time by accep-
tance of a promissory note, but the interest charge for such 
service was normally high and varied widely among dealers. 
Such wool merchants as Benjamin McLean of Kansas City, and 
Coates Brothers in Philadelphia, usually received Io percent 
interest on accounts carried beyond two months, but this by no 
means represented a standard rate. 2 In 1871, Thomas McGraw 
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of Detroit imposed an additional 8 percent charge on the Con-
stantine Mills of Constantine, Michigan, for its unpaid balance 
which had been delinquent for only thrity days. 3 On one sale of 
2o,ooo pounds of fleece in November 1864, Nevins and Com-
pany of Boston agreed to accept cash payment in forty days, yet 
collected interest after the fifteenth day.4 Most midwestern mills 
took full advantage of the credit extended by woolhouses but 
violently objected to the high rates charged on overdue ac-
.'counts. 
Manufacturers also utilized the services of commission men 
in order to market the surplus fleece which they acquired 
through direct purchases at the factory. Faced with slow and 
sometimes unreliable transportation, many farmers sold clips in 
their immediate neighborhoods rather than risk an eastern 
shipment to an unpredictable market. In years when sheep 
raisers produced large quantities, mills collected wool invento-
ries by bartering finished cloth and yam for wool, or by direct 
cash payments. Excess lots, or wool types not suited to local 
fabrication, were normally consigned to commission houses for 
disposal in other markets. Such was the case when the woolen 
factory at Northville, Michigan, shipped large quantities of 
fleece to several different wool dealers in 1864 and again in 
1865.5 Although purchases of local wool exceeded plant capac-
ity in some years, such buying encouraged farmers to trade at 
the mill, and many factory owners deemed it good business. 
Cloth producers could receive cash advances from commis-
1. Morenci Woolen Mills to Thomas McGraw, Morenci, Michigan, 
October 20, November 16, and December 20, 1870, in the Thomas 
McGraw Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library, 
Detroit. 
2. Invoices, Benjamin McLean and Company, Kansas City, March 
22, 1879, and Coates Brothers, Philadelphia, February 27, 18go, to 
the Watkins Mill, in the Watkins Mill Collection, Jackson County, 
Missouri, Historical Society Archives, Independence. 
3· Constantine Woolen Mills to McGraw, Constantine, Michigan, 
September 25, 1871, McGraw Papers. 
4· Nevins and Company to McGraw, Boston, November 3, 1864, 
McGraw Papers. 
5· Wool Book, 1864-1866, Northville Woolen Mills, in the Mich-
igan Historical Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
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sion merchants on shipments of raw wool consigned to them, 
thus relieving the drain on the manufacturer's capital, but most 
wool dealers exacted an interest charge on such money. Given a 
good market, mills might show a small profit from fleece sales 
even after woolhouses deducted as much as 6 percent for han-
dling, insurance, selling, sorting, and storage. Wool speculation, 
however, sometimes proved to be a dangerous venture. For 
example, the North Star Woolen Mills of Minneapolis sustained 
heavy losses on large quantities of local fleece purchased at 
inflated prices during 1874, and bankruptcy eventually re-
sulted.6 
While buying on their own account, some mills earned extra 
money by purchasing for woolhouses in larger cities. In the 
x86os and early x87os, for example, woolen factories at Vassar 
and Ypsilanti, Michigan, and at Mishawaka and South Bend, 
Indiana, collected commissions as the agents of Thomas 
McGraw at Detroit. Although manufacturers did not openly 
express dissatisfaction at the practice, most wool dealers func-
tioned as both buyers and sellers. That is, such firms purchased 
fleece on orders for local mills, and at the same time sold extra 
lots received from these factories. 7 
To avoid the charges of woolhouses and to encourage farmers 
to sell clips locally, some midwestern mills employed commis-
sion merchants only when necessity dictated their use. And, 
since many agent buyers proved incapable of accurately grad-
ing raw wool, this further prompted manufacturers to deal 
directly with sheep raisers. For example, by the summer of 
1873, the Island Woolen Mills of Baraboo, Wisconsin, had 
"abandoned the buying of wool through agents for the reason 
that so many lots [were] bought without proper discrimination 
6. Copy of "An Interview, Lucile Kane with William G. Northup, 
in the Minneapolis Offices of the North Star Woolen Mills," Novem-
ber 16, 1949, in the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
7. Both custom and law frowned upon this practice in buying and 
selling cotton in the South. See Harold D. Woodman, "Itinerant 
Cotton Merchants of the Antebellum South," Agricultural History 
40 (April 1966): 88. 
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as regards quality and condition."8 Island's owners urged Wis-
consin farmers to ship fleece to the factory in Baraboo, receive a 
price equal to the market in Chicago or Milwaukee, and save the 
selling commission.9 Few mills, however, found it possible to 
rely on local woolgrowers, and as the sheep population of the 
Middle West declined after r8go, most factories came to depend 
almost entirely on commission houses to supply them with raw 
material. Even the Island Mills had returned to the use of wool 
dealers and agents by the turn of the century. 
As midwestern wool production increased, fleece became an 
important item in the general produce trade of smalltown mer-
chants. The concurrent development of residentiary woolen 
mills provided area storekeepers with a convenient market for 
the increasing quantities of raw wool received from customers. 
Therefore, a close working relationship quickly developed be-
tween rural stores and the local woolen factory. Almost from 
their opening, Inills received wool from merchants within an 
approximate fifty-mile radius of the plant. As late as 1902, the 
Carrollton Woolen Mill, at Carrollton, Missouri, procured fleece 
from storekeepers in the Missouri towns of Bogard, Browning, 
Gallatin, Milan, Purden, Richmond, and Samples.10 Merchants 
made direct purchases of wool for factories, solicited informa-
tion on the quantity and quality of fleece held by local farmers, 
and stored wool in anticipation of mill needs. 
In addition to buying from woolgrowers directly at the plant, 
from rural storekeepers, and from commission merchants, 
many midwestern factories obtained raw material by dispatch-
ing their own buyers to local farms during the shearing season. 
The lack of uniformity among clips and the dishonesty of a few 
farmers encouraged the use of Inill buyers, since they could 
carefully examine entire lots and estimate overall shrinkage 
and quality, rather than depending upon a small sample. The 
8. Island Woolen Mills to A. H. Williard, Baraboo, Wisconsin, 
June 4, 1873, in the Island Woolen Mills Collection, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, Madison. 
g. Ibid. 
10. William Mcintyre to Watkins Mill, Carrollton, Missouri, June 
16, 1902, Watkins Collection. 
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ideal mill buyer possessed experience in cloth fabrication be-
cause a miscalculation in shrinkage of more than I or 2 percent 
might mean the difference between profit and loss for a factory 
operating on a close margin. Therefore, such agents were often 
part owners of a mill or closely connected with production. 
The method of direct buying employed by the Watkins Mill 
typified the approach of several other midwestern factories. The 
firm's agent, Herman Belt, toured farms in northwest Missouri 
during the I 87os to collect small lots of wool in his own wagon 
or to conclude agreements with woolgrowers to deliver fleece to 
the factory. In payment, Belt issued promissory notes which 
instructed the Watkins Mill to pay the bearer cash on demand. 
By I879, Judson Watkins, part owner of the firm, had assumed 
the direct-buying duties and made annual visits to area shear-
ing pens during the spring and summer. In one brief trip in 
I884, Watkins wrote checks in payment for over 25,000 pounds 
of wool purchased within forty miles of the plant.11 Through 
face-to-face contacts with farmers, he could usually determine 
woolgrower attitudes. Watkins adjusted his buying procedure to 
fit the particular situation, and, as indicated by a letter to his 
brother in I 879, he occasionally played the waiting game: "I 
stayed in Smithville [Missouri] last night. . . . They are waiting 
for better offers. I will have no trouble to buy next week and I 
think they will be tired of waiting. . . . I think I can make more 
money by staying in the neighborhood, posting myself as to 
where the wool is and by salting the farmers."12 
Even when purchased by a mill, wool clipped in the Middle 
West sometimes passed through the hands of several people 
and firms before its sale to a factory within the region. During 
July and August Igo8, the woolen mill at South Bend, Indiana, 
bought approximately Ioo,ooo pounds of fleece from local 
farmers. In turn, South Bend stored its purchase with Weiland 
Company, Fort Wayne commission merchants. South Bend in-
structed Weil in May Igog to release the wool to Swift and 
II. Judson Watkins to John Watkins, Linkville, Missouri, June 
IS, I884, in the private collection of Mrs. Manfred Weber, Shawnee 
Mission, Kansas. 
I2. Ibid., May IS, I879, Watkins Collection. 
58 
Quests for Wool and Workers 
Company, who then contacted the Flint Woolen Mills of Flint, 
Michigan. After much haggling over quality and price, Flint's 
owners finally agreed to buy at least 30,000 pounds of the lot.13 
Midwestern farmers realized that domestic supplies of wool 
sometimes failed to meet industry demands, and during such 
periods they attempted to play one buyer against another in an 
effort to receive higher prices. In those years when clips were 
especially light, midwestern factories faced increased competi-
tion for raw material from wool dealers within the region and 
from the buying agents of commission merchants and textiles 
mills in the East. By I87o, Vassar Woolen Mills of Vassar, 
Michigan, found local farmers reluctant to sell because Boston 
agents swarmed over the Detroit area offering high prices,14 and 
an owner of the Watkins Mill blamed Missouri's "fool country 
buyers who are trying to spring the market" for his inability to 
purchase fleece in I88I.15 As late as Igog, Flint Woolen Mills in 
Michigan felt surrounded by eastern commission men who had 
entered "every town of any size in the state."16 
The general level of agricultural prosperity also affected the 
wool trade. The high wheat prices of the late I 86os permitted 
some farmers the luxury of holding fleece for several months 
awaiting higher quotations. For example, William Hinsdell, a 
wool buyer in Grand Rapids, Michigan, complained to Thomas 
McGraw that the advancing price of grain in I 866 had caused 
f beep raisers in that part of the state to store their wool until 
the market improved.17 Confronted with a similar problem in 
I3. Flint Woolen Mills, Flint, Michigan, to J. H. Howard and Son, 
May 7, Igog, and H. T. Thompson and Company, May IS, Igog, in 
the Stone-Atwood Company Records, Michigan Historical Collections, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Stone-Atwood Company became 
the Flint Woolen Mills around Igoo, but to avoid confusion all future 
reference citations will be Stone-Atwood Collection. 
I4. Vassar Woolen Mills to McGraw, Vassar, Michigan, July I, 
I87o, McGraw Papers. 
IS. John Watkins to A. J. Watkins, Gower, Missouri, June IO, 
I88I, Watkins Collection. 
I6. Flint Woolen Mills to M. J. Smiley, Flint, Michigan, April 26, 
Igog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
I7. William Hinsdell to McGraw, Grand Rapids, Michigan, August 
3I, I866, McGraw Papers. 
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I873, the Island Woolen Mills advised its buyer to wait out the 
farmers until they realized that they were being offered a fair 
price, and then to "carry a copy of any Chicago daily paper and 
let them see for themselves what it is bringing."18 
Although manufacturers in the Middle West occasionally 
bemoaned the scarcity of fleece, or complained of its high price, 
they usually found wools of suitable quality and in sufficient 
quantities within the region. The I 878 fleece purchases of the 
North Star Woolen Mills of Minneapolis, for example, 
amounted to 8I4,209 pounds, over 7I percent of which they 
bought in Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin.19 And, although the 
region's farmers had already started to abandon woolgrowing by 
the early I8gos, Appleton Mills in Wisconsin continued to find 
the major portion of its raw material within two hundred miles 
of the factory. 
The costs of transporting raw wool from the Middle West to 
the eastern textile industry, coupled with the expense of ship-
ping finished cloth from the East to the midwestern market, 
afforded woolen mills of the region protection from competitive 
fabrics of equal quality. For example, one pound of fleece, 
costing approximately twenty cents, was required to manufac-
ture one yard of cassimere similar to the type produced by most 
pioneer woolen factories in the I 87os. Although the wool in a 
yard of such material accounted for nearly one-half the manu-
facturing costs, it could be moved by rail from the St. Louis 
market to the Atlantic coast for one cent.20 On the return trip, 
woolen textiles shipped from New York to most small towns in 
the Midwest during the same time period paid freight charges 
of nearly two cents per pound.21 Because they were not subject 
18. Island Woolen Mills to A. B. Darling, Baraboo, Wisconsin, 
June 24, 1873, Island Collection. 
19. Wool Book, I877-188I, in the North Star Woolen Mill Com-
pany Records, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
20. The cost calculation on cassimere is from the Watkins Col-
lection. 
21. For example, freight charges on dry goods shipped from New 
York to Appleton, Wisconsin, in 1874 amounted to 1.9 cents per 
pound. Chicago and North Western Railroad to William Robertson, 
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to these transportation costs, midwestern mills enjoyed an ini-
tial advantage of approximately three cents per pound over 
factories in the East on the sale of cassimere in the midwestern 
market. 
The expenses incurred in the transportation of wool and the 
finished product, in manufacturing, and in buying raw wool 
and selling finished cloth comprised the total costs of all woolen 
mills.22 For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that both the 
buying and selling costs of factories in the East and Middle 
West were equal,23 but because of greater efficiency and econ-
omies of scale, the manufacturing costs of eastern mills were 
less than those of most midwestern factories. And, presumably, 
the manufacturing cost advantages of mills in the East were 
less than their total transport expenses.24 Therefore, the costs of 
transportation constituted the key factor which protected res-
identiary woolen mills in the Middle West from outside competi-
tion. Eastern firms could not sell coarse- and medium-quality 
fabrics in the midwestern market unless they priced below their 
Chicago, August I, I874, in the Appleton Mills Collection, State His-
torical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. Freight rates on eastern goods 
can also be found in H. T. Newcomb, Changes in the Rate of Charge 
for Railroads and Other Transportation Services, United States De-
partment of Agriculture, Div. of Stat., Misc. ser., Bulletin IS. 
22. To simplify the discussion, the comparative costs of servicing 
the equity and debt of eastern and midwestern mills are assumed to 
be equal and, therefore, ignored. Lower interest rates in the East 
perhaps provided factories in that region with cost advantages in 
servicing the debt. However, most woolen mills in the Midwest were 
family-dominated partnerships and corporations with a small 
capitalization, and at times this no doubt tended to reduce the div-
idend drain. 
23. If either party enjoyed cost advantages in buying and selling, 
mills in the Middle West definitely held the upper hand because of 
their close proximity to raw wool supplies and the market for cheap 
textiles. 
24. The lower limit of the difference between the costs of an east-
ern and midwestern mill was set by the sum of the transport costs 
on raw wool and the finished product. Although the nature of the 
material available prohibits an exact calculation, the sum of the 
total transportation expenses and the manufacturing cost advantages 
constituted the upper limit of the cost differences between factories 
in the East and Middle West. 
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manufacturing costs.25 To put it another way, mills in the East 
obviously failed to obtain manufacturing cost advantages large 
enough to overcome the transportation differential. 
The types of cloth fabricated by nearly all midwestern woolen 
mills did not require hiring elaborately trained laborers for all 
operations. Factory owners found it necessary to offer relatively 
high wages in order to attract competent dyers, finishers, and 
weavers, but the remaining steps in production could often be 
assigned to unskilled workers. Since yarn constituted an impor-
tant retail line for most manufacturers, employment of women 
and children to tend spindles proved a profitable venture. As 
early as 1850, a woolen mill at St. Louis engaged 15 men and 
10 women, and the November 1894 payroll of the Flint Woolen 
Mills in Michigan included 24 females among the firm's 58 
employees. In its 1903-1904 report, the Minnesota Bureau of 
Labor listed 110 men, 100 women, and 6 children at North Star 
in Minneapolis.26 
Typical of the times, women toiled alongside men in most 
woolen mill departments, yet suffered wage discrimination for 
the same type of work. The forty cent difference between the 
daily wages of men and women who labored in the North Star 
finishing room in 1874 corresponded closely to the differences 
in pay in a Massachusetts textile factory during the same year.27 
Men also enjoyed preferential treatment during those periods 
when plants failed to op~rate at full capacity. In March 1891, 
Appleton Mills, for example, sought weavers for the coming 
season, yet made it perfectly clear that women employed for 
25. Of course, total costs plus the markup determined the prices 
charged by manufacturers selling in the midwestern market, and 
the amount of the markup was a function of the costs. 
26. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review 24 
(March 1851): 316; Time Book, Flint Woolen Mills, June 1893-
September 1896, Stone-Atwood Collection; Ninth Biennial Report of 
the Bureau of Labor of the State of Minnesota, 1903-I904 (Minne-
apolis, Minn., 1904), 100. 
27. Workman's Time Book, I874-1879, North Star Records; 
Fifteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor, Igoo: A 
Compilation of Wages in Commercial Countries from Official Sources 
(Washington, D.C., Igoo), I: s6s. 
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such work would be forced to give up their positions to men 
when production fell off in the fall. 28 
Like the farmer and many others in the West, laborers in 
midwestern woolen mills seemed perpetually dissatisfied with 
their lot and constantly searched for new positions. A stream of 
job inquiries poured into woolen company offices throughout 
the I86os and 187os, and letters from such people indicated 
that to alleviate their feelings of discontent, many had moved 
from one plant to another hoping to find steady employment 
and better pay. For example, a carder in Carthage, Missouri, in 
1884 had worked at a large Philadelphia factory and at smaller 
concerns in Ohio, while in I8gs, W. H. Kelley, a weaver, offered 
the Watkins Mill recommendations from factories in Appleton 
and Neenah, Wisconsin, in addition to references from other 
pioneer woolen mills.29 
Broken machines, business recessions, fires, inadequate 
water for steam engines, and inclement weather all added to 
unstable employment in the woolen mills of the Midwest. Small 
factories failed to run steadily, and laborers suffered when 
plant machinery stood idle. Many mills produced cloth only 
nine months each year, and, typical of such firms, the Horton 
Woolen Mill in Roanoke, Indiana, did not start its machinery 
until early March of 1868, following a winter shutdown of 
several months. During Igoo, woolen factories at Baraboo, Wis-
consin; Fairfield, Iowa; Faribault, Minnesota; Hanover, Illinois; 
and St. Joseph, Missouri, were stopped from a few days to 
several weeks by heavy rains, damaged equipment, or slack 
orders.30 The local and national level of economic prosperity 
also affected job opportunities. When the woolen mill at Spring-
field, Illinois, reduced its work force in 1878, its employees 
28. Appleton Mills to C. C. Hill, Appleton, Wisconsin, March 28, 
1891, Appleton Collection. 
29. George Fisher, Carthage, Missouri, April 2, 1884, and W. H. 
Kelley, Westvale, Massachusetts, October 27, 1895, to John Watkins, 
Watkins Collection. 
30. Woolen Manufacturers' Association of the Northwest, First 
Annual Report (Chicago, 1868), 26; Fibre and Fabric 31 (February 
17, 1900): 6, (May 26, 1900): 176, and (July 28, 1900): 288; Tex-
tile World 18 (February 1900): 309, and 19 (November 1900): 862. 
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initiated a search of other states for positions. And, although 
the owners of the Flint Woolen Mills prided themselves for 
running more steadily than any other factory in Michigan, they 
ceased operation for six months in I go8 because of a :financial 
panic.81 
In addition to periodic unemployment, workers repeatedly 
voiced dissatisfaction with the wages offered by midwestern 
mills, and thus the region's factory owners encountered diffi-
culty in attracting laborers. For example, in refusing a job offer 
at the Watkins Mill in I884, Edward Leibard, a dyer in Rich-
mond, Indiana, chided the Watkins manager on the proposed 
remuneration, suggesting that his fum could not expect to 
attract competent talent with such a low pay schedule.32 Hutch-
inson and Company, of Appleton, Wisconsin, received numer-
ous letters during the I87os from mill operatives in eastern 
states arguing that the wages offered by that concern would not 
justify a move west.33 
Complaints of eastern workers wishing to move west con-
tinued and pointed up the fact that although money wages in 
midwestern woolen factories increased steadily from I 86o to 
Igoo, such advances merely kept pace with textile mill wages 
on the national level. The pay of employees at Appleton, Fari-
bault, Flint, North Star, and Watkins corresponded closely to 
the wages received by operatives in Connecticut, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey during similar time 
periods.34 
31. Flint Woolen Mills to Nora Bird, Flint, Michigan, April 28, 
1909, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
32. Edward Leibard to John Watkins, Richmond, Indiana, April 
21, r884, Watkins Collection. 
33· For examples, see folder marked "Letters of Application," in 
the Appleton Collection. 
34. Wages at these five midwestern mills were taken from com-
pany records and correspondence, and compared to wages listed in 
Report of the Commissioner of Labor, I goo, I: 245, 565-67; u.s., 
Congress, Senate, Wholesale Prices, Wages, and Transportation, 52d 
Cong., 2d sess., Senate Report 1394, part 4, I463-156o; Julius Forst-
man, The Wool Manufacture in America and Europe (Boston, I9II ), 
33-35; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Statistics, Bulletin I28 
(1913), Bulletin ISO (1914), and Bulletin 238 (1915). 
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Nationally, real wages showed marked advances, as the pur-
chasing power of the dollar climbed following the panic of 
1873. However, many factories, especially those in isolated 
areas, provided workers with extra benefits, and this prohibits a 
comparison of real wages between eastern and midwestern 
laborers. One can only surmise that mill employees in the 
Midwest enjoyed similar increases in real wages during these 
years. In addition, some woolen factories, such as Faribault in 
Minnesota, La Porte in Indiana, and Watkins in Missouri, of-
fered workers company-owned cottages, and a few employees 
received extra compensation in the form of farm produce. For 
example, some wage earners at the Eagle Mills near Indianapolis 
in the 187os were allotted a cow, chickens, and a garden plot 
without cost.35 
Employed laborers in midwestern mills frequently contacted 
other factory owners within the region seeking jobs which 
offered increases in pay and steadier employment. Yet, by the 
turn of the century, wages in the woolen industry throughout 
the eight states of the region tended to be equal. The author has 
examined correspondence among millowners, restricted from 
direct citation by its holder, which helps in part to account for 
the similarity of pay scales offered to textile workers. Around 
Igoo several manufacturers entertained the possibility of estab-
lishing standard wage rates in the major woolen mills in Illi-
nois, Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin. A few 
woolen producers, however, rejected the proposal, arguing that 
each locality possessed unique problems and circumstances 
which would limit the effectiveness of such a plan. Although 
factory owners apparently failed to adopt a formal wage-fixing 
policy, mills frequently exchanged information on employees 
and wages, and most plant managers knew the prevailing pay 
schedules of other factories in the region. 
Millowners cooperated in other ways. Several of the major 
factories of the region collaborated to prevent the hiring of 
troublesome employees, and the labor blacklist, feared by some 
35· Indianapolis Sunday Star, August 27, Igii. 
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eastern workers, had its counterpart in the Midwest. Most man-
ufacturers felt that it was legally too risky to sign a formal 
agreement pledging themselves to refrain from hiring certain 
workers, but factories which experienced labor problems cir-
cumvented the legality of the situation by mailing lists of 
unacceptable employees to other concerns in the region request-
ing their moral support. And, both millowners and managers 
appear to have understood the implied definition of morality in 
such cases. 36 
Typical of the American business community during the 
nineteenth century, wool manufacturers in ·the Middle West 
usually refused to negotiate with their workers in any man-
ner which suggested collective bargaining. In April 1910, 
when the South Bend, Indiana, Woolen Mill faced a strike of its 
weavers following union organization, the management imme-
diately ceased production, closed the plant, and sought to hire 
new workers.37 And, in Michigan, with the walkout of the Yale 
Woolen Mill weavers in the spring of 1910, Yale's owners made 
no effort to ascertain if they were justified, but took the position 
that "if they had any grievance . . . they should have notified 
us in a proper manner, instead of stopping their looms"38 Most 
of the region's wool manufacturers appeared quite willing to 
discuss employee complaints, including low wages, but strictly 
on an individual basis. 
As early as the 189os, midwestern woolen factories had diffi-
culty in locating skilled personnel. Since good weavers could 
normally do well in any pursuit requiring good eyesight and 
rapid hand movements, retaining their services became difficult 
as industrial development continued in the region. Several mills 
suffered from a shortage of qualified weavers, and, as only one 
illustration, in November 1890, Appleton Mills appealed to Wis-
36. The author has read extensive correspondence which indicates 
that millowners in the Midwest cooperated closely in the hiring of 
new employees. 
37· Sands Hart to F. J, Harwood, Racine, Wisconsin, April 20, 
1910, Appleton Collection. 
38. Edward Audreae to F. J, Harwood, Yale, Michigan, April 23, 
1910, Appleton Collection. 
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consin factories in Baraboo, Beaver Dam, Cedarburg, Janes-
ville, Racine, Reedsburg, and Sheboygan Falls, pleading for 
their help in filling weaving vacancies.39 Seasoned carders, 
dyers, finishers, and loom-fixers also became scarce. The owners 
of woolen mills at Flint, Michigan, and Duluth, Minnesota, to 
mention only two cases, complained of their iriability to acquire 
competent finishers in 1gog.40 
Millowners in the Middle West employed various methods in 
an effort to attract laborers, and when they failed to find work-
ers locally, most manufacturers searched in the East. For exam-
ple, in June and July I goo, woolen mills at Baraboo, Wisconsin; 
Clinton, Michigan; and Rochester, Minnesota, ran advertise-
ments in Wade's Fibre and Fabric, a Boston publication.41 Dur-
ing the 187os, the Watkins Mill utilized the classified section of 
The Woolen Mill News,42 sought employees through local news-
papers, and maintained a close correspondence with those fac-
tories in the region that exchanged information on available 
workers. In its quest for loom-fixers and weavers in July Igoo, 
Flint Woolen Mills contacted manufacturers in several states, 
while advertising in a New York trade magazine, The Textile 
Manufacturers' Journal; when such efforts produced no results, 
Flint's managers then attempted to raid other midwestern mills 
by trying to lure employed workers from their jobs.43 
Locating skilled labor constituted a problem for most woolen 
mills from their first day of operation, and as early as I 868 
several manufacturers in the Midwest proposed that factory 
39· See letters from Appleton Mills to these firms dated November 
24, 1890, in the Appleton Collection. 
40. Flint Woolen Mills to John Belcher, Flint, Michigan, December 
8, 1909, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
41. Fibre and Fabric 31 (June 23, 1900): 2; (July 14, 1900): 3; 
and (July 21, 1900): 3. 
42. William H. Dillingham, a Louisville, Kentucky, textile-
machinery dealer, printed and circulated The Woolen Mill News in 
the 187os. Circulation included the South and the states of Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Ohio. 
43. Flint Woolen Mills, Flint, Michigan, toR. R. Street and Com-
pany, Textile Manufacturers' Journal, July 5, 1900, and Fred Howard 
and James Hallett, July 6, 1900, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
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owners aid one another in their efforts to find personnel. As 
labor shortages became acute in the region's woolen industry, 
mills continued to favor close cooperation in searching for 
workers and also desired a gentleman's agreement to prohibit 
raiding. Attempts to entice laborers to leave a local plant often 
produced an immediate reaction from the offended millowner. 
In Igio, when the Beaver Dam Woolen Mill in southeastern 
Wisconsin advertised for workers in a Reedsburg, Wisconsin, 
newspaper, officials of the Reedsburg Woolen Mill were quick to 
respond to the threat. In a letter to Beaver Dam officers, F. J. 
Harwood, a Reedsburg executive, reprimanded the factory man-
ager, arguing that cooperation, not competition, should charac-
terize relations between two neighboring firms. Harwood con-
cluded his letter with a friendly request: "We are 'up against' 
the same proposition in the matter of help you are and . . . to 
take a weaver away from us is to weaken us that much. It may 
be alright from a competitors stand-point but not a helpful one, 
so thought we would come to you direct and ask you not to try 
and get our help away from us."44 
Since midwestern woolen concerns seemingly felt unable to 
offer premium wages, salary schedules proved an inadequate 
drawing card in their quest for workers.45 Therefore, some 
manufacturers included other inducements designed to aid in 
the solicitation of new laborers and the retention of current 
employees. Plants in rural areas often constructed cottages to 
provide inexpensive housing for prospective operatives and 
their families, and thus argued that living expenses in their 
area were nominal. In general, the rental charges for company-
owned dwellings did remain moderate, and in a few cases cheap 
44· F. J. Harwood to Beaver Dam Woolen Mills, Appleton, Wiscon-
sin, April 21, 1910, Appleton Collection. Appleton Mills also owned 
a woolen factory at Reedsburg, Wisconsin. 
45· One might debate the point that had midwestern millowners 
offered higher wages than those prevailing in the East they would 
have been able to attract workers. As W. R. Maclaurin and Charles 
A. Meyers have shown, wages may not provide a major incentive to 
relocate. See "Wages and the Movement of Factory Labor," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 57 (February 1943): 241-64. 
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housing was an effective recruiting device. In an effort to obtain 
good employees and to discourage others from leaving, some 
eastern firms such as the Peace Dale Woolen Mill in Rhode 
Island, and the Talbot Mills of Billerica, Massachusetts, insti-
tuted profit-sharing and pension plans for their workers,46 and a 
few factories in the Midwest followed suit. Appleton Mills labor-
ers, for example, received an annual salary dividend of 4 per-
cent beginning in January 1900.47 And, F. J. Harwood, the 
Appleton president, received several inquiries from other firms 
who exhibited interest in the plan and desired to institute such 
a program in their respective factories. Mills in the Midwest 
which continued to search the eastern labor market for skilled 
workers usually found it necessary to provide prospective em-
ployees and their dependents with funds for travel and reloca-
tion. For example, in order to attract a weaver from Watertown, 
Massachusetts, in 1909, the Flint Woolen Mills were required to 
advance him the expense money for the journey west. 48 
The concept of the American West as a safety valve for 
discontented eastern laborers has invoked considerable interest 
among historians. As Fred Shannon has shown, few workers in 
Atlantic coast urban areas could accumulate the necessary ex-
pense money to migrate.49 However, interpretations such as 
Shannon's draw too narrow a definition of the safety valve and 
overlook the broader influences of the West on eastern workers. 
Responses from some laborers in the East, indicating a willing-
ness to move, and attempts by eastern factories to encourage 
workers to remain at their jobs, point up the real impact of the 
American West on eastern labor. Although few workers actually 
moved West, the very threat of doing so no doubt increased 
46. Peter Stewart, "A Profit-Sharing System for the Peace Dale 
Mill in Rhode Island," Textile History Review 4 (July 1963): 129-32; 
Textile World Record 25 (April 1903): 81. 
47· F. J. Harwood to Scranton Stove Works, Appleton, Wisconsin, 
February 2, 1900, Appleton Collection. A few years later Appleton 
also established an accident insurance fund for its employees. 
48. Flint Woolen Mills to W. J. Benjamin, Flint, Michigan, No-
vember 4, 13, and 22, 1909, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
49. Fred A. Shannon, "A Post Mortem on the Labor-Safety-Valve 
Theory," Agricultural History 19 (January 1945): 31-37. 
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wages in the eastern job market, while making laborers in the 
East less radical. In this broader sense the safety valve did exist. 
Mills occasionally lured an eastern worker away from his job, 
but after 1goo most wool manufacturers in the Middle West 
gave up in disgust. By 1908, the Flint Woolen Mills had aban-
doned the search for employees in the East, since good men 
could "get more pay in a better position than it is possible to get 
in the West,''50 and four years later the president of the woolen 
factory at Clinton, Michigan, concluded that those laborers who 
could be persuaded to leave an eastern mill were not desirable 
workers. 51 In July 1912, the manager of the Island Woolen Mills 
in Baraboo, Wisconsin, advised other manufacturers in the 
region that since the factories of the Midwest were scattered 
and individually isolated, the only solution to the labor problem 
was to disregard the eastern market and to develop a comple-
ment of local operatives so content with their positions they 
would not wish to move. 52 
Some wool manufacturers paid their workers with money and 
goods and services. For the hours spent at spinning and weav-
ing in the Murray Woolen Mill in Indiana around 1850, David 
Tiffany received cash, cloth, credit at a local store, groceries, 
and room and board. 53 Watkins Mill employees sometimes took 
part of their pay in food, dry goods, and hardware from the 
company store housed in one small room of the factory. Pay-
ment in farm produce or stock from the store allowed millown-
ers to shift part of their capital burden for wages onto eastern 
mercantile houses for several months since they provided store 
supplies on credit. 
Laborers in most midwestern woolen plants toiled long hours, 
so. Flint Woolen Mills to the Joseph M. Wade Publishing Com-
pany, Flint, Michigan, April 5, 1908, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
51. W. S. Kimball to F. J. Harwood, Clinton, Michigan, July 18, 
1912, Appleton Collection. 
52. Island Woolen Mills to F. J. Harwood, Baraboo, Wisconsin, 
July 18, 1912, Appleton Collection. 
53. Account Book, William Murray Woolen Mill, Wayne County, 
Indiana, 1847-1854, William Murray Account Books, in the Indiana 
Historical Society, Indianapolis. 
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even though factory running-time corresponded closely to that 
of eastern firms in the same industry. Until 1892, male weavers 
in Massachusetts woolen mills labored sixty hours per week and 
the six, ten-hour days worked by Faribault factory employees in 
the late 18oos typified the production time of other concerns in 
the region. 54 Increased orders occasionally encouraged factories 
to expand operating hours. The Warrensburg Woolen Mill in 
Missouri periodically ran at night, and heavy cloth orders neces-
sitated a night shift at Appleton in 1891 and a seventy-two-hour 
workweek at the Faribault mill in 1892.55 
Information concerning actual working conditions in mid-
western woolen mills is fragmentary. The author has uncovered 
no diaries or personal accounts which might indicate labor 
attitudes toward management, monotony of duties, restrictions 
and regulations, and sanitary conditions. As a general rule, all 
millowners demanded steady, industrious, and sober employees, 
who paid their debts. In isolated rural communities manufac-
turers could more carefully observe and regulate the personal 
lives of their workers. By providing company-owned houses, 
woolen producers encouraged entire families to work in the 
mill, thereby helping to alleviate labor shortages, and they could 
also more readily maintain surveillance over them. Married 
workers with families at the Eagle Mills near Indianapolis 
around 188o, for example, were required to live in nearby cot-
tages, while unmarried males took rooms in the factory owner's 
large house.56 Such an arrangement might prove highly restric-
tive, but, on the other hand, in some cases it perhaps generated a 
warm personal relationship between the employer and his work-
ers. 
Since wool manufacturers in the Midwest failed to mention a 
lack of unskilled workers, one can only assume that they faced 
54· Frank H. Klemer, "The History of the Faribault Woolen Mills" 
(paper read before the Rice County, Minnesota, Historical Society, 
October 22, 1940, copy in the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul). 
55· Ibid.; Appleton Mills to James Chambers, Appleton, Wisconsin, 
April 23, 1891, Appleton Collection. 
56. Indianapolis Sunday Star, October 26, 1930; Indianapolis Star, 
August 9, 1942. 
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no shortage of such labor. However, the location and employ-
ment of individuals with special skills in textile production 
proved to be a constant source of irritation throughout the 
period from 186o to 1920. Prior to 18go, workers in midwestern 
factories were unhappy with the low pay and periodic layoffs, 
but most mills failed to correct these two complaints that 
seemed to hinder the acquisition and retention of reliable, qual-
ified employees. Moreover, wages and fringe benefits in the 
Middle West were generally not sufficient to attract workers 
from the East. Mter 18go, the shortage of skilled labor became 
even more critical and is an indication that midwestern woolen 
mills were not paying wages competitive with those offered by 
other industries in the region, or, that for several years, young 
workers who might have been trained had stopped entering the 
textile labor force. 
The woolen factories of the Middle West obviously were not 
labor-oriented. Since the New England and Middle Atlantic 
states contained large numbers of textile firms which provided 
a pool of trained employees, an eastern cloth producer pos-
sessed a decided advantage in acquiring competent personnel. 
The problems encountered in obtaining skilled labor, however, 
were compensated by the advantages and convenience of man-
ufacturing close to the market. An analysis of production for, 
and service to, that local market constitutes a significant chap-
ter in the economic history of the Midwest. 
CHAPTER V 
Production and Sales 
in the Local and Regional Market 
The midwestern internal market developed rapidly after the 
Civil War, and by the early 187os wool manufacturers of the 
region found it unnecessary to order minor mill supplies from 
firms located along the Atlantic seaboard. The Watkins Mill in 
Missouri, for example, purchased chemicals and dye stuffs from 
Chicago and St. Louis, cotton bagging for woolsacks from Kan-
sas City, and belting used to drive power equipment from St. 
Joseph. Further north in Michigan, the Stone-Atwood Company 
found these and other items readily available in Chicago, De-
troit, St. Louis, and Fort Wayne, Indiana. 
Although frequently used supplies proved locally abundant, 
textile machine builders were not. A few eastern machinery 
manufacturers dispatched their own salesmen to the Midwest to 
solicit business, but most preferred to depend upon independent 
dealers who established small showrooms in the larger cities of 
the region. In addition to offering a line of mill equipment such 
dealers often combined machinery sales with other activities 
closely connected to wool manufacturing. For example, in the 
187os, J. B. Carson Brothers, St. Louis dry goods commission 
merchants, took machinery orders for the Bridesburg Manufac-
turing Company of Philadelphia and the C. G. Sargent Com-
pany of Graniteville, Massachusetts. Wool dealers such as J. P. 
Thompson in Milwaukee, and Merritt and Coughlen in Indian-
apolis also attempted to sell woolen textile appliances to mill-
owners throughout the Middle West.1 
A few businessmen concentrated all their efforts on the sale 
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of mill machinery to pioneer manufacturers. For example, Wil-
liam H. Dillingham rented a large warehouse in Louisville, 
Kentucky, in November 186g and then asked the C. G. Sargent 
Company and other machine builders in the East to send him 
textile equipment to display locally. He offered to set up such 
appliances for exhibit, to call on millowners in the West, and to 
take orders, all in return for a 10 percent selling commission.2 
Dillingham's proposal netted quick results, and by April 1871, 
in Indiana alone, he had sold Sargent machinery to woolen 
factories in Greensburg, Indianapolis, Jeffersonville, New Al-
bany, and Richmond. Once a sale was made, Dillingham urged 
other wool manufacturers to visit mills where his line of ma-
chinery was in operation. This was the case when he sent an 
interested party to the woolen factory in Jeffersonville, Indiana, 
in July 1870, to inspect a recently installed burr picker.3 
Dillingham also sought to reach new customers through the 
circulation of his own trade newspaper. During the early 187os, 
he published The Woolen Mill News monthly and mailed it free 
to textile manufacturers and workers throughout most of the 
Middle West and South. In this paper he advertised his own line 
of machinery, ran articles and stories of interest to factory 
owners and their employees, and included a classified section 
listing eastern and western mills seeking labor, workers wishing 
to change positions, and secondhand equipment for sale or 
trade. Through editorials, Dillingham praised the merits of 
hometown manufacturing and heralded the advantages of west-
ern woolen mills over factories located in the East. 4 
I. Sales Circular, J. B. Carson Brothers, January g, I872, J. P. 
Thompson, Milwaukee, April I3, I87I, and Merritt and Coughlen, 
Indianapolis, January 25, I867, to the C. G. Sargent Company, in the 
C. G. Sargent Collection, Merrimack Valley Textile Museum, North 
Andover, Massachusetts. 
2. Albert 0. Wilkes and William H. Dillingham to Sargent, Louis-
ville, November 29 and December II, I86g, Sargent Collection. Ap-
parently Wilkes of Louisville joined Dillingham to establish the 
company, but Wilkes severed the partnership in November I870. 
3. Ibid., July 6, I87o, Sargent Collection. 
4. For an example, see the August I, I875, copy of The Woolen 
Mill News in the Watkins Mill Collection, Jackson County, Missouri, 
Historical Society Archives, Independence. 
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In addition to employing their own salesmen and utilizing 
the services of independent dealers, textile machine builders 
often acted as agents for one another in the sale of noncompet-
itive equipment. Wool manufacturers constructing new plants 
desired many different types of mill machinery at one time, and 
if inquiries from the Midwest could be handled by one com-
pany, this expedited sales and shipment. Around 1870, the 
Bridesburg Manufacturing Company and Furbush and Gage, 
two woolen machine builders in Philadelphia, and the C. G. 
Sargent Company of Massachusetts accepted orders from mid-
western customers for equipment produced by any one of the 
three firms. On such sales, the machine manufacturer receiving 
the order obtained the usual Io percent commission.5 
Machinery represented approximately 7S percent of the in-
vestment in most woolen factories, and freight charges on 
heavy, bulky appliances were high.6 Therefore, since many 
manufacturers suffered from capital shortages, the costs of 
transportation in part influenced the size and type of machines 
in midwestern woolen mills. Since forests still existed in most 
areas of the region, woolen men quickly found that they could 
reduce transport expenses by constructing some equipment 
from wood, while ordering other necessary metal pieces from 
eastern concerns. For example, between 1867 and 1872, wool 
manufacturers in Albany, Missouri; Detroit and Vassar, Mich-
igan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Pittsfield, Illinois; and Seymour, 
Indiana, purchased only their fans and pulleys for wool dryers 
from a machine builder in the East, and fashioned frames and 
other apparatus locally. In the case of the Seymour Woolen Mill, 
the C. G. Sargent Company charged $ISO for the fan and an 
additional $so fee for the right to use it. 7 H. L. Weatherford of 
s. Furbush and Gage to Sargent, Philadelphia, September 6, 1871, 
Sargent Collection. 
6. As only one example, as late as 1893 freight charges on a wool 
dryer, costing $1,300, shipped from Graniteville, Massachusetts, to 
St. Joseph, Missouri, amounted to $105, and the machine man-
ufacturer estimated that it would cost an additional $75 to send a 
mechanic to install the new appliance. C. G. Sargent Company to 
the Buell Manufacturing Company, Graniteville, December 15, 1893, 
Sargent Collection. 
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Unionville, Missouri, typified the requests of several others in 
the region when he asked an eastern firm in 186g to make him 
a burring machine much smaller than those listed in their 
catalog, because it would "weigh less and not cost so much to 
get it delivered here'."8 
With homemade machines and equipment in other than 
standard sizes, it is not surprising that orders from midwestern 
woolen mills to eastern machine builders frequently contained 
crudely drawn sketches indicating that certain parts had to be 
placed in a unique position, or that the assembled appliance 
must fit into a specific space.9 Factory owners depended upon 
machinery manufacturers to solve such engineering problems. 
Thus, Eastern firms attempting to sell textile machinery in the 
Middle West found that sales to the woolen mills of the region 
required an unusual amount of custom-order manufacturing. 
High transportation costs, scarcity of capital, and protection 
from eastern competitors encouraged the widespread use of 
secondhand textile machinery in the Midwest. Millowners fre-
quently purchased used cards, looms, and spinning machines 
from factories in the East, or within the region from plants 
which had suffered partial losses from fire. From the early 
188os until well after the turn of the century, the major textile 
trade journals listed secondhand machinery for sale by factories 
and mill equipment firms, and in time the volume of these 
appliances increased to such an extent that a few dealers could 
specialize in their purchase and sale.10 In addition, manufac-
7· H. A. Scott to Sargent, Seymour, Indiana, August 20, 1867, Sar-
gent Collection. 
8. H. L. Weatherford to Sargent, Unionville, Missouri, November 
14, I86g, Sargent Collection. 
g. See Osceola Woolen Mill, Osceola, Iowa, January g, 1871, Smith 
and Company, Philadelphia, July 25, 1868, and P. P. Eddy, Minne-
apolis, January 13, 1872, to Sargent, Sargent Collection. 
10. Advertisements of W. S. Simmons, E. K. Watson, and the 
American Machinery Exchange, in Fibre and Fabric 13 (August 29, 
1891): 3; 53 (September 3, 1910): 16; and 68 (August 14, 1920): 
20. The rise of :firms which specialized in the purchase and sale of 
used textile machinery indicated that most machine builders did not 
wish to accept trade-ins on new equipment, but preferred that mill-
owners dispose of secondhand machinery. 
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turers wishing to dispose of used machines from established 
plants circulated sale notices. Thus, in woolen textiles the res-
identiary stage of manufacturing fostered the acquisition of 
secondhand equipment, and, from the standpoint of that indus-
try, the pioneer experience invoked no revolutionary changes in 
machine technology. Indeed, isolation from the national market 
because of expensive inter- and intraregional transportation 
bred and nurtured obsolescence. In short, the residentiary stage 
of manufacturing modified technology to meet its own require-
ments rather than stimulating advances in that field. 
Secondhand and sometimes obsolete woolen machinery con-
tinued to move westward as new mills opened in developing 
areas. Factories in the Middle West depended greatly on used 
equipment prior to 18go, and by Igoo, machinery from those 
mills was being dismantled and moved to newly constructed 
plants in the Far West.U As long as pioneer manufacturers 
concentrated on production of cheap textiles that sold well in 
the local market, few saw need to buy up-to-date machinery if 
old equipment could still be repaired. Failure to adopt the latest 
technology offered no special dangers as long as factories in the 
Midwest remained protected from outside competition. 
The distance from the Midwest to the Atlantic Coast, coupled 
with the fact that most pioneer woolen mills contained a con-
glomeration of homemade, new, and secondhand equipment, 
complicated the procurement of maintenance on machinery 
and the acquisition of replacement parts. A woolen factory in 
the East could usually obtain prompt service from mechanics 
sent out by machine builders, but a wool manufacturer located 
in an isolated midwestern community enjoyed no such luxury. 
Several millowners found it necessary to maintain a large stock 
II. Textile World 19 (October 1900): 671; 20 (June 1901): II51; 
21 (September 1901): 547; 23 (December 1902): 1160; 24 (Febru-
ary 1903): 399; Fibre and Fabric 13 (March 28, 1891): 44· For a de-
tailed discussion of the movement of textile machinery into the West 
consult Norman L. Crockett, "The Westward Movement and the 
Transit of American Machine Technology: The Case of Wool Man-
ufacturing," Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business 8 (Sum-
mer 1969): 1II-20. 
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of spare parts in order to avoid returning an entire machine to 
the manufacturer for repairs. Still, parts were often hard to 
find. When the woolen factory in Appleton, Wisconsin, needed 
a new drive chain for its washing machine in March I8gi, the 
owners discovered that the washer manufacturer no longer sold 
machines of that model and had only one suggestion where the 
part might be foundY As late as Igog, Flint Woolen Mills 
suffered a serious delay in production while the company 
waited for an eastern machine shop to repair their damaged 
fulling mill.13 Such cases pointed up disadvantages of an oper-
ation located hundreds of miles from eastern machinery sup-
pliers. Spare-parts inventories tied up capital and broken equip-
ment reduced factory running-time. 
Woolen cloth for apparel constituted the major demand for 
the output of midwestern woolen mills prior to 18go. Before 
readymade clothing initiated a revolution in domestic consump-
tion patterns, women of the region purchased cloth from local 
factories and storekeepers, and fashioned it into family gar-
ments. Farmers and residents of small towns seemed less af-
fected by fashion than people congregated in large urban areas, 
and pioneer wool manufacturers concentrated men and ma-
chines on the production of coarse- and medium-grade fabrics 
offering warmth and durability rather than style. Although a 
few mills attempted product specialization, blankets, cassi-
meres, flannels, and jeans comprised the most important fab-
rics manufactured by woolen mills in the Middle West.H 
Pioneer woolen factories utilized a heavy, coarse, and loosely 
12. A. Hopkins and Company to Appleton Mills, Providence, 
March 31, I8gi, in the Appleton Mills Collection, State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, Madison. 
13. Flint Woolen Mills to Republic Rubber Company, Flint, Mich-
igan, November 15, 1909, in the Stone-Atwood Company Records, 
Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
14. Of the twenty-three Iowa woolen mills which reported product 
lines to the Textile Manufacturers' Directory in 1883, nineteen pro-
duced flannel, seventeen made blankets and cassimere, and eight 
manufactured jeans. A check of factories in other midwestern states 
indicated a similar proportion of mills fabricating these four items. 
Textile Manufacturers' Directory (New York, 1883), 59-61. 
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twisted yarn for blanket weaving. Although the resulting prod-
uct might last for years, its scratchy surface often proved highly 
uncomfortable to human skin. Cassimere, a general term de-
scribing material normally employed in making men's clothing, 
could be woven plain or twilled, and constituted a medium-
weight cloth of soft texture. The loosely woven, coarse-threaded 
flannel sold by nearly all woolen concerns in the region found 
extensive use as undergarments and bed coverings, and because 
it required little or no fulling and shearing, it could be produced 
cheaply and quickly. Jeans, or janes as they were often called, 
should not be confused with modern blue jeans or dungarees 
which are normally all cotton. The jean of the midwestern 
woolen mill consisted of a stout, twilled fabric used almost 
entirely for rough work clothing; the woolen homespun fabri-
cated by pioneer women closely resembled factory-made jeans.15 
The average midwestern woolen mill of 1870 constituted a 
small manufacturing unit. Two sets of cards, 5 looms, and 253 
spindles composed its major machinery, and the annual con-
sumption of 22,820 pounds of raw wool resulted in a yearly 
finished product valued at approximately $18,ooo. The number 
of employees varied seasonally, but on the average six men, 
three women, and one child labored nine to ten months each 
year in a steam- or water-powered plant which represented a 
total capital investment of $17,733.16 Of course, no two factories 
were identical, but the Watkins Mill, which provided fabrics for 
a portion of northwest Missouri between 1861 and 1886, typified 
most firms of the region. Therefore, the Watkins method of con-
verting raw wool into finished cloth and yarn offers a production 
model illustrative of pioneer wool manufacturing in general.U 
15. The discussion of fabrics is based on Cole's Encyclopedia of 
Dry Goods (New York, 1900), 30, 91, 199, 28o; Elizabeth Dyer, 
Textile Fabrics (Boston, 1927), 283, 294; Norma Hollen and Jane 
Saddler, Textiles (New York, 1955), 127; and William H. Dooley, 
Textiles (Boston, 1924), 153, 166. 
16. Average midwestern mill in 1870 calculated from U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures: 
1905, Textiles, Bulletin 74, 134-37. 
17. A pamphlet, Watkins Mill Guide (Independence, Mo., n.d.), 
floor plans of the factory provided by the Missouri State Park Board, 
79 
The Woolen Industry 
Like all wools, the sacks of fleece obtained by the Watkins 
Mill from local storekeepers, by direct buying, or through orders 
to commission houses, varied in color, fineness, length, 
strength, and other qualities. The first operation, therefore, 
involved sorting lots into appropriate classes. Even the clips 
purchased from wool merchants, which were often presorted, 
needed separation and grading in accordance with the desired 
weight and quality of cloth. The next step was to clean the 
wool. 
Typical of most pioneer mills, Watkins used a picking ma-
chine, which was a large rectangular box containing a revolving 
cylinder armed with spikes to knock out excess burrs and dirt. 
From the picking room, wool moved to the first floor, where 
both the washing and dyeing steps followed. Watkins's washers 
held an alkali-soap solution, and as the fleece moved in the 
machine, all dirt, grease, and vegetable matter went into sus-
pension in the warm soapy water. Following several rinses and 
squeezings through ringers, the damp wool was hoisted to the 
fourth-floor drying room to be spread on racks. During July and 
August, workers on the fourth floor no doubt suffered from the 
intense heat and humidity, since wool in process was never 
allowed to dry completely. 
Although Watkins apparently did not employ the process, 
some midwestern factories carbonized fleece. In carbonization, 
wool was immersed in a chemical solution of sulphuric acid and 
then heated to 160° F. With the application of heat, the chem-
ical agent destroyed all extraneous matter without harming 
fleece fibers. Carbonizing proved especially necessary with 
wools containing an excessive number of burrs or where farm-
ers had tied wool bundles with sisal twine. 
Dyeing, which was handled on the first floor at Watkins, 
might take place at any one of several stages in the manufac-
turing process. Fleece could be dyed "in the wool," after its 
conversion to yam, or by the piece as it came from the loom. 
and correspondence with B. H. Rucker, Historical Administrator of 
the Watkins Mill State Park, aided the discussion of production 
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The exact point chosen for the application of color varied with 
the type of wool and the finished pattern. Typical of other mills, 
Watkins possessed their own formulas, which were no doubt 
acquired from skilled artisans or through a long process of 
experimentation. 
Carding involved straightening and intertwining long- and 
short-wool fibers in preparation for spinning. Wool taken from 
the fourth-floor drying racks at Watkins received a light appli-
cation of oil to make it soft and pliable, and was then trans-
ported to the third-floor carding department. Each carding ma-
chine was equipped with a large revolving cylinder, flanked by 
smaller rollers, all of which were studded with short, wire teeth. 
Wool fed into the cards passed between the cylinders, which 
revolved in various directions. As a result, the brushed fleece 
formed a flat web, similar in appearance to a thin sheet of 
cotton batting. Rollers at the rear of the carding apparatus 
divided the web into several extended ropes, or rovings, which 
resembled yarn. Mter winding them on large spools, Watkins's 
card operators transferred the rovings to spinners on the oppo-
site side of the third floor. 
The fundamental principle of spinning was to extend and 
twist the rovings to create finished yarn. Like other factories in 
the Midwest, the Watkins Mill utilized machines on which the 
rovings were drawn and spun in the same operation. The rov-
ings were threaded from the spindles, which were mounted on a 
movable carriage, through a set of pressure rollers, and then 
attached to the bobbins. The operator then moved the carriage 
outward, away from the bobbin rack, and simultaneously ro-
tated a handcrank to activate the spindles. As the spindles 
revolved, the rovings were played out, while receiving the de-
sired twist. A return of the carriage wound the twisted yarn on 
the bobbins, and the operator repeated the procedure. Con-
tinued trips of the carriage filled the bobbins, and the spinner 
then rethreaded.18 
18. The hand-operated jack described in the Watkins spinning 
operation had become obsolete by the mid-187os with the invention 
of the automatic mule. However, mills throughout the Midwest were 
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Except for the need to twist several strands together, woolen 
yarn as it came from the spinning machines proved perfectly 
suitable for use as weft, or the crosswise filler threads employed 
in weaving. However, since power looms exerted great stress on 
the warp, or lengthwise threads, additional treatment of warp 
yarns was a necessity, and their preparation required three or 
four supplemental operations. Spools containing warp, which 
had usually received a tighter twist than weft, were arranged on 
the warper stand. At this point the selection of colors for future 
patterns began, since the dresser tender, as he was called, could 
arrange the various threads in numerous color combinations 
when he pulled them from the spools and laid them out on a 
large cylindrical wheel called the reel. A reverse rotation of the 
reel rewound the warp onto spools called loom beams. To im-
part greater strength, and to eliminate any protruding fibers, 
warp threads usually received an application of paste as they 
passed from the reel to the loom beam. 
In harness weaving each warp thread was drawn off the loom 
beam, passed through a wire eyelet suspended in a wooden 
frame, and then fastened to another beam which took up the 
woven cloth. Weft yarn was wound on a bobbin and inserted in 
the shuttle, which moved back and forth thus weaving the weft 
over and under the warp. The reed, a horizontal wooden bar, 
slammed against the weft following each shuttle passage and 
kept the weave tight. The weaver's major duties with the 
power-driven harness loom were to watch for broken threads 
and to keep the shuttle filled. 
Under ordinary circumstances woolen cloth fresh from the 
loom was not salable. Containing oil inserted prior to carding 
and paste applied before weaving, unfulled woolens were un-
even in texture and often stiff and scratchy. The Watkins's 
fulling mill consisted of a hollow box with a water-tight com-
partment in its base, and was fitted with a set of pressure rollers 
in the upper portion. The fuller ran long pieces of cloth through 
the rollers, and sewed them end to end. When the machine 
started, the wet material was drawn up through the rollers, 
rung out, and then fell into the tub of warm, soapy water below. 
84 
Group of Faribault workers, ca. Igio. 
Courtesy of the Faribault Woolen Mill. 


Carding machines, Watkins Mill. 
Courtesy of the Missouri State Park Board. 
Loom, reel, warper stand at Watkins Mill. 
Courtesy of the Missouri State Park Board. 
Watkins Mill, ca. Igio. 
Courtesy of the State Historical Society of Missouri. 
Rock River Woolen Mills , ca. I907. 
Courtesy of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 
Appleton Mills, ca. r8g3. 
Courtesy of Appleton Mills. 
Faribault Woolen Mill, rg67. 
Stone Woolen Mill, ca. IB7g. Photo taken from 
pp. I36-37 of the History of Genesee County, Michigan. 
Reproduction by the Michigan Historical Collections. 
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Fulling time depended on the type of fabric. The resulting cloth, 
shrunken to as much as one-third of its original size, received a 
rinse in clear water, and was then placed on racks to dry'. 
In the finishing department, dry cloth was napped and 
sheared, or pressed. Teazles, the spiny heads of a plant exactly 
the correct height to raise woolen nap, yet break off if embedded 
too far, had been employed in finishing woolen fabrics for 
centuries. With teazles set in a cylinder, Watkins's finisher 
slowly raised the nap, which he then cut to an even height with 
handscissors or a shearing machine. Flannel, an important item 
in the product line of most pioneer mills, required no shearing, 
as a steam press merely matted the nap. 
Yam for the retail trade moved from the spinning machines 
to a baler, hanker, and ply-twister located on the second floor. 
Yarns of several plies were formed by a twister, which pulled 
the threads from a rack filled with spools. After the hanker 
twisted yarn into hanks, the bundles were again twisted to 
prevent kinking and knotting in transit. A baler then com-
pressed the hanks in order to save space, thus making shipment 
less expensive. 
The sale of yarn to area residents who wished to knit and 
weave at home provided the bulk of receipts for some pioneer 
woolen concerns. Typical of such firms, mills in the Missouri 
towns of Carthage, Fulton, and Huntsville advertised their fin-
ished cloth in 1883, but all three strongly emphasized that 
woolen yarn represented the plant specialty.19 As settlers con-
tinued to move westward, household wool manufacturing grad-
ually gave way to factory production just as it had in the East, 
but domestic manufacturing continued to exist in the Midwest. 
Indeed, in more remote localities household spinners and weav-
ers continued to operate their spinning wheels and handlooms 
alongside the complete factory as late as Igoo. Therefore, at 
any given time, some of the fleece in process in a midwestern 
mill usually belonged to families in the immediate neighbor-
hood availing themselves of the factory's custom services. 
xg. Missouri State Gazetteer and Business Directory, z883-zBB4 
(St. Louis, Mo., x884), 243, 357, 435· 
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A number of mills accepted raw wool for custom carding and 
spinning, and also fulled domestically woven cloth, while simul-
taneously fabricating their own material. The I 86o advertise-
ment of Dale and McCoun, a woolen factory in Liberty, Mis-
souri, amply illustrates the attempts of many mills to solicit 
business from household manufacturers'. Through the local 
newspaper, the firm offered to do custom carding for eight cents 
per pound, or card, spin, and hank for twenty-five cents, in 
addition to producing their own cassimere, flannel, and yarn.20 
In its May 1870 sales flyer, Appleton Mills urged domestic cloth 
producers in Wisconsin to bring their wool and homespun 
fabrics to the plant in Appleton, assuring them that "cloth 
dressing and roll carding shall have our usual careful atten-
tion."21 
Like the merchant, the pioneer wool manufacturer often 
found it necessary to accept farm produce in order to make 
sales and collect debts. The account book of the Corunna 
Woolen Mill in Michigan indicates that in 1866 the factory 
offered local customers alternative methods of payment for 
purchases of cloth and yarn. Pliny S. Lyman, the Corunna 
owner, took cash, raw wool, or a combination of both, processed 
the farmers' fleece and retained a portion as payment, or sold 
finished cloth in the fall and accepted personal notes promising 
"wool in the spring."22 In addition to cash, fleece, and promis-
sory notes, the Watkins Mill allowed Missouri farmers to pay 
with bacon, corn, dry hides, homemade soap, lard, wheat, and 
wood. Typical of other factories, the nonperishable products 
bartered to the Eagle Mills near Indianapolis were usually 
hauled to a larger market for disposal.23 
20. Liberty (Mo.) Weekly Tribune, April 27 and June 8, 186o. 
21. Tenth Annual Circular of the Appleton Woolen Factory, in the 
Appleton Collection. 
22. Account Book, 1866, Corunna Woolen Mill, in the Pliny S. 
Lyman Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, University of Mich-
igan, Ann Arbor. 
23. Liberty (Mo.) Tribune, May 10, 1861, April 24, 1863; Indian-
apolis Star, August 9, 1942; Indianapolis Sunday Star, October 26, 
1930. 
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Company stores offered several advantages for midwestern 
wool manufacturers. In some isolated areas the millstore com-
prised the only mercantile firm within several miles. Payrolls 
could sometimes be partially met with stock from store shelves, 
and the retailing of dry goods, hardware, and staple groceries 
provided profits to supplement those received from the sale of 
fabrics. Rural customers calling at the store for needed items 
might also be induced to buy cloth or yarn. The availability of 
mercantile goods, along with the willingness of most millown-
ers to accept fleece in lieu of cash, no doubt prompted some 
farmers to market their wool clips at the local factory. 
On a normal spring or summer day in the 187os the average 
midwestern woolen mill bustled with trade activity. Farmers 
hauling wood, wool, and produce to the plant mingled with 
customers who came to examine finished goods in the factory 
showroom. Millowners encouraged both retail and wholesale 
buying at the plant. Rather than awaiting the arrival of sales-
men, some local merchants visited mills directly to make per-
sonal selections, and since these visits reduced company ex-
penses incurred in distribution, wool manufacturers invited 
prospective buyers to call at the mill. In Missouri, the Huntsville 
Woolen Mill provided storekeepers with transportation between 
the local rail depot and the factory sample rooms in the early 
188os. And, in its first newspaper advertisement in May 1861 
the Watkins Mill hoped to increase its retail sales by urging 
ladies to inspect woolen fabrics at the plant, since they were 
"generally better judges than men, of such goods."24 
To encourage further direct buying, some factories opened 
retail outlets in nearby towns or added special departments. The 
Faribault Mill, for example, established a showroom in Fergus 
Falls, Minnesota, in the spring of 1888.25 Since many people 
took woolen cloth to local tailors to be fashioned into clothing, 
Hutchinson and Company of Appleton, Wisconsin, like a few 
24. Liberty (Mo.) Tribune, May 10, x86x. 
25. Frank H. Klemer, "The History of the Faribault Woolen Mills" 
(paper read before the Rice County, Minnesota, Historical Society, 
October 22, 1940, copy in the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul). 
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other mills, attempted to provide this service for their customers 
with the addition of a tailoring department to their salesroom in 
1877. Through advertisements, Hutchinson's owners invited 
men and boys in the Appleton area to call at the company store, 
select material from a wide range of fabrics and styles, and to 
be fitted for a "good suit of clothes for $20."26 
Direct buying at the factory generated some trade, but most 
mills sold the largest portion of their cloth and yarn through 
smalltown merchants, each of whom served residents in a tiny 
trade area of a few miles. As the middlewestern sheep popula-
tion continued to increase after 1850, the region's rural store-
keepers collected large quantities of fleece from local farmers in 
payment of accounts. Therefore, a mill-merchant exchange of 
raw wool for finished fabrics proved a mutually beneficial ar-
rangement, and prior to the I 88os nearly every wool manufac-
turer in the Midwest utilized this method of sales. 
The barter agreement worked out between the Island Woolen 
Mills at Baraboo and a storekeeper in Highland, Wisconsin, in 
April 186g exemplifies the sales procedure of several pioneer 
wool manufacturers attempting to sell in the local market. 
Island's owners shipped a collection of fabric samples to David 
Ellsworth, the Highland merchant, along with a listing of ratios 
which indicated the pounds of wool to be taken in for each yard 
of cloth. Using the samples, Ellsworth then attempted to solicit 
fabric orders from farm families in the area who wished to sell 
their wool. When enough orders had been received, the fleece 
inventory was dispatched to Baraboo, the mill paying the 
freight charges on the wool from the store to the factory, and 
the farmers agreeing to pay the return freight on the finished 
product. As compensation, the Island Mills placed a monetary 
value on the finished cloth and Ellsworth collected a 10 percent 
selling commission.27 
26. Advertisement in a pocket memorandum distributed by Hut-
chinson and Company, January I, 1877, Appleton Collection. 
27. In x86g, Island instructed merchants to barter one yard of 
fulled cloth for every two and two-thirds pounds of raw wool, and 
one yard of flannel for every two pounds. Island Woolen Mills, 
Baraboo, Wisconsin, to David Ellsworth, April 20, x86g, and P. E. 
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Over and above the assurance of finding adequate supplies of 
raw material, bartering finished cloth for wool helped in part to 
solve a major problem faced by all pioneer mills. Typical of 
most processors, the value added by wool manufacturers was 
relatively low, which meant that raw material constituted the 
largest single variable cost in woolen textile production. In 
some years fleece prices fluctuated wildly, but establishing a 
fixed ratio between fabrics and wool acted as a hedge against 
short-run price increases on raw material. Also, utilizing mer-
chants who were willing to accept fleece eliminated the neces-
sity of hiring a wool buyer or ordering from commission mer-
chants, and the actual price the farmer received for his wool 
was hidden by the ratio. The strength of the barter system, 
however, rested upon each merchant's ability to grade fleece. 
The methods employed to retail and wholesale cloth and yarn 
varied among mills, and some manufacturers preferred to ex-
tend credit to local merchants by placing fabric assortments in 
rural stores on a consignment basis, settling mercantile ac-
counts once or twice each year. Merchants handling Watkins 
Mill cloth in the 187os, for example, received sales commissions 
of 15 percent, with the option of returning all fabric remnants 
longer than three yards. The factory balanced accounts in Jan-
uary and July, with stock held by the storekeeper, plus sales 
commissions and any wool taken in for the mill then being 
deducted from the amount owed by the merchant.28 Although 
no one store handled a large quantity of consigned cloth, a 
multitude of small firms did stock Watkins's goods. Thus, at 
any time, the factory had a substantial amount of money tied 
up in fabrics on mercantile consignment.29 
Webster, February II, I86g, in the Island Woolen Mills Collection, 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. 
28. For examples of such credit arrangements see the accounts of 
Royle and New, Ruben Puckett, and S. R. Crispin during I876 in the 
Watkins Collection. 
29. Inventory levels varied widely among stores. For example, the 
Watkins inventory of S. R. Crispin of Richmond, Missouri, amounted 
to only $28.I8 in I875, while in I878, Royle and New, a Lexington, 
Missouri, mercantile concern, held Watkins's yam and cloth valued 
at $9I3.97. 
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To deliver and collect cloth orders to and from rural stores, 
nearly all midwestern mills engaged traveling salesmen. Her-
man Belt, the Watkins Mill salesman in northwest Missouri 
during the 187os, visited smalltown merchants within an ap-
proximate fifty-mile radius of the plant. Traveling by horse-
drawn wagon, Belt collected accounts, delivered orders, dis-
played fabric samples, purchased raw wool, noted local business 
activity, ruled on credit extension, and, like all salesmen, re-
ceived complaints. Although he had to revisit the factory every 
seven to ten days to replenish his supply of goods, to return 
cloth, and to unload fleece, Belt seems to have called on mer-
chants in a four-county area on a regular basis. During Novem-
ber 1877, Belt conducted business with one or more stores in at 
least fifteen small Missouri towns.30 In contrast to the Watkins 
technique, owners of the Island Woolen Mills in 1871 apparently 
issued fabric samples to many individuals who solicited orders 
in a random fashion, seeking mercantile customers wherever 
they could be found.31 
The typical pioneer woolen mill usually limited sales to a 
small trade area, but by the 18gos a number of factories in the 
Midwest had closed their doors, and a few of those manufac-
turers who continued to operate tried to expand into the re-
gional market. For example, in the winter of 1891 Appleton 
Mills in Wisconsin offered C. C. Hill six hundred dollars per 
year plus expenses to begin the sales of Appleton woolens in 
Lower Michigan.32 Hill had previously traveled the territory as a 
30. H. W. Belt, Note Book, 1877-1878, Wholesale and Retail Ac-
counts, 1877-1878, and Personal Records, 1876-1877, in the Wat-
kins Collection. In addition to supplying regular merchants, Watkins 
also furnished fabrics and yarn to Farmers' Grange Stores in several 
Missouri towns at the usual 15 percent sales commission. 
31. By 188s, however, the Island Woolen Mills had abandoned 
retail sales to local merchants and concentrated all their efforts on 
selling to cloth jobbers and clothiers in Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleve-
land, and Detroit. James Balfour to the Island Woolen Mills, Chicago, 
March 6, 188s, Island Collection. 
32. Appleton also employed two other salesmen who covered por-
tions of Minnesota and Wisconsin, and in an effort to sell to garment 
makers in Chicago, the firm utilized Curtiss and Warren, selling 
agents in that city. 
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salesman for the woolen factory at Vassar, Michigan, which 
had ceased production the previous year, and because of his 
contacts in the area Appleton hoped that he could easily break 
into the new market. However, despite his friendship with local 
merchants, Hill found it extremely difficult to attract new cus-
tomers. The small mills in Michigan could offer storekeepers 
fast service, frequently cut prices below those of Appleton, and 
occasionally postdated bills as much as five months in ad-
vance.33 
Hill traveled from town to town by train, or hired a horse and 
buggy to reach those stores not adjacent to the railroad. In good 
weather he usually covered his entire route in five or six weeks. 
During sales trips, Hill informed Appleton of his actions, the 
general market conditions in the territory, and carefully 
watched the movements of other salesmen. He frequently sent 
samples of competitive cloth to Appleton for examination, and, 
if such material was selling well, Hill normally suggested that 
the factory try to produce a close copy at a cheaper price.34 
Unlike some of his Michigan competitors, Hill did not sell 
goods on consignment, but offered merchants terms of 3/Io, 
I/30, net 6o.35 To stay in the market, Appleton found it neces-
sary to give additional discounts to compensate for freight 
charges from Wisconsin to Michigan, and to make up special 
bolts of cloth less than the standard fifty yards. In an attempt to 
match the delivery speed of Michigan mills, Hill proposed the 
establishment of several storage depots along his sales route 
where Appleton fabrics and yarn could be stored in predeter-
mined warehouses. The factory managers rejected the idea, 
however, no doubt because it necessitated a large inventory 
which might not sell at a profit.36 
33· C. C. Hill to Appleton Mills, Grayling, Michigan, June II, I8gi, 
Appleton Collection. 
34· Ibid., Vassar, Michigan, June 2, 5, and 8, I8gi, and Saginaw, 
Michigan, June II, I8gi, Appleton Collection. 
35. Two percent discount if paid within ten days, I percent if 
paid within thirty days, and the net amount when paid in sixty days. 
36. C. C. Hill to Appleton Mills, Howell, Michigan, August I4, 
I8gi, Sheboygen, Michigan, June g, I8gi, and Vassar, Michigan, 
September 15, I8gi, Appleton Collection. 
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The interior transportation system of the Midwest in part 
delimited the sales area of the region's woolen mills. Service to 
rural stores demanded constant attention in order to maintain 
inventories of frequently purchased fabrics and to collect fleece 
taken in for factories. Except for those mills which could serve 
customers by rail, promptness of service was determined by the 
varying surface condition of country roads, often impassable in 
winter, and the speed of horse-drawn wagons. Even with the 
railroad, shipments were sometimes delayed. As late as I88I, a 
St. Louis merchant complained that it usually required six full 
days to receive woolen yarn sent by rail two hundred miles from 
a town in northwest Missouri.37 Trade areas varied with local 
conditions. Flint Woolen Mills marketed the bulk of its products 
in southern Michigan towns, such as Albion, Battle Creek, 
Bellevue, Kalamazoo, and Jackson, all of which were within one 
hundred miles of the factory. Andrew Yount's mill in Indiana 
served residents as far away as sixty miles, while the Watkins 
Mill concentrated on selling fabrics and yarn in Missouri towns 
located inside a fifty-mile radius of the plant. 
Prior to I8go, those woolen factories in the Middle West 
which confined sales activity to their immediate trade area 
seemed to have faced only limited competition from other mills 
within the region. A few storekeepers in the I 87os and I 88os 
grumbled about the high prices charged for cloth and yarn, but 
company records suggested that most merchants remained con-
sistent customers of the same small mill year after year. Fac-
tory marketing by consignment, which built up store invento-
ries on a credit basis, favorable terms such as delayed billing 
and discounts, and a storekeeper's close proximity to a wool 
manufacturer that could offer relatively speedy service reduced 
the probability of changing suppliers. Moreover, customer pref-
erences, habit, and personal friendships with millowners 
shaped merchant attitudes. In memos to their employers, mill 
salesmen often blamed the inability to add new accounts on the 
blind devotion of a few stores to one particular woolen factory. 
37· Case and Cabot Company to Watkins Mill, St. Louis, Au-
gust 26, I88x, Watkins Collection. 
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Pioneer wool manufacturers attempted to entice customers 
near the factory or in surrounding small towns with two major 
types of advertising. Handbills, emphasizing the honesty of the 
owners and praising the skill of the workers, the elaborate and 
up-to-date machinery, and the high quality of fabrics produced, 
seemed popular with most millowners. Such flyers were distrib-
uted to area residents and merchants, and typical of the times 
and of this method, prices were seldom mentioned. To accen-
tuate custom services, such as carding, fulling, and spinning, 
manufacturers also utilized the classified sections of weekly 
newspapers. Much like the merchants with whom they so often 
dealt, millowners repeatedly permitted an advertisement to run 
for several weeks without change. For example, during the early 
I86os, the Dale Woolen Mill of Liberty, Missouri, continued the 
same advertisement in the Liberty Tribune for fourteen consec-
utive months.38 Products of local woolen factories were also 
brought to public attention by storekeepers who listed such 
fabrics among items offered for sale. Illustrative of this proce-
dure, an 1877 newspaper advertisement of Royle and New, a 
Lexington, Missouri, mercantile fum, noted the recent arrival of 
cloth and yarn from the Watkins Mill.89 In x8gx, salesmen for 
Appleton Mills placed placards in the windows of country 
stores, informing customers that good values could be found 
among the "Appleton Yarns, Flannels, Skirts, for Sale Here."40 
With few exceptions, woolen mills in the Middle West faced 
serious shortages of funds to carry on normal business transac-
tions. Consignment selling, extension of credit to merchants, 
and the need to purchase correct wool types when and where 
they were available, exerted pressure on millowners to acquire 
operating capital. Pioneer manufacturers paid higher interest 
rates on loanable funds than producers in the East, and under 
the National Banking system, western businessmen suffered 
each fall when country bankers expected prompt settlement of 
38. Liberty (Mo.) Tribune, April 16, 1863, to June 24, 1864. 
39· The Lexington (Mo.) Intelligencer, October 6, 1877. 
40. C. C. Hill to Appleton Mills, Vassar, Michigan, June 5, 1891, 
Appleton Collection. 
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promissory notes. In the spring, . banks advanced money to 
commission merchants to buy the new wool clip, and these 
firms normally sold to local mills on a credit of sixty days.41 
However, by July or early August wool dealers demanded pay-
ment since funds were now needed by local banks and other 
firms to finance the movement of farm produce which would hit 
the western market in the fall. For the same reason, country 
banks also forced woolen mills to settle accounts. Thus, mid-
western wool manufacturers found money scarce and interest 
rates increasing at the very time when production was at its 
height and cloth sales at a minimum.42 
Mter 1850 many eastern businessmen migrated westward to 
construct small woolen mills aimed at service to a local market, 
and by 1870 the Midwest contained 881 such factories. 43 A 
combination of high transportation costs on raw material and 
finished products provided these mills an advantage over man-
ufacturers in the East on the sale of coarse- and medium-grade 
woolen textiles in the midwestern market. Custom-order ser-
vices supplemented the income received from the sale of cloth 
and yarn. The typical pioneer factory faced capital shortages, or 
at best paid high interest rates, and constantly searched for 
skilled labor. The great distance to the eastern machinery mar-
ket and the use of old equipment meant that the breakdown of a 
loom or the repair of a shearing machine might entail a tempo-
rary halt in production. Most mills could show a profit, however, 
41. For a firsthand description of the movement of eastern bank 
capital into the West and South, see the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle 7 (November 14, 1868): 615. 
42. As one of many examples, in May 1874 the Ray County Sav-
ings Bank of Richmond, Missouri, notified the Watkins Mill that 
only one renewal would be allowed on its loan, and the interest rate 
on short term funds would increase after September I, because 
"about that time money will be scarce." Ray County Savings Bank to 
Waltus Watkins, Richmond, Missouri, May 29, 1874, Watkins Col-
lection. For other types of seasonal financial pressure on the same 
firm, see Benjamin McLean and Company, Kansas City, July 28, 
1877, J. B. Carson Brothers, St. Louis, October 21, 1872, and E. Y. 
Moody, Edgerton, Missouri, July 3, 1877, to Watkins Mill, Watkins 
Collection. 
43. Census of Manufactures: 1905, Textiles, 134-37. 
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as long as they produced fabrics best suited to local wool 
supplies and if they manufactured what rural and smalltown 
families wanted to buy. Since these firms were oriented to their 
local market any forces which affected that market threatened 




of a Nationalizing Market 
In the long run, manufacturers commanding large capital 
resources can normally adjust production and distribution to 
compensate for changes in market demand, labor supplies, and 
raw material sources. Plants can be expanded or relocated, 
workers recruited from other regions, and shifts in consumer 
demand countered by adaptation of product lines. However, 
small firms possessing limited capital and only slight manufac-
turing and marketing advantages over other companies in an 
industry face the danger of extinction when unforeseen forces 
quickly transform the economic status quo. From the 188os to 
1920, midwestern woolen mills struggled to survive as fashion 
affected consumer preferences, improved transportation facili-
ties altered markets, population shifted from rural to urban 
areas, and sheep moved farther westward. 
In the decade before the Civil War, construction companies 
extended the American railroad network as far west as St. 
Joseph, Missouri, and La Crosse, Wisconsin, and by the early 
I 87os railroad bridges spanned the Mississippi and Missouri 
Rivers at four different locations.1 Midwestern states and towns 
competed in further promotion, and as a result large portions of 
the region's population gained convenient and less expensive 
connections with the national market. Moreover, through the 
use of compromise cars, sliding wheels, and the addition of a 
third rail, the eight states of the Middle West had succeeded in 
coordinating track-gauge differentials by the turn of the cen-
tury. Through bills of lading and reductions in freight rates 
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then became possible since standardization eliminated the old 
necessity of loading and unloading shipments at each point 
where track gauges varied, or of hoisting cars to change 
wheels.2 
In addition to steam railroads, midwestern residents enjoyed 
increased mobility from other sources. Ohio inaugurated the 
Midwest's first interurban railroad in 1888, and other states in 
the region soon launched similar programs. In 1915, over seven 
thousand miles of interurban track stretched through Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, while networks on a less grandi-
ose scale extended through portions of Iowa, Missouri, and 
Wisconsin. The interurban concentrated on providing depend-
able, efficient, and rapid passenger service from small towns to 
larger cities. On normal runs, electrically powered interurban 
trains averaged thirty to thirty-five miles per hour, and in open 
country they were capable of reaching speeds as high as seventy 
to eighty miles per hour. Before the automobile brought their 
economic destruction after 1920, the interurban systems helped 
in part to alleviate the isolation of midwestern families. 3 
By comparison to its later impact, the passenger car had only 
begun to influence life in the Middle West by 1920. However, 
the rugged and relatively inexpensive Model T Ford, first offered 
to the public in 1908, seemed custom built to plow through the 
mud and ruts of country roads, and those people who could 
afford to purchase them found new trading centers beyond the 
local country store. 4 Car owners were soon pressuring state 
legislatures to construct and maintain better roads, and a Good 
Roads Movement gathered support from many people in the 
region. Michigan, for example, created a state highway depart-
1. Thomas C. Cochran, Basic History of American Business 
(Princeton, N.J., 1959), 59; Duane Meyer, The Heritage of Missouri 
-A History (St. Louis, Mo., 1963), 472-73. 
2. George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu, The American Railroad 
Network, 186r-r8go (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 35-41, sS-66, 83. 
3· John F. Due, "The Rise and Decline of the Midwest Interurban," 
Current Economic Comment 14 (August 1952): 36-51. 
4· Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Giant Enterprise: Ford, General Motors, 
and the Automobile Industry (New York, 1964), u-12. 
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ment in 1905, and within eight years the new agency had 
outlined a comprehensive road system. With the advent of 
automobiles, farmers also initiated campaigns for the rural free 
delivery of mail, much to the consternation of smalltown mer-
chants who preferred that local residents purchase "at home," 
rather than buying from the new mail-order houses such as 
Sears, Roebuck and Montgomery Ward.5 
Automobiles and better roads to drive them on, the inter-
urban, along with expanded and improved rail service freed mid-
western farmers and the citizens of rural small towns from 
economic and social isolation. Horse-drawn buggies and wagons 
no longer limited farmers to a journey of six to ten miles, and 
shopping trips to larger cities, on the interurban or in the 
family car, became more and more routine. Overcrowded 
coaches and rough, dusty roads no doubt discouraged a few 
people from ail-day shopping excursions to the city, thereby 
allowing the rural merchant to continue to compete with de-
partment stores in larger urban centers, but the 24,000 items 
displayed in the 1890 Montgomery Ward catalog represented an 
added threat to country stores. Catalogs brought the city to the 
farmer's mailbox, and thus small storekeepers felt competitive 
pressure from mail-order houses since customers could easily 
compare prices.6 Although both Sears ·and Wards demanded 
cash, whereas the local merchant extended credit, apparent 
savings might compensate for immediate monetary outlay. 
Woolen mill profits were linked directly to the prosperity of 
smalltown merchants, and after 1890 wool manufacturers saw 
the volume of fabric sales to such firms slowly dwindle each 
year. 
5. Sidney Glazer, "The Rural Community in the Urban Age: The 
Changes in Michigan since 1900," Agricultural History 23 (April 
1949): 131; Lewis E. Atherton, Main Street on the Middle Border 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1954), 231-33. 
6. Montgomery Ward and Company, founded in 1872 by Aaron M. 
Ward, was Chicago's first large mail-order house. Sears, Roebuck and 
Company, established in 1886, moved to Chicago in 1895. Boris 
Emmet and John Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters: A History of Sears, 
Roebuck and Company (Chicago, 1950), 19; Atherton, Main Street, 
231. 
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The development of mature banking and marketing systems 
in the Middle West during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century also freed farmers from their previous dependence 
upon country stores to extend credit and to market produce. 
Better and cheaper transportation opened the grain and live-
stock markets of Kansas City, Chicago, Minneapolis, and St. 
Louis, and as the Northeast continued to industrialize, increas-
ing demand for western farm staples expanded rural incomes. 
In addition, a growing number of farmers abandoned the feed-
lot and plow to seek jobs within the region in automotive 
assembly, flour milling, processing forest products, and meat-
packing. In the twenty years after 188o, average personal per 
capita income increased in the Midwest by approximately $120, 
and with more money to spend consumers insisted on both a 
wider variety of manufactured goods and products of better 
quality.7 
While disposable incomes grew and rural mobility increased, 
the Midwest's population exploded and moved to town. By 1900, 
the region contained over twenty-three million inhabitants, a 
gain of nearly seven million in twenty years, and the number of 
evacuees from farming to industry matched the intensity of the 
boom in total population. In I 88o, 20 percent of all midwester-
ners resided in a town of four thousand or more people-ten 
years later, 33 percent. Rural-city emigration varied within the 
region, but during the 188os central Missouri, eastern Iowa, 
northern and western Illinois, along with the southern sections 
of Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio experienced heavy losses in 
farm residents.8 By the turn of the century more than one-half of 
the labor force in every midwestern state except Iowa was earn-
7· Simon Kuznets and others, Population Redistribution and Eco-
nomic Growth, z87o-I950, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1960 ), 2: 185. 
8. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Office, Abstract of the 
Twelfth Census, 1900 (Washington, D.C., 1902), 32; Conrad Taeu-
ber, "Rural-Urban Migration," Agricultural History IS (July 1941): 
157; Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, I878-1898 (New 
York, 1933), 57, 67. On the national level, the urban population grew 
by 4 percent a decade from 1840 to 188o, and by 6 percent from I88o 
to 1900. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in 
the History of Industrial Enterprise (Garden City, N.J., 1966), 27. 
99 
The Woolen Industry 
ing the majority of its income from nonagricultural pursuits.9 
For the region's wool manufacturers such demographic 
changes spelled disaster. The growth in the Midwest's popula-
tion from 1870 to 1900 enlarged the total regional market, but, 
paradoxically, the migration of farmers to urban centers de-
creased the market of most pioneer mills. Since woolen facto-
ries had previously concentrated on selling cloth and yarn to 
nearby farmers and the residents of small towns, the exodus of 
people from these areas sharply reduced the total number of 
potential customers. The volume of fabric sales fell, custom 
orders declined, and the country stores and the woolen mill that 
supplied their eloth inventories could look to the future and 
only anticipate a continuation of the same trend. And, by 1900, 
selling in the larger cities of the Middle West meant competing 
with cloth producers in the East. 
Transportation charges on eastern manufactures shipped to 
the Middle West declined steadily during the 187os and 188os, 
and in the process woolen mills in the region lost a substantial 
portion of their previous protection from eastern competitive 
fabrics. Freight rates on dry goods moved by rail from New 
York to St. Louis fell from $1.50 per hundred pounds in 1870 to 
$0.87 in 1900; New York to Chicago, from $1.13 to $0.75; and, 
New York to Detroit, from $o.88 to $0.59 cents. Charges for 
short hauls also exhibited marked declines. For example, the 
average rate per ton mile on the Michigan Central was cut 75 
percent in the thirty years after 1870.10 Eastern woolen factories 
and western consumers might rejoice at lower transportation 
costs, but to woolen mills in the Midwest each reduction in-
creased the danger of competition from outside the region. 
Some pioneer wool manufacturers fretted over the possibility of 
cheap textiles flooding the local market, but in a few years a 
major change in fashions closely connected with urbanization 
g. Kuznets, Population Redistribution, 2: 82. 
10. H. T. Newcomb, Changes in the Rate of Charge for Railroads 
and Other Transportation Services, United States Department of 
Agriculture, Div. of Stat., Misc. ser., Bulletin IS, 22, 37-38, 42. In 
general, Boston shipments to the Midwest paid the same freight 
charges as those originating in New York. 
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made the entire question of East-West freight rates irrelevant. 
Many factors contribute to the emergence of fashion in a 
particular society, but once individuals congregate in groups, 
such as cities and towns, personal appearance assumes in-
creased importance. The social phenomenon labeled fashion is 
both a quest for novelty and a desire for conformity. A high 
degree of fashion or style consciousness usually develops in 
cultures possessing a large, affluent middle class which places 
heavy emphasis on material gratification. For a few, wearing 
the '1atest thing'' provides a temporary status symbol because 
not all members of the group can afford to discard or alter 
clothing each year, while for many it merely represents con-
forming to the current seasonal mode of dress in order to 
appear like others.U As American cities and towns grew in 
number and in population during the 188os and 18gos, the 
desire for fashion in garments increased. Except for the meager 
amounts utilized for upholstering material, woolen textiles en-
tered few industrial or domestic markets, and an overwhelming 
majority of these fabrics went into clothing. Therefore, fashion 
in wearing apparel injected the woolen industry with a highly 
unstable element because by Igoo style and readymade clothing 
had become synonymous. 
Enterprising businessmen in New York City began factory 
production of ready-to-wear clothing in the early 183os, and 
despite the panic later in the decade, within fifteen years the 
industry was well established in the East. Most early factories 
merely sold cut-up material, which local women then stitched 
together in their own homes. Although the number of such 
plants grew rapidly, they offered only limited competition to 
custom-tailors who continued to produce the bulk of men's 
garments until 1865. The introduction of the sewing machine 
in the 185os increased the rate of sewing to as much as nine 
I I. Dwight E. Robinson, "Fashion Theory and Product Design," 
Harvard Business Review 36 (November-December I958): I27, and 
"The Importance of Fashion in Taste to Business History: An Intro-
ductory Essay," Business History Review 37 (Spring-Summer I963): 
I3-I4. Also see Paul H. Nystrom's discussion of the psychology of 
fashion in his study Economics of Fashion (New York, I928). 
101 
The Woolen Industry 
hundred stitches per minute, but it was government demand 
caused by the Civil War which actually placed men's ready-
mades on a firm economic foundation. Huge orders for army 
uniforms encouraged plant construction and expansion, and 
military needs necessitated the standardization of sizes.12 
Consumers in the postbellum period quickly began to appre-
ciate the convenience and value of ready-to-wear, and by 1869 
over seven thousand factories concentrated on manufacturing 
such clothing. Mter the Civil War the heavy influx of unskilled 
immigrants provided a large pool of labor, and by the turn of 
the century Jews from Austria, Germany, and Russia dominated 
the industry. During the 187os and 188os the contract system 
became popular, in which manufacturers sent cut-up cloth to 
small contractors whose workers each performed a small por-
tion of fabrication. Cheap labor, the large number of hand 
operations, and the added influence of fashion in clothing con-
fined the ready-to-wear industry to small shops. Frequent style 
changes prevented bulk purchases of fabrics, since material 
could not be safely carried over from one season to the next, 
and demands for different designs retarded the use of machines 
in the cutting operation. As late as 18go less than 10 percent of 
all garment shops contained power equipment.13 
Because of the city's close proximity to the New England 
textile mills, and since most imported fabrics entered its port, 
New York continued to maintain its hold on the garment indus-
try, and in a short time was recognized as the nation's leading 
fashion center. By 1900, garment manufacturers in the New 
York suburban area accounted for nearly one-half of the ready-
made clothing produced in the United States. Although the 
12. Edna Bryner, The Gannent Trades (Cleveland, Ohio, 1916), 
13; "War as a Stimulus to American Industry," Bulletin of the Busi-
ness Historical Society 8 (January 1934): 51. 
13. J. M. Budish and George Soule, The New Unionism in the 
Clothing Industry (New York, 1927), 16-24; Florence S. Richards, 
The Ready-to-Wear Industry, I900-I950 (New York, 1951), 7-8. Ex-
cept where brand names could be promoted, large firms possessed few 
advantages over small ready-to-wear manufacturers. The numerous 
hand operations reduced the optimum-size plant and prevented ad-
ditional economies of scale in large factories. 
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industry experienced a phenomenal growth in Chicago, Cincin-
nati, and Philadelphia, New York City had lost only a small 
percentage of its dominant position twenty years later. Wom-
en's ready-to-wear, which developed somewhat later than the 
men's sector, also localized in the East, with New York's gar-
ment district turning out approximately 75 percent of the coun-
try's output in 1920.14 
Many consumers in the Middle West had been introduced to 
readymade garments long before they revolutionized American 
textile markets. In the 183os, St. Louis merchants were adver-
tising eastern-manufactured suits for men and boys, and within 
twenty years stores in several other midwestern cities displayed 
such wearing appareJ.l5 The scent of large profits through cloth-
ing sales to the western market lured a host of small garment 
makers to Chicago and Cincinnati. As early as 1851, officials in 
the latter city reported that over nine thousand women were 
currently employed in 108 garment factories.16 
In an effort to reach the expanding national market, eastern 
manufacturers employed display advertising in newspapers and 
in magazines such as Scribner's, Harper's, and the Atlantic. 
Such advertisements increased by over 75 percent in the 188os 
and went on to grow another one-third in the 18gos.17 Depart-
ment stores also arrived in the larger cities of the Midwest 
during the 18gos, bringing with them a one-price policy, the 
money-back guarantee, and special departments featuring the 
14. Mabel A. Magee, Trends in Location of the Women's Clothing 
Industry (Chicago, 1930), III-I4; Jesse Pope, The Clothing Industry 
in New York, University of Missouri Studies, no. I, (Columbia, Mo., 
1905) I: 288-92; Harold Underwood Faulkner, The Decline of Lais-
sez Faire, I897-I9I7 (New York, I95I ), I45· 
IS. Wayland A. Tonning, "The Beginnings of the Money-Back 
Guarantee and the One Price Policy in Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, 
1833-1880," Business History Review 30 (June 1956): 199; Lewis E. 
Atherton, "Early Western Mercantile Advertising," Bulletin of the 
Business Historical Society I2 (September I938): 52. 
16. Preliminary Report of the Eighth Census, z86o, in Guy Stevens 
Callender, Selections from the Economic History of the United States, 
1765-I86o (Boston, I909), 48I. 
17. Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor, 
and Public Policy, z86o-z897 (New York, I96I), 272. 
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latest eastern clothing fashions.18 Not to be slighted, farmers 
could view current styles on advertising material mailed to 
storekeepers by garment manufacturers. And, of course, mail-
order houses encouraged farmwomen to abandon dresses made 
at home and to don the latest factory-made fashions on Sunday 
and for special occasions. Consumers were being told that what 
had once sufficed for clothing on the farm was somehow no 
longer acceptable in town.19 Certainly by 1920, fashion and 
readymade clothing were fast becoming almost as much a part 
of midwestern life as cattle, corn, and conservative politics. 
The switch from homemade to readymade clothing relocated 
the market of most midwestern mills. Within twenty years wool 
manufacturers in the region lost all previous advantages arising 
from a close proximity to the market. When rural families 
migrated to the city, the mills' market moved with them from 
country stores in the immediate vicinity of the plant to the 
newly populated urban centers. And the fashion trend favoring 
ready-to-wear again shifted the locus of demand-in the second 
instance, several hundred miles from the Middle West to the 
Atlantic Coast. Eastern garment makers, rather than the res-
idents of midwestern farms and towns, comprised the most 
important consumers of woolen fabrics by Igoo. Thus, as a 
result of fashion and urbanization, woolen textiles had been 
converted from a consumer good to a raw product. 
Furnishing coarse woolen cloth to customers in the Middle 
West who sewed their own clothing at home was one thing, but 
attempting to supply fine-quality fabrics to hundreds of tiny 
garment shops located in larger cities was quite another. In-
stant knowledge of style changes, the daily actions and prices of 
competitors, and the mood of buyers in the market at any given 
time constituted the very minimum of information necessary to 
sell in the garment districts. The ease and speed with which a 
small textile factory might convert from the production of one 
type of material to another could perhaps offer important man-
18. For a discussion of their growth in one midwestern state, see 
Wayland A. Tonning, "Department Stores in Down State Illinois, 
J889-I943," Business History Review 29 (December 1955): 335-49· 
19. Atherton, Main Street, 227-28. 
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ufacturing cost advantages over larger concerns, but because 
mills in the Middle West were isolated they were more out of 
touch with fashion changes than :firms close to the clothing 
market. Capital scarcity prohibited many pioneer manufac-
turers from employing the best, and therefore the most expen-
sive, merchandising agents; the ability of experienced selling 
agents to sense subtle changes in the market and to predict its 
future direction, gave mills who could afford to purchase their 
services the upper hand over others in the trade.20 In addition to 
these problems, a shortage of skilled labor, along with the 
homemade, secondhand, and obsolete machinery collected over 
a number of years, prevented all but a very few midwestern 
mills from producing woolen fabrics of high quality, or at a 
price low enough to permit competition with up-to-date facto-
ries. The limitations of capital, expertise, machinery, and labor 
also thwarted these firms from supplying garment makers 
within their own region in Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and 
St. Louis. 
Those millowners in the Midwest who ventured into the 
eastern textile market during the I 8gos were immediately 
struck with the realization that wool manufacturers in that 
region had been struggling for a number of years with competi-
tors from another branch of the industry. Affluence, better 
heated homes, urban living, and, later, the closed automobile, 
prompted many Americans in the postbellum period to demand 
lighter and more stylish fabrics than those produced by most 
woolen concerns. Thus, as early as the 187os fashion-conscious 
consumers in the East had started to favor worsted material. 
Clothing customers could readily identify cloth woven from 
worsted yam by the evident weave pattern, light weight, and 
hard, lustrous finish. Suits of all-wool worsted with their clean-
cut lines had become the vogue in men's dress by I8go.21 
20. Hansjorg Siegthaler critically analyzes the economic contri-
bution of dry goods commission houses in "What Price Style? The 
Fabric-Advisory Function of the Drygoods Commission Merchant, 
185o-188o," Business History Review 41 (Spring 1967): 36-61. 
21. Herman E. Michl, The Textile Industries: An Economic Anal-
ysis (Washington, D.C., 1938), 197. 
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Woolen and worsted manufacturing differed primarily in the 
processes employed prior to spinning. Wool for worsted yarn 
was carded, then passed through a series of mechanical combs 
which removed all short ends, straightened the remaining 
fibers, and laid them parallel to each other. They were then 
spun very tightly.22 Since worsted combs parallelized all fibers, 
wool passed through them had to be long enough to permit such 
an operation. Commercially, worsted manufacturing had its 
beginning in the United States with the Canadian Reciprocity 
Treaty of 1854, which allowed the duty-free importation of 
fleece suitable for combing. While the woolen industry experi-
enced a general trend toward geographic dispersion immedi-
ately after the Civil War, worsted mills remained in the East, 
close to capital markets and the major cities which imported 
foreign fleece. The invention of an improved combing machine 
in 1888, capable of handling short-fibered wool, plus crossbreed-
ing by American sheep raisers, freed worsted manufacturers 
from complete dependence upon imports for raw material. 23 
However, close proximity to the readymade clothing industry 
and the large capital investment in plant and machinery en-
couraged worsted mills to stay in New England.24 
Worsted factories enjoyed several important cost advantages 
over woolen mills. A large number of automatic machines per-
mitted the employment of unskilled labor in most departments, 
and market demand allowed high-volume production of a few 
staple-grade fabrics, such as serge, at very low cost. Moreover, 
22. A complete description of worsted manufacturing can be found 
in A. F. DuPlessis, The Marketing of Wool (London, I93I ), 22-46. 
23. Despite such improvements, domestic production of combing 
wool lagged well behind domestic demand for many years. For ex-
ample, in 1905, combing wool imports for consumption exceeded 
twenty million pounds. Chester W. Wright, Wool-Growing and the 
Tariff (Cambridge, Mass., Igio), 343. 
24. The additional steps in production before spinning neces-
sitated a heavy capital investment in complicated and expensive 
combing machines. For that reason, the investment in a worsted fac-
tory was normally much larger than the investment in a woolen mill. 
Modern machinery and the mixture of wool with snythetic fibers 
all but eliminated the once important distinction between woolen 
and worsted fabrics. 
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combed wool, or "top," could be classified into standard grades 
and traded in a futures market, something impossible with 
carded fleece. In less than twenty years, 188o to 1899, the value 
of worsted fabrics produced in the United States increased by 
approximately eighty-seven million dollars; by the close of the 
period worsteds had surpassed woolens as the major branch of 
the industry.25 While woolen and worsted manufacturers fought 
for the allegiance of consumers in the East, millowners out in 
the Midwest were observing a new threat to their existence-
the exodus of sheep from the region. 
Population pressure and rising land values after I 870 forced 
many farmers in the Midwest to abandon sheep in favor of 
heavier concentration on cereals, beef and pork production, and 
dairy farming. Never completely committed to woolgrowing as 
a commercial enterprise, cornbelt farmers tended to dispose of 
flocks when fleece prices declined and sheep raising failed to 
pay as well as other agricultural pursuits. In more densely pop-
ulated areas packs of stray dogs exacted a heavy annual toll of 
flocks, but, no doubt reacting to public pressure, most midwest-
ern legislators generally remained reluctant to enact statutes 
aimed at restricting the mobility of man's best friend. As sheep 
lost the battle of comparative advantage, the Midwest's ovine 
population tumbled. Less than one-fourth of the thirty-nine 
million sheep in the United States in I goo could be found in the 
Middle West, and in that year the federal census enumerated 
only 8,soo,ooo, a decline of approximately five million in thirty 
years.26 
Because of their hardiness, a strong propensity to flock, and 
an amazing ability to forage and survive in rugged, arid re-
gions, Merinos seemed ideally suited for the dry, open country 
25. Arthur Harrison Cole, "A Neglected Chapter in the History of 
Combinations: The American Wool Manufacture," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 37 (May 1923): 439; L. D. H. Weld, "Specialization in 
the Woolen and Worsted Industry," Quarterly Journal of Economics 
27 (November 1912): 70-71. 
26. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Eleventh 
Census, Agriculture: 1890, 92-93, and Thirteenth Census, Agricul-
ture, s: 407. 
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of the West. And like cattlemen, sheep owners soon perceived 
the economic advantages of utilizing the public domain for 
grazing. The violent conflicts between cowboys and sheepherd-
ers during the 187os and 188os merely indicated that mid-
western sheep were pouring onto ranges of the Far West in 
ever-increasing numbers. As only one example of the trend, 
Montana's sheep population jumped from a few thousand in 
1870 to over four million in 1900, elevating that state to the 
nation's top in sheep production.27 
Sheep in the Middle West not only declined in total numbers, 
but farmers shifted from woolgrowing to the production of 
mutton for sale to the meatpackers of Chicago, Kansas City, 
and Omaha. As a result, they quickly exchanged the Merino, 
with its small frame, for one of the crossbreeds, such as the 
Shropshire, which combined a large carcass of high food value 
with a medium-quality fleece. Crossbred sheep, however, 
usually yielded coarser wool and in much smaller quantities 
than the Merino, and buyers often discounted clips from such 
animals because the black wool from the feet, head, and legs 
tended to mix with white fibers, thereby sharply reducing its 
utility to manufacturers.28 As early as 1875, the Minneapolis 
Daily Tribune warned Minnesota farmers that they were mak-
ing a serious mistake by giving up Merinos in favor of the 
coarse-wooled breeds,29 and in 1909 an owner of the Flint 
Woolen Mills complained to a close friend that Michigan fleece 
was no longer suitable for manufacturing because "there ap-
pears to be a great many coarse locks and streaks . . . and they 
appear to be very kempy. . . . It is very seldom you will find a 
flock in Michigan, even in a small way, that will run as uniform 
as a flock of Western sheep."30 Typical of all states in the 
27. Thirteenth Census, Agriculture, s: 407. 
28. American Sheep Producers Council, Breeds of Sheep, Educa-
tional Pamphlet 3 (Denver, Colo., n.d.), passim. 
29. Minneapolis Daily Tribune, August 15, 1875· 
30. Flint Woolen Mills to M. J. Smiley, Flint, Michigan, April 26, 
Igog, in the Stone-Atwood Company Records, Michigan Historical 
Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Kempy wool con-
tained fibers called "kemps" which would not absorb solutions, thus 
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Midwest, Indiana listed only five counties in 1900 containing a 
substantial number of Merinos, nearly all its woolgrowers hav-
ing shifted to the fattening of western lambs.31 
As the popularity of wool as a market commodity disappeared 
in the Middle West, eastern commission merchants closed their 
branch offices in the region, while several midwestern wool 
dealers sought investments in more lucrative areas. Many local 
produce speculators, so important in an earlier period in finding 
and collecting small lots of fleece, focused their attention on 
other agricultural products. With many of these middlemen 
gone or inactive, and faced with a declining wool clip, few 
midwestern mills could afford the convenience and luxury of 
several direct buyers. Woolen factories which continued to oper-
ate found it more and more necessary to procure raw material 
from woolhouses in larger cities, and by 1914 Boston alone 
handled 70 percent of all the wool marketed in the United 
States. 
Millowners came to rely upon commission merchants for 
another reason. Since the vagaries of fashion might change the 
demand for different types of wool, small mills without several 
buyers had to depend upon woolhouses who purchased and 
stored various grades of fleece awaiting orders. Manufacturers 
caught holding large wool inventories could suffer heavy finan-
cial losses if the preferences of consumers in the clothing 
market shifted suddenly; buying clips before styles and prices 
had been well established proved exceedingly risky. Some mills 
in the East received special freight rates on wool moved by rail 
from terminals on the Pacific Coast to Boston, which repre-
sented a lower rate than the freight charges on fleece shipped 
from interior points. Thus, from a monetary standpoint, a few 
eastern wool manufacturers by 1920 were closer to the domestic 
wool supply than mills located in the Midwest. 
As soon as the Middle West joined the national market, wool 
manufacturers could not use such fleece for fabrics dyed in solid 
colors. 
31. Edward Norris Wentworth, America's Sheep Trails, History, 
Personalities (Ames, Iowa, 1948), 161. 
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manufacturers in the region inherited all the problems of the 
industry on the national level. The demand for worsted material 
and the movement of sheep to the Far West only compounded 
the instability created by consumer demands for readymade 
clothing. Midwestern mills attempting to sell textiles in the East 
faced competition from both woolen and worsted manufac-
turers, many of whom enjoyed access to relatively large capital 
resources, operated modem, well-equipped factories, and dis-
posed of output through aggressive, experienced selling agents. 
Gone were the days when pioneer millowners could run ma-
chinery at their leisure, when retailing meant serving farmers 
and their wives at the counter of the company store, and when 
wholesaling involved horse-and-wagon deliveries of a few miles 
to rural and smalltown merchants. Faced with declining local 
demand for piece goods and yam, most of the older woolen men 
simply closed the doors of their factories, accepting what ap-
peared to be the inevitable. However, a few businessmen con-
tinued to search for possible solutions to their plight. 
CHAPTER VII 
The Struggle for Survival 
The economic and social undercurrents of urbanization com-
pelled most midwestern wool manufacturers to abandon their 
business sometime during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. Progress exacted its toll and within two generations 
vacant mills dotted the countryside, providing older residents 
with memories of an era when country stores were the center of 
trade, sheep abounded in the area, and horses provided trans-
portation. In the thirty years after 1870 the midwestern woolen 
industry suffered an average of twenty-three mill failures per 
year. The region's 881 factories in 1870 dwindled to only 183 by 
Igoo, and all but a few of the seventy mills which remained in 
1920 had long since abandoned the manufacture of woolen 
fabrics for appareP 
An examination of the different courses of action taken by 
four midwestern woolen concerns after I 870 illustrates a num-
ber of the possible alternatives open to such firms in their 
efforts to avert failure. The methods employed by the managers 
of the Watkins Mill in Missouri, the Faribault Mill in Minne-
sota, Flint Woolen Mills in Michigan, and the Appleton Mills of 
Wisconsin offer insights into some of the problems confronting 
small companies forced to enter the national market during this 
period. Moreover, case studies of these four mills strongly sug-
gest that the degree of perception exhibited by managers and 
owners frequently plays a significant role in business success. 
Following its construction in 1861, the owner of the Watkins 
Mill, located near Lawson, Missouri, marketed the bulk of fac-
tory output by placing yarn and fabric assortments in small-
town stores within fifty miles of the plant. Additional income 
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from a factory salesroom and company store, a flour-and-grist 
mill, and custom carding and spinning supplemented profits 
from consignment sales. Waltus Watkins, the mill's founder, 
accepted farm produce, wood, and wool in payment for cloth, 
flour and meal, or custom services, and procured the bulk of the 
firm's raw material through direct purchases from woolgrowers 
in northwest Missouri. Watkins divided his time between wool 
manufacturing and a rather extensive farming and livestock 
operation, sometimes closing the mill during the winter months 
when inclement weather hindered its operation. 
By the early 188os, when the elder Watkins retired and his 
three sons assumed control of the business, cloth sales to rural 
stores had already started to decline and farmers in that section 
of Missouri were rapidly disposing of fine-wooled Merinos. 
While maintaining service to local merchants, Judson, John, 
and Joseph Watkins expanded the mill's output of yarn, and 
negotiated contracts for the delivery of such goods to several 
large mercantile firms in Kansas City, St. Joseph, and St. Louis.2 
Extant records do not clearly indicate all the problems, but it 
seems obvious from correspondence that the Watkins brothers 
lacked even their father's meager commitment to wool man-
ufacturing, and that sales of fabrics and yarn failed to yield 
profits in sufficient quantity to justify updating equipment, or 
for that matter, continuing production for an extended period 
of time. The factory carded raw wool for local farmers and 
family friends for a number of years,3 and periodically man-
ufactured some cloth, but for all practical purposes the Watkins 
Mill had ceased to be a viable business enterprise by 1886. In 
1900, John Watkins confessed to the Director of the Census 
that plant machinery had been idle for several years, was in 
I. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Four-
teenth Census, Manufacturing, zgzg, 10: 264-65, and Census of 
Manufactures: zgos, Textiles, Bulletin 74, 134-36. 
2. Three letters, John Watkins to Judson Watkins, St. Louis, all 
dated September 13, 1883, and Bullene, Moore, and Emery to Watkins 
Mill, Kansas City, October 27, 188o, in the Watkins Mill Collection, 
Jackson County, Missouri, Historical Society, Archives, Independence. 
3. M. Wilson to John Watkins, Ludlow, Missouri, September 4, 
1902, Watkins Collection. 
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need of repair, and that his workers had all gone elsewhere, 
because "I run the farm and neglect the mill."4 
AB early as 1882 the Watkins brothers had entertained the 
possibility of moving the mill farther west.5 The Fort Worth, 
Texas, Board of Trade contacted John Watkins and the owner 
of a woolen mill in Iowa, in an attempt to induce one or both 
firms to relocate in that community. Watkins corresponded with 
Fort Worth representatives, sent fabric samples for exhibition 
to potential investors there, and personally visited the city to 
discuss details with local officials. At first, Fort Worth pro-
moters appeared interested in the plan, but soon expressed 
concern regarding the age of the machinery in the Watkins 
Mill, and the proposal failed to materialize.6 
During the fall of 1884, John Watkins again visited the West, 
this time to survey parts of New Mexico as a possible site for 
the relocation of the mill. Following his visit to Albuquerque, 
John seemed pleased with what he had seen, and in a letter to 
his brother Judson in early October, he outlined the reasons for 
his optimism: "We called on the land agent for the Atlantic and 
Pacific R.R. and ... [he] thinks a mill located here would be a 
good thing. He says the Pueblo Indians could be used in the mill 
and at very low wages. The people here say the Pueblos are the 
best workers in the country. Fuel would be high and hard to get 
however there is plenty of coal about 15 miles from here ... , 
the A. and P. R. R. when extended East will run through it. . . . 
Wool is worth g to 10 cts per lb."7 John's observations produced 
4· John Watkins to the Director of the Twelfth Census, Lawson, 
Missouri, May 16, Igoo, Watkins Collection. 
5· In 1874, owners of the Watkins Mill had received inquiries 
concerning the removal of the woolen factory to Leavenworth, Kan-
sas. See E. Estes to John Watkins, Leavenworth, January I, 1874, 
Watkins Collection. 
6. W. P. Wilson to John Watkins, Fort Worth, August 14, 1882, 
and October g, 1882, Watkins Collection; Wilson, Paddock and Com-
pany to M. D. Scruggs, Fort Worth, June 26, 1882, and June 27, 
1882, and M.D. Scruggs to John Watkins, Fort Worth, July 30, 1882, 
copies in the private collection of Mrs. Ruth B. Roney, Lawson, Mo. 
7· John Watkins to Judson Watkins, Albuquerque, October g, 
1884, in the private collection of Mrs. Manfred Weber, Shawnee 
Mission, Kansas. 
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little action and this venture also resulted in disappointment. 
Actually, relocation in a new frontier area would only have 
delayed the inevitable for a few more years. As soon as New 
Mexico had developed adequate internal transportation and had 
joined the national market, Watkins's problems would have 
reappeared. 8 
While the owners of the Watkins Mill in Missouri looked to 
the west, farther north in Minnesota the managers of the Fari-
bault Woolen Mill were just starting to experience similar prob-
lems. The woolen factory in Faribault had its beginning when 
Carl Klemer, a German immigrant and cabinetmaker by trade, 
purchased a used, horsepowered carding machine in I86s. Two 
years later, a small steam engine replaced the treadmill, and in 
1872 Klemer added spinning jennies for the production of yarn. 
Despite capital shortages and three disastrous fires within four 
years, Klemer managed to continue expansion as dyeing vats, 
looms, and other appliances were included to make a complete 
factory. By the early 189os, the company owned a two-set mill 
with up-to-date machinery, and the blankets, cassimeres, and 
flannels manufactured at Faribault typified the output of a 
hundred other mills in the Midwest.9 
Carl Klemer's two sons, Henry and Ferdinand, entered the 
business as managers and partners during the I 89os, just in 
time to witness the decline of fabric sales to consumers in 
Minnesota and to feel the increased competition from ready-
made clothing. To reach this new market, the owners installed 
sewing machines in one department of the plant in 1901 and 
shifted part of the labor force to production of men's all-wool 
pants and shirts. In an effort to obtain additional funds, the 
business was incorporated in 1905, and the following year 
8. The Watkins Mill is located approximately seven miles west of 
Lawson, Missouri, in Ray County. The Missouri State Park Board 
opened the mill and plantation to the public in 1966. 
g. The discussion of the early history of the Faribault Mill is based 
on Frank H. Klemer, "The History of the Faribault Woolen Mills" 
(paper read before the Rice County, Minnesota, Historical Society, 
October 22, 1940, copy in the Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul), 
and "Large Midwestem Woolen Mill Founded by German Cabinet-
maker," America's Textile Reporter 75 (June 8, Ig6I): 47-49. s8. 
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capital stock was offered to the general public and to the 
Minneapolis selling agent who marketed the firm's products. 
Experiencing little success in the ready-to-wear trade, the man-
agers discontinued the sale of clothing and turned men and 
machines to the manufacture of quality blankets. 
After working several years in other woolen factories and 
completing a course of study at the Philadelphia Textile School, 
Walter Klemer, a grandson of the founder, joined the company 
in 1912. Almost immediately Walter intensified the specializa-
tion on all-wool, fine-quality blankets, while sharply curtailing 
the production of piece goods and yarn. Orders for 1oo,ooo 
army blankets plus a government wool allotment sustained the 
mill through World War I, and by 1920 Faribault blankets were 
being sold in large department stores throughout the country 
and to hospitals, hotels, and other public and private institu-
tions. Concentration on blankets permitted internal economies 
of scale stemming from high-volume production, eliminated the 
need to search for different types of wool with each caprice of 
fashion, and avoided the instability of the garment industry. 
Perhaps because of its location in the heart of a rapidly 
industrializing area, the owners of the Flint Woolen Mills o£ 
Flint, Michigan, were forced to search for a competitive position 
in one sector of the woolen industry somewhat earlier than 
most mills in the Midwest. Oren Stone, a farmer, merchant, 
and real estate speculator, constructed the factory at Flint in 
1867 to utilize Lower Michigan's abundant wool supply and to 
offer the growing population in the southern portion of the state 
coarse- and medium-quality blankets, flannels, and jeans.10 Al-
though several partners entered and left the business from time 
to time, Stone personally supervised both production and sales 
until 1900. Typical of such firms, he emphasized custom card-
ing and spinning during the early years of the operation.11 
Quickly sensing the future importance of readymade cloth-
IO. Stone first organized the business as Stone-Atwood Company, 
but in I goo new owners renamed it the F1int Woolen Mills. 
II. Biographical History of Genesse County, Michigan (Indian-
apolis, Ind., n.d.), 339-41. 
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ing, Stone adjusted machinery and output to meet the new 
demand, and by 1887 Flint salesmen were displaying fabric 
samples to custom-tailors and ready-to-wear manufacturers in 
Baltimore, New York City, and Rochester. Two years later, the 
mill also began the manufacture of men's wool pants for sale to 
consumers in the East and Middle West. Apparently profits 
received in the pants market failed to justify continuance of the 
line, so Stone launched an aggressive campaign to increase the 
volume of cloth sales to garment makers located closer to the 
factory. Consequently, by the turn of the century salesmen from 
Flint, supplied with samples, made regular calls on clothing 
manufacturers in Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Indianapolis, 
and Milwaukee, in addition to visits to older, established cus-
tomers in other cities.12 
New owners assumed control of the mill in January I goo, but 
introduced few innovations except the disposal of all narrow 
looms, a step necessary to meet the demands of garment mak-
ers for fabrics in widths of at least fifty-four inches. The volume 
of sales to ready-to-wear manufacturers remained high, but 
after six months of operation the company failed to show a 
profit, and salesmen were immediately contacted and instructed 
to increase prices, thereby lowering the firm's ability to compete 
with eastern textile factories.13 Flint's new managers were being 
educated in some of the techniques of selling to the clothing 
industry, and they soon learned that certain tactics used by 
garment manufacturers enhanced the instability of their mar-
ket. 
Garment makers placed cloth orders after examination of 
samples presented by mill agents or salesmen. In turn, man-
ufacturers made up sample clothing to show to jobbers in the 
spring and fall. I£ jobbers disliked a particular line because of 
its pattern, style, or weave, garment makers often canceled the 
:r2. See orders and correspondence in letter books of February 7, 
:r887-January 18, :r888; May 18, :r88g-July 30, :r8go; and Decem-
ber 22, :r8gg-May 27, :rgoo, in the Stone-Atwood Company Records, 
Michigan Historical Collections, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
13. Flint Woolen Mills to F. E. Larson, Flint, Michigan, July 5, 
:rgoo, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
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remainder of their order for that fabric, or returned remnants to 
textile mills claiming that they were either defective or unlike 
the sample.14 Also, clothing manufacturers frequently placed 
their largest orders with big eastern factories, giving midwest-
em mills like Flint only the specialty orders for small pieces of 
cloth later in the season, expecting them to be rushed through 
the factory ahead of other fabrics already in process. Therefore, 
Flint's new owners initiated a general policy of allowing no 
cancelations, threatening to take the offending party to court if 
necessary in order to collect damages, and of refusing to accept 
small orders from manufacturers who were not regular custom-
ers. Despite these and other minor changes, Flint found it 
difficult to compete. 
With only moderate success in selling to the ready-to-wear 
industry, Flint shifted production in 1904 to the manufacture of 
carriage cloth for sale to buggy factories in Indiana and Mich-
igan, and within five years the plant had completely converted to 
that purpose. Large orders for carriage cloth allowed important 
economies of scale, but in their eagerness to specialize, and 
perhaps as a result of their previous experiences in the garment 
trades, Flint's managers instituted a new policy on the settle-
ment of accounts which all but guaranteed the failure of the 
venture. Customers received no discounts for prompt payment 
of bills, and all carriage cloth was sold strictly on a "net" basis. 
"We allow no man a discount," an owner of the mill explained in 
response to an inquiry in 1909, furthermore, "we believe a 
manufacturer who will give discounts . . . is a coward."15 Be-
cause they could usually expect to receive a 3 percent discount 
from other factories, buggymakers went elsewhere. 
The new policy adopted on costing and prices added little to 
the prospects of success in the new line. After calculating net 
costs, and profits of 7 percent, Flint's managers added I percent 
to cover bad debts and incidental expenses. If raw wool prices 
I4. Ibid., February 6, I9oo, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
IS. Flint Woolen Mills to the General Committee of Woolen and 
Worsted Manufacturers, Flint, Michigan, May IS, I909, Stone-
Atwood Collection. 
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increased or declined, the price of carriage cloth to buggy 
manufacturers received a corresponding adjustment.16 By xgoo, 
however, Michigan sheep no longer provided fleece in adequate 
quantities or of suitable quality. Therefore, Flint was compelled 
to dispatch a buyer to Montana and Wyoming each spring to 
obtain raw material. To figure their costs, buggymakers insisted 
on signing contracts for the future delivery of fabrics at set 
prices, but since the price of wool in the western market might 
fluctuate widely from year to year, Flint normally refused to 
make quotations on carriage cloth until all the raw product had 
been purchased in the Far West.U This impasse usually resulted 
in the loss of customers for the mill. In I gog, Flint yielded and 
signed a few set-price contracts, but lost money because of a 
miscalculation on the amount of wool that would be required to 
fill them.18 
By the fall of 1909, Flint could no longer manufacture high-
quality carriage cloth at a price competitive with textile facto-
ries located in the East. Suffering from a decline in business, 
several eastern woolen mills had turned to the production of 
carriage cloth during slack periods in an effort to keep machin-
ery in operation and workers employed. "We are up against it 
pretty strong," wrote one of the Flint owners in October, be-
cause "they are willing to make carriage cloth for practically an 
exchange of dollars."19 To resolve the problem, Flint's managers 
considered reentering the garment trade, even going so far as to 
contact a few of their old customers, but this idea never reached 
fruition.20 
With Flint's machinery especially adapted to the manufac-
x6. Ibid. 
17. Flint Woolen Mills, Flint, Michigan, to Rex Buggy Company, 
June 27, xgo8, Noyes Carriage Company, July 14, xgo8, Mossman, 
Yarnelle and Company, May 27, xgog, and Henney Buggy Company, 
June 24, xgog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
18. Flint Woolen Mills toM. J. Smiley, Flint, Michigan, April 26, 
xgog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
Ig. Flint Woolen Mills to S. H. Curls, Flint, Michigan, October II, 
xgog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
20. Flint Woolen Mills to Collings-Taylor Company, Flint, Mich-
igan, October 13, xgog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
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ture of one type of fabric, thoughts of regaining a foothold in 
the ready-to-wear trade displayed a certain lack of appreciation 
for the expenses and problems involved in such a move. Yet, the 
absence of perception regarding another sector of the market, 
geographically very close to the mill, demonstrated an even 
greater lack of foresight on the part of Flint's owners. Although 
they had noted the growth of the automobile industry in Mich-
igan during the spring of 1909, the managers failed to perceive 
the future importance of the passenger car. In a letter to a 
friend in April, one of the owners seemed bewildered by the 
number of automobiles turned out every twenty-four hours, and 
further amazed at "where they go and how many people who 
buy automobiles and that cannot afford it."21 From June 
through August Igog, the company passed up several requests 
for automotive top lining, preferring instead to stock carriage 
cloth for buggies.22 Flint Woolen Mills closed in December of 
that year and the machinery was dismantled and sold. In Sep-
tember 191 I the city of Flint purchased the property for use as 
a community market.23 
The early development of the Appleton Mills in Wisconsin 
resembled that of other midwestern woolen factories. W. W. 
Hutchinson, a native of Nova Scotia, moved from Canada to 
Appleton in 1858, procured a water-power site on the Fox River, 
and sometime during the early I86os constructed a small 
woolen mill. This pioneer fum immediately offered custom-
carding services to local farmers and within a few years sup-
plied a host of rural merchants with coarse-quality cloth and 
yam. Hutchinson had sold his controlling interest in the mill by 
188I, the year a fire completely consumed the original building 
and all its machinery. A group of local investors, some of whom 
21. Flint Woolen Mills to M. J, Smiley, Flint, Michigan, April 26, 
xgog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
22. "It looks very much as if we will have to let the automobile 
top lining pass this season as we will be obligated to make a liberal 
stock of carriage cloth during the summer months." Flint Woolen 
Mills to Mossman, Yarnelle and Company, Flint, Michigan, June 4, 
xgog, Stone-Atwood Collection. 
23. TextileWorldRecord41 (Septemberxgxx): 734· 
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had migrated from New York to Wisconsin in the 187os, incor-
porated a new company, ordered equipment, and in the spring 
of 1882 Appleton Mills resumed production.24 
Apparently formulating a new strategy to increase sales in 
the Upper Midwest, Appleton's managers attempted to fill the 
void in the market created by the failure of other woolen mills 
in the region. This was the case in I8gi, for example, when the 
factory hired an additional salesman to pick up the old custom-
ers of the Vassar Woolen Mills in southern Michigan. During 
the early 18gos three full-time salesmen traveled through the 
small towns of Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, showing 
cloth samples to local storekeepers.25 In addition, Appleton also 
employed the Curtiss and Warren selling agency of Chicago to 
present their ·fabrics to ready-to-wear manufacturers in that 
city. Later in the decade, Appleton withdrew from the local 
market, released its salesmen, and sold exclusively through 
Elmer E. Rockwood, a dry goods commission merchant in Chi-
cago who also marketed cloth in the East and Middle West for 
the Columbiaville Woolen Mills of Michigan. Rockwood called 
on clothiers and tailors, displayed fabrics, advised the mill on 
production, and solicited orders.26 
Long before complete entrance into the garment trade, at 
least one manager at Appleton visualized the future importance 
of another midwestern business, which in time provided a 
growing market practically adjacent to the factory. Northern 
Wisconsin and Minnesota, and the Upper Michigan peninsula 
comprised one of the nation's leading papermaking regions, and 
Appleton's close proximity to firms in that industry offered 
distinct locational advantages to the company if subsidiary 
products needed by papermakers could be developed. For ap-
24. Appleton (Wis.) Post-Crescent, November 6, 1922; W. A. 
Goodspeed, History of Outagamie County, Wisconsin (Chicago, 
19II ), 1028; History of Northern Wisconsin (Chicago, 1881 ), 68o. 
25. Appleton Mills to Parker, Wilder and Company, Appleton, 
Wisconsin, April 18, 1891, in the Appleton Mills Collection, State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison. 
26. For examples, see correspondence from Elmer E. Rockwood 
to Appleton Mills during February 1909 in the Appleton Collection. 
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proximately ten years, F. J. Harwood, the plant superintendent 
and a major stockholder, along with a handful of workers and 
department foremen, periodically conducted experiments on the 
fabrication of the endless, woven felts used on papermaking 
machines.27 The manufacture of woolen felts required great 
technical skill, and although they had to meet exacting stan-
dards, no close substitutes existed for them. Therefore, Harwood 
realized that once Appleton could produce a high-quality felt the 
entire paper industry would open as a market. The mill invoiced 
its first felt in May 1890,28 but for several more years Harwood 
and his associates worked closely with papermakers in the Fox 
River Valley, such as the Atlas Paper Company, a subsidiary of 
Kimberly-Clark, in an attempt to eliminate the numerous prob-
lems involved in their manufacture.29 In July 1900, company 
salesmen reported that Appleton felts were finally established in 
the market and were capable of meeting all competitors, both in 
price and quality. Orders poured in. Appleton not only supplied 
paper mills in the Midwest, but quickly added felt customers 
located in Canada, the Middle Atlantic states, and New Eng-
land.30 
The flood of felt orders around 1900 seriously crowded the 
small plant and threatened to delay the production of fabrics 
for sale to the clothing industry. At a special meeting called in 
November 1902, the Appleton Board of Directors, acting on 
Harwood's recommendation, approved the acquisition of a 
woolen factory at Reedsburg, Wisconsin.81 The Reedsburg 
27. The technical requirements for the manufacture of paper· 
makers' felts can be found in Dard Hunter, Papermaking: A History 
and Technique of an Ancient Craft (New York, I947), I8I, 565. 
28. F. Harwood Orbison to Norman L. Crockett, Appleton, Wis-
consin, June 29, I967. 
29. Appleton Mills, Appleton, Wisconsin, to W. S. Bartholew, 
May II, I89I, and Kimberly-Clark, July IS, I90I, Appleton Collec-
tion. 
30. For specific examples, see correspondence between F. J. Har-
wood and F. M. Towne during December I900 and January I90I, in 
the Appleton Collection. 
3I. Minutes of the Board of Directors, Appleton Woolen Mills, 
November I3, I902, in the possession of the company, Appleton, 
Wisconsin. 
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Woolen Mill had been constructed in x88x, incorporated in 
I 8g2, and by the time of the Appleton purchase contained four 
sets of cards and thirty-two broadlooms. Appleton transferred 
the manufacture of all piece goods to the newly acquired plant 
in Reedsburg, and converted the mill from water power to 
electricity in xgiO. The company then contracted for an addi-
tion to the Appleton factory, ordering the necessary machinery 
to concentrate entirely on woven felts. 32 
In the sale of fabrics to the garment industry, fashion 
changes and order cancellations by no means constituted all the 
problems confronting Appleton Mills. In early xgog, Elmer 
Rockwood, the firm's representative in the East, impressed upon 
Harwood the necessity of altering the mill's production and 
marketing schedules. Rockwood argued that in the past Apple-
ton had made up and shown too many samples too early in the 
season. Thus, by the time clothiers were ready to place orders 
with textile factories most had tired of Appleton designs. 
Wholesaling goods affected by fashion involved a high degree of 
risk, and few garment makers were willing to commit them-
selves to large cloth contracts far in advance of sales to their 
customers. The mill, therefore, would benefit by displaying a 
smaller variety of samples later in each season, allowing cloth-
ing manufacturers time to survey the market, and thereby 
enabling them to predict more accurately which combinations 
of fabrics and styles would produce the largest profits.83 
Rockwood also counseled the mill on the need to consider 
another factor in the market which placed definite limits on 
manufacturing costs. For years, clothing retailers had clung to 
an irrational faith in rigid price brackets, and the influence of 
this unique phenomenon could be felt by all businesses serving 
the garment industry. If the price of a textile fabric exceeded 
some point, for example $x.oo per yard, most retailers assumed 
that there was no price short of the next bracket, perhaps $x.og 
32. Reedsburg (Wis.) Times Press, February 25, I954· 
33· Elmer E. Rockwood to F. J, Harwood, Chicago, February 23, 
Igog, Appleton Collection. 
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per yard, for which it could be sold. 34 Since the entire industry 
seemed to share the belief in a discontinuous demand curve, 
mills were compelled to try to produce quality material at a 
reasonable profit, yet capable of competing in a particular price 
range. For the 1909 spring season, Rockwood advised Appleton 
to price its goods as close as possible to $I.oo, $I.Io, and 
$1.121/2 to $1.15.35 
At first, F. J. Harwood was undoubtedly shocked when his 
selling agent informed him that Appleton textiles were «too 
good." Rockwood went on to explain, however, that for the 
price, Appleton cloth represented the best buy in the trade, but 
other factories were offering lower grade, less-expensive goods 
which appeared to be of identical quality. Garment makers 
appreciated craftsmanship, but refused to pay an additional 
seven to ten cents per yard to obtain it because the average 
consumer of clothing proved incapable of distinguishing be-
tween subtle degrees of quality. Therefore, if the mill wished to 
remain in the market, manufacturing costs had to be reduced in 
order to bring Appleton prices more in line with those of com-
petitors. As a second possibility, Rockwood recommended that 
the boss finisher be apprised of the situation and then urged to 
concentrate more of his efforts and skill on finishing cheaper 
material to enhance its surface appearance. «The fabrics that I 
want," wrote Rockwood in February Igog, «are the ones that 
look as good, even if they are not quite so good."36 
Revenue received from the sale of papermakers' felts helped 
in part to sustain Appleton while the mill at Reedsburg sought 
an entree into the eastern clothing market. The demands of 
clothiers for postdated billing forced textile factories to carry 
customers for sixty to ninety days, sometimes longer, or to 
34· Committee on Textile Price Research, Bureau of Economic 
Research, Textile Markets: Their Structure in Relation to Price Re-
search (New York, 1939), 172. Since marginal mills cannot normally 
compete in these brackets, most are compelled to concentrate on 
«fancy'' goods for special orders. 
35· Elmer E. Rockwood to F. J. Harwood, Chicago, February 25, 
1909, Appleton Collection. 
36. Ibid. 
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liquidate the accounts receivable by selling them to a factor, 
who assumed the credit risk on such sales and advanced cash to 
cloth manufacturers. For these services, factors normally col-
lected a fee amounting to 6 percent of the net sales.87 In most 
industries factoring was considered a sign of weakness, but in 
woolen textiles it became an essential part of the financial 
operation of a small mill, and even the very largest concerns 
often found it to their interests to factor accounts. Felt profits 
failed to liberate Appleton from factoring, but they provided 
operating capital which carried the company through critical 
years, such as Igo6 and Igo8, when the Reedsburg operation 
lost money. Later, reinvestment of earnings in the plant at 
Reedsburg tended to keep it competitive. 58 
The policies adopted by the managers of Appleton, Faribault, 
Flint, and Watkins illustrated a few of the possibilities open to 
other mills in the Midwest during the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century. An overwhelming majority of the region's 
woolen factories ceased production after 18go, and in this 
respect Appleton and Faribault were unique. However, the 
problems faced by these two mills, Flint's inability to com-
pete, and the Watkins's attempts to move farther west ex-
emplified some of the frustrations experienced by other mill-
owners. With Appleton as a possible exception, managers 
failed to formulate long-range strategies, instead reacting to 
alterations in the national market only when confronted with 
the unavoidable realization that past methods of operation were 
doomed to failure. And, of course, each delay in recognizing the 
obvious, and in planning for the future, sharply reduced the 
number of realistic alternatives open to the firm. Thus, the 
perception of managers at any given time relative to current 
37· Prior to the 189os, some commission houses and selling agents 
offered this service, but by the turn of the century a few banks had 
opened credit departments and started the purchase of "receivables." 
See Albert 0. Greef, The Commercial Paper House in the United 
States (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), 104-105, and Owen T. Jones, 
"Factoring," Harvard Business Review 14 (Winter 1936): 186--99. 
38. Corporate Minutes, Appleton Mills, in the possession of the 
company, Appleton, Wisconsin, and F. Harwood Orbison to Norman 
L. Crockett, Appleton, Wisconsin, September 9, 1965. 
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changes in the regional environment, and forecasts of how 
those variations might affect company prosperity, constituted 
an important factor in determining later success or failure. 
Lack of perception in anticipating change proved fatal in most 
cases.39 
Flint's conversion from apparel fabrics to carriage cloth 
showed foresight. However, a lack of managerial ability and the 
failure to recognize how quickly the automobile would replace 
the horse and buggy quickly nullified most of the benefits 
arising from the transition. In retrospect, Flint's proximity to 
Detroit probably offered locational advantages equal to those of 
Appleton Mills and the western paper industry. It remains a 
mystery whether F. J, Harwood of Appleton developed the idea 
of producing endless, woven felts or if a Wisconsin papermaker 
first suggested it to him. Nevertheless, his determination to 
perfect their manufacture indicated he was convinced of their 
potentialities long before Appleton could successfully compete 
in the felt market. Harwood's diligence resulted in handsome 
profits and perhaps even the survival of the company. At Fari-
bault, the shift from cloth to clothing and finally to blankets 
corresponded closely to the entrance of young blood into the 
firm during the 18gos and again in 1912. The need to exper-
iment and innovate, recognized by the young managers at Fari-
bault, along with the willingness of the older generation in the 
family dominated company to accept change, injected new life 
into the mill at important junctures in its development. Special-
ization on all-wool blankets, which began around 1goo and was 
nearly complete by 1914, placed the firm in a favorable position 
to seek and obtain government contracts from the army, but 
company records clearly indicate that Faribault was already 
well on the way to gaining a niche in the market for blankets 
before the advent of World War I. Conceivably, the Watkins 
brothers might have been attempting to realize some money 
39· Of course, a few millowners in the Midwest may have antic-
ipated the changes in the region's economy, but because of age, 
lack of capital, or the unwillingness to invest it, merely decided to 
continue production until profit margins no longer justified operation. 
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from the woolen mill by moving their old machinery west and 
selling it to a group of investors there. After reading the corre-
spondence, however, it seems more plausible that the rural 
location of the factory and the brothers' deep involvement in 
farming and livestock-trading clouded their vision as to the real-
ities of the situation. Namely, that the small, integrated woolen 
mill attempting to manufacture a complete line of coarse- and 
medium-quality cloth and serve a local market, symbolized a 
manufacturing unit of the past. Although some regions of the 
country still remained relatively isolated as late as 1900, the 
possibility of a profitable operation of these mills was 
vanishing. 
The 113 small mills composing the midwestern woolen indus-
try in 1909 shared a number of common problems, a few of 
which stemmed from their regional location. In an effort to 
discuss issues of mutual interest, representatives from eleven 
factories in the Midwest gathered in Chicago during July of that 
year, and the delegates organized the Western Woolen Man-
ufacturers Association. Millowners from Indiana and Wisconsin 
dominated the original membership roster, which also listed 
executives from firms located in Michigan, Minnesota, and 
Missouri.40 The new trade association almost immediately fo-
cused its attention on two major questions: the establishment 
of a uniform policy on the prepayment of freight which would 
place midwestern manufacturers on an equal basis with eastern 
textile mills, and an investigation of the prices charged by 
supply houses for frequently used dye goods. 
Long before the Chicago meeting, midwestern woolen men 
40. "Members of the Western Woolen Manufacturers Association," 
in the Appleton Collection. Contact and cooperation between the 
midwestern group and the National Association of Wool Manufac-
turers appears to have been negligible. Because of its dominance by 
carpet and worsted producers and its preoccupation with the tariff 
on imported wool, the NA WM no doubt offered little of interest to 
millowners in the Midwest. In 1871, for example, when the mid-
western industry was near its peak, only a handful of wool man-
ufacturers from the region were listed among the NA WM directors. 
See National Association of Wool Manufacturers, Bulletin 2 (Octo-
ber 1871): 553· 
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had complained that suppliers of soaps and dyes charged sev-
eral different prices for the same item. To alleviate such dis-
crimination and hoping to document their suspicions, WWMA 
members submitted old invoices of purchases from dye houses 
to a select committee for comparison and study.H The second 
problem proved more complex. Midwestern mills selling cloth in 
the Chicago market sought equality with eastern firms in regard 
to handling the payment of shipping costs. Chicago garment 
makers refused to pay the freight on fabrics shipped from 
midwestern factories until the account for such goods was 
settled. Since most accounts ran for at least sixty days, mills in 
the Midwest were burdened with the necessity of a cash outlay 
for the prepayment of transportation charges in addition to the 
normal extension of credit. On the other hand, eastern textile 
factories coerced clothing manufacturers in Chicago into pay-
ing all freight on delivery. Midwestern mills demanded the 
same privilege. Although several millowners seemed enthusias-
tic in the beginning, membership in the Western Woolen Man-
ufacturers Association dwindled, meetings often lacked a quo-
rum, and the organization apparently disbanded in 1914 before 
taking positive action on either problem.42 
Beginning in 1873, the wholesale price index in the United 
States began a general downward trend lasting for approx-
imately twenty-five years. All American manufacturers struggled 
with the decline, but the price of textiles, and especially woolen 
textiles, fell at a faster rate than most commodity groups. 
Moreover, increased competition from other fibers, such as cot-
ton, and improved methods of reconstituting woolen rags into 
shoddy sharply reduced American per capita consumption of 
41. F. J. Harwood to Davenport Woolen Mills, Appleton, Wis-
consin, April 18, Igio, Appleton Collection. 
42. F. J. Harwood to the Members of the Western Woolen Man-
ufacturers Association, Appleton, Wisconsin, November 4, 1910, Ap-
pleton Collection. The minutes of the WWMA, in the Appleton Collec-
tion, gave no indication for the decline in interest among its 
members. By Igio, however, most mills in the Midwest had spe-
cialized, and it seems plausible that the number of problems common 
to all firms were not sufficient to encourage close cooperation. 
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wool after I8go.43 Although the American woolen industry expe-
rienced few important combinations, over 350 woolen factories 
in New England and the Middle Atlantic states vanished from 
the census rolls between I88o and 1900.44 Thus, while man-
ufacturers in the Midwest sought to compete with eastern textile 
mills, market pressures were eliminating less efficient firms 
throughout the country. The unhealthy state of the industry on 
the national level merely compounded the problems plaguing 
midwestern millowners and further helps to explain the nearly 
complete disappearance of these factories in one generation. 
In 1870, the 881 woolen mills scattered throughout the eight 
states of the Middle West represented a combined capital in-
vestment of $14,604,372. However, these tiny factories consti-
tuted only 36 percent of all such establishments in the United 
States, and their capital investment comprised less than IO 
percent of the industry total.45 Despite their meager size, limited 
market, and the ephemeral nature of their existence, midwest-
ern woolen mills accelerated the region's growth and develop-
ment. 
When measured in terms of capital investment, value of final 
output, and similar indexes, the woolen mills of the Midwest 
remained small in comparison to factories located along the 
Atlantic seaboard. To an eastern observer in the I 87os, produc-
tion methods employed by a tiny midwestern firm would un-
doubtedly have seemed crude and inefficient. However, the 
character and size of the local market, along with the costs of 
43· Norman S. B. Gras and Henrietta M. Larson, Casebook in 
American Business History (New York, 1939), 707; Chester W. 
Wright, Wool-Growing and the Tariff (Cambridge, Mass., 1910), 
295-97· 
44· U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census 
of Manufactures: 1905, Textiles, Bulletin 74, 130-36. Only one im-
portant combination existed in the industry. The American Woolen 
Company, organized in 1899, combined twenty-six woolen and 
worsted mills in the Northeast. In 1923 the corporation controlled 
:fifty-nine factories in eight states. See Arthur Harrison Cole, "A 
Neglected Chapter in the History of Combinations: The American 
Wool Manufacture," Quarterly Journal of Economics 37 (May 1923): 
439· 
45· Census of Manufactures: 1905, Textiles, 130-36. 
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inputs and many other factors, determined economic efficiency. 
Manufacturing techniques utilized by a factory located in Mas-
sachusetts which sold fabrics in Boston might have resulted in 
failure if copied by a smaller mill in southern Iowa marketing 
finished cloth to farmers within fifty miles of the plant. Varia-
tions in transportation facilities, labor supplies, the depth of the 
market, and other considerations prompted millowners to apply 
a level of technology appropriate to a particular region or local-
ity. The continued purchase and operation of obsolete machines 
in the Midwest long after the advent of improved equipment 
represented a case in point. 
Directly, woolen mills and other types of residentiary man-
ufacturing contributed little to the short-run economic develop-
ment of the Middle West. Selling locally, and depending upon 
an abundant resource close to the factory, each firm merely 
floated on the prosperity of a small agricultural area:. Since their 
marketing advantage rested almost entirely upon the ability to 
remain isolated from competitors, few manufacturers exhibited 
enthusiasm for the promotion of internal improvements which 
might encourage interregional trade. Moreover, the very nature 
of these enterprises prevented them from generating a signifi-
cant number of backward or forward linkages leading to the 
formation and growth of subsidiary industries within the re-
gion. For example, rather than constructing plants in the Mid-
west, eastern textile machine builders sold new equipment 
through branch outlets in the region or consigned machinery to 
independent dealers there. 
Indirectly, and over a period of time, regions derived benefits 
from the presence of a large number of these small residentiary 
factories. Perhaps their most important single contribution re-
sulted from the simple production of goods for sale to people 
residing in relatively isolated areas. During the initial years of 
settlement the combination of high transportation costs and 
poor country roads excluded eastern manufactures from some 
portions of the midwestern market. The very existence of local 
factories and their ability to compete with finished commodities 
shipped into the region clearly indicated that goods manufac-
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tured in the Midwest were less expensive than those being 
imported from the outside. In addition, the custom services 
provided by most local concerns freed rural families from self-
sufficiency, thereby allowing them to concentrate more of their 
labor on other pursuits, such as the production of staple crops. 
Pioneer manufacturers also influenced the utilization and 
movement of capital and labor. Several eastern businessmen, 
possessing funds accumulated from other enterprises, were at-
tracted to the Midwest by the possibilities of profitable invest-
ments in small woolen plants. To be sure, no single millowner 
commanded a large supply of capital, but the number of such 
people who were willing to migrate westward with their hold-
ings constituted a substantial flow of funds into the region. 
More in the realm of speculation, it is possible that some of the 
money scraped together by manufacturers through small loans 
from family members and close friends would not have been 
employed in any other type of productive investment in the 
absence of these firms. This situation, observable in several 
developing nations, arises from the willingness of people to 
make sacrifices by foregoing current consumption in order to 
loan money to relatives. 46 As previously indicated, the low 
wages offered by most millowners in the Midwest prevented 
them from attracting skilled workers from the East. In 1870, 
however, the midwestern woolen industry provided at least 
part-time employment for approximately ten thousand people. 
And in many cases, jobs in pioneer mills supplemented rural 
incomes. For many persons toiling in midwestern factories 
these jobs were their first introduction to the routine of an 
organized industrial discipline. Thus, woolen mills and other 
types of residentiary manufacturing helped in part to break 
down the habits and mores of an agricultural society, and to 
prepare its citizens for more experienced participation in the 
full industrialization that soon occurred in the Midwest. 
In their day, pioneer woolen mills served their surrounding 
territory well. Rural communities that were plagued with slow, 
46. Eugene Staley, Small Industry Development (Menlo Park, 
Calif., 1958), 13. 
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costly, and unreliable transportation found the wool fabrics and 
yarn produced by such firms more to their liking than home-
spun cloth. By accepting farm produce in exchange for custom 
services and fabrics, extending credit to merchants, and provid-
ing farmers with a convenient local market, such mills eased the 
scarcity of money in isolated areas. Sales methods and quests 
for capital speeded the growth of a mature credit and marketing 
system in the region. Yet, like other residentiary concerns, the 
tiny woolen mills of the Midwest fell victim to the very eco-
nomic progress they had helped to create. 
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